

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

**SQUARE-DANCING INTO THE FUTURE:
THE U.S. MILITARY/NGO RELATIONSHIP AND THE
CMOC IN TIMES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION[®]**

by

Chris Seiple

December, 1995

Thesis Advisor:

Daniel Moran

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19960307 022

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE *December 1995.		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE *SQUARE-DANCING INTO THE FUTURE: THE U.S. MILITARY/NGO RELATIONSHIP AND THE CMOC IN TIMES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ^o			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) *Chris Seiple				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) * This thesis focuses on the U.S. military/Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) relationship in times of humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it examines the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), or the variant thereof, and its ability to facilitate collaboration and coordination between the two communities. Accordingly, this work examines the relationship in the following four case studies: 1) <i>Operation Provide Comfort</i> (southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, April 1991); 2) <i>Operation Sea Angel</i> (Bangladesh, May 1991); 3) <i>Operation Restore Hope</i> (Somalia, December 1992); and 4) <i>Operation Restore Hope</i> (Rwanda, July 1994). While no case is exactly the same, conceptual themes have emerged. Humanitarian intervention is a political process. There is a continuum of effort. Each community should generally operate according to its comparative advantage. The principle of altruistic self-interest governs the relationship: it must be mutually beneficial in order to succeed. The successful CMOC is not so much a designated spot as much as it is a function of personnel living and working together. It is the military's only institutional means to provide feedback on whether or not the humanitarian mandate is being met. During humanitarian interventions, it should be the focus of the military's effort. Ultimately, it is through the CMOC that the military has the best change to craft its own exit strategy.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS *HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; CMOC; NGO; OOTW/MOOTW			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 332	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

D220 QUALITY INSPECTED 1

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**SQUARE-DANCING INTO THE FUTURE:
THE U.S. MILITARY/NGO RELATIONSHIP AND THE CMOC IN TIMES
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION¹⁰**

Chris Seiple
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.A., Stanford University, 1990

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 1995

Author:




Chris Seiple


Approved by:



Daniel Moran, Thesis Advisor



Bert Patenaude, Second Reader



Dr. Frank Teti, Chairman

Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the U.S. military/Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) relationship in times of humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it examines the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), or the variant thereof, and its ability to facilitate collaboration and coordination between the two communities. Accordingly, this work examines the relationship in the following four case studies: 1) *Operation Provide Comfort* (southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, April 1991); 2) *Operation Sea Angel* (Bangladesh, May 1991); 3) *Operation Restore Hope* (Somalia, December 1992); and 4) *Operation Restore Hope* (Rwanda, July 1994).

While no case is exactly the same, conceptual themes have emerged. Humanitarian intervention is a political process. There is a continuum of effort. Each community should generally operate according to its comparative advantage. The principle of altruistic self-interest governs the relationship: it must be mutually beneficial in order to succeed.

The successful CMOC is not so much a designated spot as much as it is a function of personnel living and working together. It is the military's only institutional means to provide feedback on whether or not the humanitarian mandate is being met. During humanitarian interventions, it should be the focus of the military's effort. Ultimately, it is through the CMOC that the military has the best change to craft its own exit strategy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. INTRODUCTION	1
B. PURPOSE	2
C. APPROACH	3
D. CONTRIBUTIONS	4
E. APPROACHING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE NGO/U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP	7
F. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT	8
G. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION	11
H. THE OPERATORS	13
I. THE MOMENT	14
J. THE PRINCIPLES OF ALTRUISTIC SELF-INTEREST AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	15
K. RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY	17
L. THE CONTINUUM	21
II. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT	29
A. INTRODUCTION	29
B. POLITICAL CONTEXT	33
C. EMERGENCY SITUATION	35
D. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: THE NATURE OF COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN RELIEF	37
E. MISSION	39

F.	RESPONSE STRUCTURE	40
G.	OFDA: EMPOWERED TO FIND THE "HOW"	43
H.	CUNY'S STRATEGY	46
I.	NGO/U.S. MILITARY COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION	50
J.	IN THE MOUNTAIN CAMPS	51
K.	DIYARBAKIR	57
L.	TRANSITION TO ZAKHO	62
M.	ZAKHO TOWN	65
N.	THE NCCNI	66
O.	THE CAMP	68
P.	THE MEETING	69
Q.	CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS	72
R.	THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT	72
S.	STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS	79
T.	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS	80
U.	TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS	85
V.	OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT COORDINATION PRINCIPLES	90
III.	OPERATION SEA ANGEL	93
A.	INTRODUCTION	93
B.	THE POLITICAL CONTEXT	96
C.	THE EMERGENCY CONTEXT	103

D.	THE BANGLADESHI RESPONSE STRUCTURE	106
E.	THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENT	108
F.	MISSION	109
G.	THE ART OF MAKING COMMON SENSE OUT OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING	110
H.	NGO/U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS	115
I.	NGO/US MILITARY COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION	117
1.	Dhaka	117
2.	Chittagong	124
3.	The Meeting	125
J.	CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT	130
K.	STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS	133
L.	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS	135
M.	TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS	137
N.	OPERATION SEA ANGEL COORDINATION PRINCIPLES	141
IV.	OPERATION RESTORE HOPE	145
A.	INTRODUCTION	145
B.	THE POLITICAL CONTEXT	149
C.	THE EMERGENCY SITUATION	153
D.	THE MISSION	155
E.	PROVIDE RELIEF, NGOS, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS	160

F.	NGOS	162
G.	CIVIL AFFAIRS	164
H.	RESPONSE STRUCTURE	164
I.	THE MEETING	168
J.	PROBLEMS	172
K.	CULTURAL CHASM: THE TYRANNY OF A TEN-MINUTE DRIVE	174
L.	SECURITY (AND DISARMAMENT)	181
M.	DISARMAMENT	185
N.	HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY?	190
O.	CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS	195
P.	THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT	196
Q.	STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS	199
R.	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS	205
S.	TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS	206
T.	OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES	208
V.	OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE	211
A.	INTRODUCTION	211
B.	THE POLITICAL CONTEXT	215
C.	THE EMERGENCY SITUATION	218
D.	COMMON UNDERSTANDING	219
E.	THE MISSION	222

F.	THE RESPONSE STRUCTURE	223
G.	THE U.S. INTERFACE	224
H.	CMOC ENTEBBE	225
I.	CMOC GOMA	233
J.	CMOC KIGALI	236
K.	THE NGOS AND THE NGO LIAISON	243
L.	THE OTHER MILITARY	246
M.	ARTIFICIAL SEPARATIONS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT	248
N.	PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS	250
O.	STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS	254
P.	OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (PURELY HUMANITARIAN)	254
Q.	TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS	258
R.	OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES	258
VI.	CONCLUSIONS	261
A.	INTRODUCTION	261
B.	STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS	261
1.	The Political	262
2.	Presidential Leadership	267
3.	The National Interest and Happenstance	269
4.	The Role of the United Nations	270
5.	Stateside NGO/Military Coordination	271

C.	OPERATIONAL OBSERVATIONS	272
1.	The Continuum	272
2.	Continuum Roles	276
D.	TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS	278
E.	MAKING IT BETTER	280
F.	WHERE TO?	281
	LIST OF REFERENCES	283
	DISTRIBUTION LIST	295

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis explores the nature of the relationship between American Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the American military during times of humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it uses the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) as the vehicle of analysis to examine the process of collaboration and coordination between the two communities. Importantly, this work considers the political context, the emergency situation, and the various international and indigenous players that shape the NGO/military relationship.

The following four case studies are presented: 1) *Operation Provide Comfort* (southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, April, 1991); 2) *Operation Sea Angel* (Bangladesh, May, 1991); 3) *Operation Restore Hope* (Somalia, December, 1992); and 4) *Operation Support Hope* (Rwanda, July, 1994). While each case is different and never to be repeated again, some common conceptual themes emerge. First, humanitarian intervention is a political process. Paradoxically, success only takes place when this fact is acknowledged by keeping the humanitarian intent primary. Once military or political concerns dominate, confusion, if not failure, comes quick. In a humanitarian intervention, the political and military tasks are implicit within the humanitarian intent. Second, there is a continuum of effort that takes place. Usually, the military with its logistics, infrastructure, and security is better in the beginning of a crisis while the NGOs with its humanitarian expertise, cultural awareness, and sustained

commitment are better once the emergency has been stabilized. Consequently, the relationship tends to be based on the principle of altruistic self-interest. Each offers the other the services of their comparative advantage in an exchange that is mutually beneficial. The reward is that NGO has access to means far beyond their budget while the military quickens stabilization in a process that it cannot inherently address. The end result is that the military goes home quicker, leaving the humanitarians to their professional calling.

The CMOC is the fulcrum of this relationship. It is not so much a designated place as it is a function of personnel. It is most successful when: 1) its participants are aware of the local political impact and strategic accumulation of their actions; and 2) their forum has been isolated from the "politics" of the situation at hand. In northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and Rwanda, for different reasons, the CMOC, or its equivalent, was isolated from the politics of the situation. This isolation did not take place in Somalia, however, as the CMOC became many things to many people, eventually handling humanitarian coordination and local policy issues.

Furthermore, all the case studies indicate that the CMOC is most successful when the military and NGOs sit at the same table, making decisions jointly. The more surveyors of "reality," the more a certain and accepted truth emerges. Moreover, once exposed to each other on a consistent basis, there is less room for institutional stereotype.

If these are the traits of the context and the relationship, one further point must be made. In a humanitarian intervention, the CMOC must be the

focus of the military's effort. The CMOC is the military's only institutional means of registering whether or not the humanitarian mandate is being met. It is through the CMOC that the military has the best chance to craft its own exit strategy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I thank Gordon McCormick, Jennifer Duncan, and Roman Laba, without whom I never would have attended the Naval Postgraduate School. Second, I would like to thank the SO/LIC program, Dana Eyre, Paul Stockton, James Blandon, the Army Peacekeeping Institute, and the United States Institute of Peace for their encouragement and support of my research trips. I would also like to thank Bert Patenaude, who has proven to be a good friend as well. Additionally, I would also like to thank Brenda Whyte and Shawn Tribe who were more than gracious in their administrative support.

A very special thank you goes out to all those whom I interviewed. Thank you for your patience, understanding, interest, time, connections, and materials sent. I am deeply indebted. I am particularly indebted to Lauren Landis-Guzman and Elizabeth Lukasavich who introduced me to the humanitarian community. Moreover, I am forever grateful to the following folks, in chronological order, for their invaluable comments and criticisms of various parts of this work: Robin Needham, Dr. Mary Kilgour, Dayton Maxwell, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret), Kevin Kennedy, Lauren Landis-Guzman, Robert MacPherson, Anita Menghetti, Dr. Les Roberts, Dr. Michael Toole, and Margaret Ann and Robert A. Seiple.

Finally, I thank Professor Daniel Moran. His integrity, concern, and professionalism shine bright.

But you all have to move in a square-dance.

Anita Menghetti¹

¹ Interview with Anita Menghetti, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, August 7, 1995.

I. INTRODUCTION

"No one serving as a soldier gets involved in civilian affairs -- he wants to please his commanding officer."

Paul; 2nd Timothy 2:4

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the American military has been increasingly employed in engagements where traditional national security criteria have been loosely adhered to or largely ignored. A quick perusal of recent operational titles suggest the humanitarian nature of these efforts: "Provide Comfort" (northern Iraq); "Sea Angel" (Bangladesh); "Restore Hope" (Somalia); and "Support Hope" (Rwanda). These emergency situations have been so overpowering -- characterized as sudden, overwhelming, with the near, or actual catastrophic loss of life -- that the traditional humanitarian response from the international civilian community is not enough. As a result, the American military -- according to its ability to provide logistics, infrastructure, and security -- has been called upon to enable the relief effort.

It is within this setting that NGOs and the American military have had to work together towards a common goal. It is not a natural relationship. The former are used to autonomy and operating according to their own charters and

core values. The latter is an instrument of a national polity and follows its orders. Yet the two have worked together, and mostly with great success.

Irrespective of personal opinions, past definitions, or formerly agreed upon boundaries, the interaction between the NGO community and the military will take place. In fact, contrary to St. Paul's advice to Timothy, the soldier will do well to get "involved in civilian affairs." While the lamb is not yet lying with the lion, each is beginning to recognize the other's intrinsic value during these humanitarian emergencies; indeed, they need each other.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the operational interface between American non-governmental organizations² (NGOs) and the United States military during humanitarian interventions. The thesis focuses on the infrastructure that is established or utilized to collaborate and coordinate with the NGO community during the first thirty to sixty days of a humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it analyzes the use of the Civil-Military Operations Center, or the variant thereof, and its effectiveness as a mechanism for facilitating collaboration and coordination between the NGO community and the U.S. military.

²NGOs refers to any non-governmental organization that is involved in humanitarian work. It does not include International Organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It does include private voluntary organizations (PVOs), an American term for what the rest of the world calls NGOs. The thesis avoids the term humanitarian relief organizations (HROs), because it is inclusive of IOs and does not necessarily incorporate NGOs who (also) focus on development or human rights.

C. APPROACH

This thesis will comparatively analyze the NGO/military interface through the following four cases studies:

1. *Operation Provide Comfort* (northern Iraq, April, 1991);
2. *Operation Sea Angel* (Bangladesh, May, 1991);
3. *Operation Restore Hope* (Somalia, December, 1992); and
4. *Operation Support Hope* (Rwanda, July, 1994).

Using historical analysis as its primary methodology, the thesis will focus on the CMOC as the last point of coordination before the implementation of the humanitarian response.

For the purposes of this work, each of the case studies is defined as a humanitarian intervention. While a uniform definition does not yet exist, all share a single, essential element: the presence of near-term or actual catastrophic loss of life within an uncertain threat environment. This prospect is so great that the local and international humanitarian response community cannot handle the situation by themselves. In other words, American military intervention -- *vis-à-vis* its logistics, infrastructure, and security capabilities -- is absolutely needed to enable the relief effort.³

³ These humanitarian interventions are often the result of a pre-existing complex humanitarian emergency. While debate surrounds the precise definition of this term, it can be reduced to the following: 1) multiple causation (i.e. economic failure, drought, etc. and usually conflict); and 2) a significant increase in population mortality. (This basic definition courtesy of Dr. Michael Toole, October 23, 1995 correspondence with author). With the exception of the Bangladesh case, each of the case studies meets this basic criteria. As a result, complex humanitarian emergency and humanitarian intervention are used interchangeably in the other three studies.

How this intervention unfolds is completely dependent upon the uncertain threat within the fluid political and emergency context of the day. Importantly, the term "threat" is not always related to security. "Threat" refers to impediments, natural or man-made, to stabilization and/or resolution. Threat may be defined as an impending cholera or measles epidemic; armed belligerents; or the creation of a dependency mindset among the aid recipients.

It should also be recognized that this analysis is rather U.S.-centric. In fact, more attention might have been paid to the United Nations, other international organizations, other NGOs, the proper medicinal and technical approach, cost-effectiveness, and the critical role of the people being helped. Nonetheless, it has seemed reasonable to focus on the ideas and actions of U.S. participants -- U.S. government, military, and NGOs -- because the collaboration and coordination among them, although much improved, still needs considerable work. We must first understand ourselves and our proper role before examining other factors. As a result, this work is most decidedly a 1995 snapshot into the ever-evolving problem of complex humanitarian emergencies and the role of NGO/military coordination therein.

D. CONTRIBUTIONS

This thesis intends to make three contributions to the U.S. military and the humanitarian response community. Its greatest contribution may be that it presents the four major humanitarian interventions next to each other. At a

minimum, such straight-forward juxtaposition should allow all parties, no matter their expertise or experience, to take something away from the narrative.

Each case study can be viewed as an independent element with its own lessons, which may serve as a reference point for a similar emergency in the future. While overarching themes are developed, the case studies are presented in their own terms, with their own unique characteristics. Such a process encourages the reader to develop his/her own opinion about events as they "get their arms around" this complex subject.

The second contribution is to develop a greater awareness of how interaction between NGOs and the military actually takes place. In an age of coordination conferences, emerging humanitarian-speak, and peacekeeping as a growth industry, acronyms and wire-diagrams are pristinely proselytized without, please excuse the expression, the smell of gunsmoke. Terms like Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and CMOC can come to dominate a discussion without an appreciation for how the process actually unfolds on the ground during the crisis itself. This paper makes an effort to describe and understand the daily dynamics of interaction. How is collaboration, consensus, and coordination achieved in this type of environment?

The thesis consequently focuses, to a large degree, on the development of some principles of coordination between the two communities. It is written, as far as possible, from the point of view of those who operate at ground level, where, no matter the official positions of governments or organizations, a working policy is usually created out of nothing.

Finally, this thesis seeks to examine the armed forces/NGOs relationship within the ever-evolving concept of national security. Today, national security is many things to many people. To some it is simply the age-old criteria of nation survival and traditional vital interests. To others, it embodies trans-national issues such as health, environment, narcotics, and refugees. Depending on one's definition of national security, expectations as to the respective roles of the military and the NGO necessarily vary. Ultimately, this relationship and its analysis reflects how one understands national security in a transitory age.

To reduce the relationship between the military and the NGOs to purely bilateral terms -- focusing solely on its operational aspects while ignoring the intrinsic interaction of other participants as well as the influence of the political and emergency context -- is to render the analysis artificial. Without grappling with the larger influences that shape and manifest themselves in the NGO/military relationship, failure, with all its implications, will loom large for both the relationship and the national security.

Such an awareness ultimately challenges both communities in their shared tradition of claimed apoliticalness. In an age of trespassed boundaries where traditional parameters and definitions must be re-examined or completely discarded in preparation for a new era, tough questions must be asked. This thesis contends that the emerging U.S. military/NGO relationship is not some happenstance of a transitory time. Rather, it is a fundamental trait of a completely new era.

E. APPROACHING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE NGO/U.S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Understanding the relationship between NGOs and the American military requires an understanding of the complex dynamics at work. The case studies first reveal that the parameters of the NGO/military relationship are most definitely formed by the political context of a humanitarian intervention as well as by the conditions of the emergency situation. This relationship is further delineated by the participants, according to the shared moment itself. Moreover, there are basic principles that govern the relationship.

Additionally, this relationship is a fundamental trait of a new era. Consequently, the old mindsets of each community are rarely appropriate, making the conceptual framework with which one addresses each complex humanitarian emergency that much more important. The NGOs, for example, must comprehend the crying need for a comprehensive and integrated response, sometimes subjugating their charter for the good of the overall effort. On the other hand, a linear military mindset is also generally inapplicable. With no two crises exactly the same, the only way to address any given situation is to use a conceptual checklist as a reference point, being fully prepared to throw it away if it does not work. Humanitarian intervention is not a matter of "x" amount of input, for "y" amount of days, to achieve the definable and finite "z."

In both cases, it is best to think of these situations within the conceptual context of a protracted game of multi-dimensional chess. Every chess piece has

its contribution to make, primary for a time, yet yielding appropriately to the other integral components within a continuum of effort.

F. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Coming to grips with which chess piece to play within the proper dimension first requires us to grasp the political context of the situation. "Political," in this sense, refers to the dynamics of the domestic (both in the U.S. and in the intervened state), international, and host region players. There is a political dynamic and effect within every dimension of an effort that falls under the deceptively simple rubric of "humanitarianism."

The decision to intervene is extremely political. There are short and long term domestic ramifications for the President and his administration. Building international support for such an effort involves sustained political will and a willingness to make trade-offs. Implicitly, such actions involve national prestige.

Once assigned, the military's mission reflects its political mandate. The deployment of a foreign force to a region/state/former state is inherently political since its presence demonstrates that there is something which the affected state cannot, or will not, do for its own people. The presence of forces is political: they cannot help but affect the daily life and political course of a country. These forces also -- no matter how limited the mission -- also represent a chance for significant change in the condition of a country. The expectations of an afflicted people make for potentially divisive tensions once the situation stabilizes or, may prohibit stabilization.

Aid itself is political.⁴ It is not always the good and right answer; aid can even exacerbate an existing crisis. In Somalia, the most complex of emergencies, food itself became the currency of political power. He who controlled the food controlled everything else. Even the distribution of food is an arena of "city politics." Who gets what and when increases/decreases the political power and prestige of local leaders.

Despite their traditional apolitical stance, NGOs are political. They have their own agenda and their own turf. With a tradition of organizational autonomy and a liberating perspective that allows them to act when and where they want, they are not used to external direction, let alone the possibility that they could be political players. Additionally, as in any other community, they compete with one another for fund-raising purposes -- a process that, depending on an organization's resources, can be tied to the media coverage of a complex humanitarian emergency.

Moreover, every actor, to include the U.N. and regional actors, quite naturally has its own self-interests. Hopefully benign in their effect, they are not unknown to have a deleterious affect on everyone involved.

What does this context-awareness mean to those who participate in the NGO/military relationship? In short, that they are political beings responsible for the consequences of their actions. These case studies suggest that, even in the presence of a clear political strategy for a humanitarian operation (which has yet

⁴ See unpublished paper, "International Assistance and Conflict: An Explanation of Negative Impacts," by Dr. Mary B. Anderson; and African Rights paper No. 5, "Humanitarianism Unbound."

to be the case), the leaders in the field, through their purposeful and/or aggregate action, create and establish policy.

An anathema to the military and NGO alike -- who pride themselves on their apolitical stance -- this awareness must be appreciated and understood. In fact, the CMOC, as the center of civil-military collaboration and coordination, assumes that much more importance because this center represents the intersection of both communities' efforts. This research argues that the CMOC, or its conceptual equivalent, must be the focus of the entire military effort and that the traditional Tactical/Combat Operations Center should support it.

Such an understanding allows the humanitarian intervention to combat the greatest threat resulting from its inherent political context: a short-term mentality. A complex humanitarian emergency almost always demands a protracted response. It requires a sustained commitment if a significant difference is to be made. This logic is not to suggest that the American military should be responsible for any such long-term commitment. Even in the short-run, however, effective military action requires a long-term understanding of the situation and the impact of short-term actions.

A CMOC as the fulcrum of an effort allows the humanitarian intent to be kept primary as the transition to a purely civilian effort is planned from the very beginning. Ironically, this awareness may just create greater stability in the long-run.

G. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION

"Emergency" refers to how the actual problem is addressed. No matter how complex the situation, there is always a basic and common understanding of the nature of the problem. Even in Somalia, everyone knew that it was a question of security and food distribution. The hub around which every dimension of a complex humanitarian emergency eventually turns is whether or not this common understanding is translated into a shared vision of how to address the situation. The dilemma, however, is that the translation from a common understanding to a common sense-purposeful strategy takes time.

It takes time to determine the needs of the situation. It takes time to understand the dynamics that impede or accelerate certain actions. It takes time to understand the comparative advantages of other participants. It takes time to figure out just how one's own organization fits into the continuum of effort.

Yet, as in war, time is short in the face of the need for decisive and sufficient action. It is clear from the case studies that once a common sense emerges from a common understanding, the process of coordination becomes much more simple. This logic eventually points to the imperative need for an integrated, yet flexible strategy from the beginning.

However, the case studies also clearly indicate, that the more complex a situation the less likely it is that a shared vision, and an integrated strategy, will result. Even assuming sustained and correct attention from the highest policy-making circles, a shared vision is extremely difficult to develop in a complex

situation. The implications for the NGO/military relationship are enormous. First, it emphasizes again that the decisions of the "on-the-ground" operators carry that much more weight: like it or not, they will collectively create a policy. Second, they must be empowered by their respective headquarters to act with wide latitude. It is only *vis-à-vis* their presence and understanding of the situation that an overarching shared vision might present itself.

Implicit within this discussion is the fundamental prerequisite for the above process to take place: the creation of a secure zone or area in which to conduct relief operations. Without such a zone, not only is grasping the essence of the emergency situation impossible, but there will be no opportunity to implement a shared vision. Without security, there is no stability. Without stability, there is no enduring humanitarian effect.

Creating such a zone will always be a political as well as a military act, which, for better or for worse, will link the emergency situation irrevocably to the political context from which it arises. Accomplishing this objective will often be the initial focus of military effort, and the starting point for cooperation between the armed forces and the NGOs. It, too, will take time.

The process of establishing security and restoring a tenuous stability in order to address humanitarian needs is inherently political and almost necessarily protracted. To accept this logic is to accept that there is no such thing as pure humanitarian action within an intervention. While a common humanitarian goal may unite all interested parties, all parties bring their own self-interest to the proverbial table. To take account of this self-interest is not necessarily judgmental.

Rather, it accepts the process for what it is: even the most altruistic individuals will conduct themselves according to their own values. If one accepts the notion that the first part of wisdom is addressing something by its proper name, this awareness is paramount.

Both NGOs and the military have to "work hard at coordination, because you will never have complete agreement."⁵ This assertion assaults the notion that in order for coordination to take place, there must be prior agreement. In an emergency situation where time is short and memoranda of understanding do not exist, it is that much more important that the operators conceptually approach the situation from the perspective of collaboration and consensus instead of with an insular or hierarchical mindset.

H. THE OPERATORS

This work accepts as normal that organizations and the people in them act according to the way they have been trained and that their values have been enhanced as a result of being associated with a particular organization or community. At the same time, unduly rigid ideas about institutional cultures and organizational behavior contribute little to our understanding of how the military and the NGOs interact in practice. In general, cultural and organizational norms that may weigh heavily at higher echelons have far less saliency for operators in

⁵ Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret), National Defense University, 9 August 1995.

the field (although the Somalia study proves something of an exception). For the operator in the field, it is about problem-solving; it is about people.⁶

Which brings us to the most essential element of the backdrop against which these events take place: *nowhere will you find more selfless, dedicated, and professional people than you will find at the operator level in the military and the humanitarian response community*. The more research one does, the more respect one has for the personalities involved. For most, their work is not a profession, but a calling.

I. THE MOMENT

The final element that shapes the parameters of the NGO/military relationship is the moment itself. At once it encompasses the polar experiences of being human: from the idyllic of humans helping humans to the reality of humans grating on humans in an environment that makes tremendous physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual demands on its participants.

In general, there are two elements that anchor both ends of the spectrum of experience in a humanitarian emergency. The first is the undeniable *Power of the Moment*. Time and time again, individuals interviewed for this thesis recalled how meaningful it was to participate in such an event. No matter their personal political orientation or the perspective of the organization they were representing

⁶ This work does not make an attempt to analyze the actual decision-making and coordination process above the level of the operators in the field. In general, the further one is removed from the emergency at hand, the more likely individuals are to act in the sole interest of their institution.

at the time, most were moved by the monumental suffering of the people they were helping. All were happy that they contributed to alleviating the problem. Most recognized that they were "in it together." Thus, it cannot be forgotten that these endeavors touch the very root of human behavior. It remains important to recall this point when one wants to dismiss certain observations as "touchy-feely."

At the other end of the experience, there is the *Exhaustion of the Moment*. The operators involved in these events are not reflecting on some nine-to-five experience pursuant to their company's quarterly business plan. It is an experience that entails sixteen hour days, no showers, extreme conditions, and a decision-making process that carries life-and-death implications with it. It is an endeavor that one eats, drinks, and sleeps. It is an emergency and that mindset shapes the agenda. Consequently, there is an ineluctable wear-and-tear on body and soul. As in war, friction applies.

J. THE PRINCIPLES OF ALTRUISTIC SELF-INTEREST AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Given the situation, the operators, and the moment, we return to the most fundamental observation of this research: that in order for the NGO/military relationship to work, there must be an exchange of services: *the relationship must be mutually beneficial*. It is in the name of humanitarianism that both communities act. Yet the manner in which individuals of each community pursue this "common" humanitarian goal depends on how he/she thinks and where he/she sits; i.e. their personal values and the core values and purposes of the

organizations they represent. NGOs, by definition, are autonomous organizations and act according to their charters. The military, by definition, is an instrument of national policy, and therefore a political actor. Superficially, one could not ask for two more disparate partners. While the case studies reveal many nuances to these descriptions, it remains true that such polar partners must develop a relationship with the clear understanding that information and services must operate as a two-way street. Otherwise, they each act as they would anyway: the NGO pursuing exclusively humanitarian purposes and the military providing its own solution according to its self-contained infrastructure.

Operating according to comparative advantage in a mutually supportive manner leaves both parties happy. Each community has something unique to offer. The NGO usually brings humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the affected area, and sustained commitment. The military brings an infrastructure that provides communication, logistics, and security. In its most simple form, the equation works like this: the military's infrastructure leverages the NGOs into collaboration while the NGOs provide the military their ticket home. In other words, NGOs are willing to participate in collaboration and eventual coordination because of the need for a comprehensive effort, not to mention that the military will sometimes move their relief supplies and personnel for free. The military, on the other hand, needs to transition to civilian agencies in order to withdraw quickly -- something on which all agree.⁷

⁷ "Quickly" is a relative term that will always be defined according to the situation. In all cases, however, the military's primacy in a continuum of effort must be relatively short in duration.

Given this mutual need, both communities must work to understand each other prior to the crisis. Both must seek a basic agreement upon which to build future contingency coordination.

K. RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

That the primary mission of the American military is not humanitarian operations remains self-evident. Nevertheless, the present study takes for granted that complex humanitarian emergencies will continue to happen and that the American military, when called upon, will play a part in them. It is also taken for granted that American intervention in these situations will increasingly be viewed as consistent with our national interests. The need to understand and master these types of deployments must be regarded as an important, even paramount, strategic priority.

While the military exists to represent and defend the nation's interest, to include fighting and winning its wars, those wars are fewer and farther-between. In the meantime, we must come to grips with the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention. We are good enough to do both. The case studies agree.

Nevertheless, we -- along with the rest of the humanitarian response community -- must not lose sight of a basic truth: military operations are military operations. One of the essential contributions that armed forces can make in a complex humanitarian emergency -- the establishment of security -- often entails some degree of violent action or other form of direct intimidation. It is this

process of credible coercion that prevents would-be instigators from disrupting the humanitarian effort.

To label the military's efforts as "peace" or "other-than-war" operations, however, is to create false expectations. Such a label automatically "lowers the threshold of violence," to the point where these operations appear risk and casualty-free.⁸ How, the American public asks, can there be casualties in operations that are about "peace" or "humanitarianism," or are "other-than-war?"

Humanitarian intervention should not be conceived of as a bloodless exercise. The inherent risks in such an operation must be envisioned by the senior American leadership and fully articulated to the American people. Policies that cannot bear the risk of casualties cannot be advanced by the use of the armed forces. That casualties in humanitarian operations may mount to a point where an operation ceases to be worth the cost is of course true; but it is no less true in all other forms of military action.

To lower the threshold of acceptable violence is to lower the chances of operational success. If no casualties is the paramount concern -- something subliminally reinforced by the "other-than-war" categorization -- then the rest of the effort is, by definition, subordinate to it. Moreover, if the consequences of "failure" (taking casualties) is not adequately considered, then the credibility of the nation itself could be undermined. The fact that America disengaged from Somalia in the

⁸ Interview with Major General James L. Jones, USMC, The Pentagon, Washington D.C., 2 August 1995. General Jones was commander of the 24th MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort.

wake of eighteen fatal casualties is more likely to have longer-term negative implications than any other aspect of that operation, including its humanitarian origins.

By acknowledging military operations for what they are -- military -- a second, more subtle, truth is kept in perspective: humanitarian operations are the pursuit of policy by other means. The humanitarian need must be the driving vision, and political purpose, that unifies the entire effort. The specific military objectives are implied tasks. If the military's needs, what Clausewitz calls the "grammar" of military action, becomes preeminent, then means and ends have become confused and failure is imminent.

The most common complaint against the military, particularly in the Somalia case, is that security becomes an end in itself rather than an enabler to the broader humanitarian goals. On the one hand, there is no commander alive that does not think his first priority is bringing his troops home. This mindset is one that every troop commander takes to war with him, fully recognizing that they will not all come back. On the other hand, if casualties as such are intolerable, then the desire to bring them home is amplified to the point of distortion. The humanitarian intent of the larger policy is now a distant second because the soldiers themselves have become a political chess piece as opposed to a political implementor.

If strategic policy-makers cling too tightly to the humanitarian label, while ignoring the local political realities of humanitarian intervention and implementation, they in turn force military personnel to develop their own tactical solutions. Instead of implementing a higher policy that accounts for on-the-ground

political realities, the military operator must now make political decisions in order to simply address the humanitarian need. He is no longer a tool, but a creator, of policy.

In fact, military personnel have been severed from any higher political purpose, because that purpose has not been articulated by the senior policy-makers who view humanitarian operations as separate and different from traditional political concerns. Separated from their political purpose in an environment not their own, it becomes much easier for the military to operate according to its needs. It now becomes quite possible to confuse military means with humanitarian ends.

Hence, if one accepts that militaries do military things (and may take casualties) in pursuit of a larger policy, then there should not be a problem. This traditional understanding demands that senior decision-makers consider humanitarian interventions with the same rigor of analysis that they would any wartime deployment of armed forces. There will be an irreconcilable problem, however, if the threshold of violence is lowered to the point where military instruments of policy have been separated from a political purpose. If there is no high-level consideration of the political reality on-the-ground and the possible need for credible coercion, then the deployed soldier or Marine has simply become a target -- a direct link to a United States policy change.

Also clearly evident from the case studies, is this corollary: that the military can never be in charge. If it is in charge, then it inevitably denies the humanitarian effort and, ironically, prevents its own departure. If the military

conceives of its role from the beginning as a means to an end, and acts to support civilian efforts, then civilians will remain responsible for the overall strategy and for the end-state that results. If the exigencies of military action are allowed to predominate, however, one of two things will happen: 1) the military will leave too quickly (because it is afraid of nation-building); or 2) the military will stay too long (because no one else can do it, the military takes on the task of nation-building). Ultimately, decisive results are the realm of the NGOs in conjunction with other IOs and the indigenous authorities. Logically, theirs is the dominant role, and the larger responsibility.

L. THE CONTINUUM

This balance of mutually supporting comparative advantages suggests that there is a continuum of effort. In military terminology, this continuum moves from the left, "humanitarianism," to the right, "nation-building," the latter being a mission that the post-Vietnam military has fiercely rejected. One thing that is apparent from these four case studies, however, is that they are strongly inclined to occupy the "grey-area" between humanitarianism and nation-building. It is also clearly evident that the proper role of the military is, in fact, to help move the continuum from band-aid humanitarianism towards conditions which may allow for nation-building. In short, its job is to enable "marginal self-sufficiency."⁹

⁹ Telephone interview with Andrew Natsios, 23 August 1995.


Once a relative stability has been achieved in the local environment, it is not the job of the military to be involved in full-time restoration and/or reconciliation - to be involved in nation-building. But, to simply say that we only do humanitarian operations while we do not do nation-building, is to ignore the reality of the in-between and of those who will remain behind once we depart. If we recognize that reality and its corresponding actions, only then will we have a chance to make a lasting impact.

Once the military has recognized its proper place, it must adjust its concepts of "time" and "decisiveness." Even under the best of circumstances, humanitarian operations are likely to be protracted, more likely to be measured in months than in weeks. Likewise, the NGOs must accept a role for the military while they also adjust to the need for a comprehensive effort and the other-than-humanitarian impacts of their actions. In any case, there will be no single event or one day when decisive "victory" is achieved. That day will come long after the military has gone. The military must realize that it is its aggregate actions in the early stages that are most important in the long run. In the short term, success is measured according to the identification of 1) our contribution to the continuum of effort; and 2) the process by which we will transition to civilian agencies.


Both of these measures of effectiveness are determined, in part, by how well the military and the NGO communities understand each other; and, by how well they square-dance together.

The following maps have been included in order to give the reader an overview of the areas discussed in the case studies, as well as a point of reference.


Turkey and the Border Region




Map 1. Turkey and the Border Region




Map 2. Border Camps



Map 3. Bangladesh



Map 4. Somalia



Map 5. Rwanda, April-August 1994: Population Movements

II. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

A. INTRODUCTION

Encouraged by American radio-casts to rise up against their dictator, the Kurds of northern Iraq rebelled against a nominally defeated and certainly weakened Saddam Hussein in March of 1991. Although enjoying initial success, the rebellion was quickly and ruthlessly crushed by the Republican Guard. In the vacuum of the Kurdish military collapse between March 27th and April 2nd, over a million Kurds fled Iraq. By the end of the first week in April, there were approximately 800,000 Kurds in Iran, 300,000 in southeastern Turkey, and another 100,000 along the Turkish-Iraqi border. On April 5th, President Bush ordered the military to assist the Kurds, primarily through airdrops. As the situation grew worse, with somewhere between 500 and 1000 Kurds dying each day in 8000 foot mountain passes, it was readily apparent that something else had to be done. On April 16th President Bush, in conjunction with European allies, announced the creation of a security zone in northern Iraq. A multinational military force would stabilize the situation and work to return the Kurds to their homes in northern Iraq from the Turkish mountains. Transition to civilian agencies -- the United Nations and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in the area -- would take place as quickly as possible. This effort became known as *Operation Provide Comfort*.¹⁰

¹⁰ Provide Comfort would deal only with the Kurds that had gone into Turkey. The Kurds that fled into Iran were allowed to assimilate or develop sustainable camps there.

By May 13th, the UN had taken ceremonially control of the town of Zakho, the primary transition site in northern Iraq between the mountain refugee camps and the original homes of the Kurds. By June 1st, CARE had taken over the distribution of food. By June 4th, the population of the Turkish mountain refugee camps was almost non-existent. By June 7th, the original US forces sent in support of *Provide Comfort* began to pull out. By July 15th, most coalition forces had been withdrawn, leaving a small contingent force behind. *Operation Provide Comfort* continues to this day.

Universally deemed a great and continuing success, Operation Provide Comfort hinged on the ability of coalition military forces to transition to civilian agencies, particularly the United Nations.¹¹ One relationship absolutely critical to this process was that between the American military and the NGOs present. Unprecedented in its scale and scope, this relationship's necessity surprised both communities.

With one community hierarchically organized for decision and the other decentralized according to need and individual charter, this seemingly dichotomous relationship proved to be one of the linchpins of success. An Army Lieutenant Colonel, responsible for NGO coordination in Diyarbakir, Turkey, acknowledged unequivocally that the NGO personnel in Kurdistan were "very talented" people who knew the humanitarian business: "we don't, they're the

¹¹ Although slow in the initial response, it has been the U.N.'s presence that today has allowed for continued stability and the withdrawal of even the NGOs.

experts."¹² This respect found reciprocation among the NGOs. The use of the military, according to one NGO worker, particularly its inherent logistics capability, was "phenomenal." Overall, the military/NGO relationship was "pretty remarkable [in] how well it worked."¹³ Indeed, one NGO representative suggested that the reason this relationship worked so well was because the "military and NGOs had things common: that can-do attitude."¹⁴

Given the nature of their organizational structures, not to mention the respective cultures that result from these structures and the polar purposes that drives them, the above comments are truly "remarkable." This chapter argues that in the unique circumstances of April-May 1991, several factors allowed for the success of the NGO/military relationship. Strategically, almost by default, the humanitarian intent was kept primary throughout the entire operation. With no time to react, no doctrine to act by, and no governments able to formulate a directive policy, the political and military tasks were left to be discovered by those on the spot. If the action supported the saving of lives and the return of the Kurds, it was done. Whether it was a Special Forces soldier administering direct aid or the inclusion of Dohuk into the security zone, the action took place. Ultimately, this lesson of a humanitarian intent kept primary is the most important one.

¹²Telephone interview with Colonel John Petrella, USAR, 12 May 1995.

¹³Telephone interview with Mark Gorman, 16 May 1995. Mr. Gorman worked for the International Refugee Committee (IRC) at the time.

¹⁴Telephone interview with Kevin Henry, CARE, 17 May 1995.

Operationally, there were five factors that contributed to success within this strategic scope. First, despite the fact that the American military was in charge of the coalition responsible for *Provide Comfort*, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA/U.S. Agency for International Development) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was, in effect, managing the situation and establishing strategy. Second, the military commanders on the ground recognized the DART expertise and utilized their judgment. Third, the Special Forces (SF) initially sent into the Turkish mountains were absolutely critical in stabilizing the situation (to include the establishment of an initial rapport with the NGOs). Fourth, the Army Civil Affairs (CA) officers responsible for NGO interaction/coordination, particularly in Zakho, were exceptional people with a clear understanding of the situation at hand. Fifth, that the NGOs had the same caliber of people leading their effort to address the humanitarian emergency.

This chapter will focus on the fusion points of coordination between the NGO community and the military. It pays particular attention to the Zakho CMOC, which proved to be the pivotal point of coordination. Moreover, the narrative will demonstrate that the CMOC, in terms of NGO liaison, is not so much a military-designated place and time, but a "floating" and continuous process. Finally, as with the following case study on *Operation Sea Angel*, very specific attention is given to the actual meeting of the two communities in order to witness the process of collaboration and consensus. The reason for this concentration on the dynamics of the relationship -- to include its stereotypes -- is twofold. First, along with Bangladesh, which happens more or less concurrently, these operations represent

the first time that both communities encounter one another. Neither side was in anyway prepared for such interaction. Second, the NGO/military dynamics prove to be relatively the same in the Somalia and Rwanda case studies. Consequently, not as much time is spent in these chapters on the coordination process itself and the stereotypes that existed beforehand.

B. POLITICAL CONTEXT

As late as April 4th, the official position of the Bush Administration, was to condemn the Iraqi repression of the Kurds (*vis-à-vis* the U.N.) and encourage relief agencies, but basically present a "hands-off policy in the failed anti-Saddam uprising."¹⁵ Despite the initiation of airdrops on April 6th, the administration was not inclined towards the commitment of U.S. troops into southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Proceeding cautiously, the administration had some acute concerns: 1) an open-ended engagement; 2) affecting the regional balance of power by empowering an ethnic group that had no state; and 3) the issue of Iraqi sovereignty. On April 10th, under increasing European pressure to put humanitarian concerns above political ones,¹⁶ the White House issued a warning to Iraq that it should not interfere with the relief effort of the Kurds in northern Iraq. Senior administration officials said that the warning would "rely on the

¹⁵ Tony Caplan, "U.S. Presses U.N. Condemnation, Urges Relief," UPI, BC Cycle, International Section, 4 April 1991.

¹⁶ Particularly the British and the French. It was Prime Minister John Major who originally made the Kurds an international issue and suggested the formation of a "safe enclave" in northern Iraq. (The British announced on 4 April 1991 that they were pledging 35 million dollars for Kurdish relief).

presence of international emergency relief workers to deter Saddam's forces from attacking," thereby creating a de facto safe zone.¹⁷ White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, in a separate statement, emphasized that "we're not doing anything to violate territorial integrity. Nobody wants to establish another country inside Iraq."¹⁸

The administration was very sensitive to the delicacy of Turkish desires. Turkey had been a great ally during the war. Not only had it allowed "Proven Force" to take place,¹⁹ it had shut off its oil flow, at great cost, to Iraq. This support had to be carefully balanced against traditional Turk-Kurd relations and the crisis at hand. Two significant events, however, quickly changed the nature of addressing the problem. On April 15th, Hayri Kozakcoglu, the emergency-rule governor, or "super-governor," of eastern Turkey announced that Turkey would officially support the Kurdish relief effort. This decision soon transformed the border-town of Silopi (a hajj pilgrimage way station for Muslim pilgrims) into a relief hub. Publicly inviting the UN and private relief agencies to assist in the aid effort, Kozakcoglu explained, "we do not claim that we have done the best." Because the plight of the Kurds was approaching catastrophic proportions, Turkey

¹⁷John E. Yang, Ann Devroy, "U.S. Seeks to Protect Kurd Refugee Areas; Iraq Warned Against Air Operations in North," *The Washington Post*, 11 April 1991, p. A1.

¹⁸ Rita Beamish, "White House Says Northern Iraq is Safe Haven for Kurds," AP, AM Cycle, 11 April 1991.

¹⁹ Proven Force was the operational name for the air campaign, based in Turkey, against Iraq during the Gulf War.

could not handle it alone. "Turkey should not be left alone with this problem . . . all the world is responsible."²⁰

Secondly, after consultation with European allies, President Bush announced the following plan on April 16th: 1) Due to the difficult logistical access to the remote mountain refugee camps, other refugee camps would be established in more negotiable terrain and managed by coalition military forces; 2) The UN (and the NGO community) would take over administrative control of the camps as soon as possible. Bush stressed that this action was "purely humanitarian," was not a step towards a long intervention in Iraq, and that it was in keeping with UN resolution 688.²¹ It was under these auspices, on April 19th, that Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort -- already established in Incirlik, and Silopi, Turkey, to support the airdrops -- moved its military forces into northern Iraq.

C. EMERGENCY SITUATION

The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. There are estimated to be some ten million in Turkey, five million in Iran, 600,000 in Syria, and 300,000 in the former Soviet Union. They are a tribal-based and highly educated society whereby clan and patriarch often take priority over any pan-Kurd ideas. Because of this proud parochialism, and the larger established states

²⁰ Blaine Harden, "Turkey to Move Iraqi Refugees; Effort Would Ease Harsh Living Conditions," *The Washington Post*, 16 April 1991, p. A1. The article also mentions that the word "Kurd" was never used in any of the official Turkish documents announcing the change in policy.

²¹ *Facts on File World News Digest*, "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up as Refugee Crisis Escalates," International Affairs Section, 18 April 1991, p. 269, A1.

around them, the Kurds have never achieved an independent state. Due to their resulting minority status within the aforementioned states, the Kurds have often been the victims of severe oppression. Beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that there is deep enmity between the Kurds and the Turks, as well as between the Kurds and the Iraqis (who had gassed Kurd villages as recently as 1988).

The scale of the March uprising had taken the traditional Kurd guerrillas, the *Peshmerga* ("those who face death"), aback as they had no chance to direct or even channel this spontaneous outburst against long oppression. The Iraqis struck back quickly and it was soon a matter of armor and artillery against AK-47s. "All of a sudden, we found ourselves trying to be a government, an army, a police force, a judiciary and a relief organization facing a major catastrophe. We just didn't have the experience or the capability. We couldn't cope."²² Such was the immediate retrospective opinion of Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Almost immediately, entire city populations fled with only that which they could carry. As they entered the snow-covered mountain passes, the journey began to take its toll. Elderly Kurds died and were left unburied by the roadside. As their condition weakened, Kurds quickly became susceptible to disease. Most importantly was the lack of potable water. Bad water inevitably means the advent of dysentery, diarrhea, and cholera. Kurds were literally defecating themselves to

²² Jim Muir, "Kurds Assess Why Revolt Against Saddam Failed," Special to *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 May 1991, p. 1.

death. On thin roads in steep terrain, sanitation was soon as much a problem as the lack of water. Adding injury to injury was the prevalence of land mines. Crowded, weakened, disease-ridden, and walking through their own waste and over their own bodies, the Kurds were on the brink. As one American observed, "the Kurds were in a humble, humble, situation."²³

D. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: THE NATURE OF COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

Given the context of this overwhelming and complex emergency, there was only one organization in the world that had the capability to comprehensively address the need. "Logistics is the name of the game. There is no institution in the world better equipped for this than the military."²⁴ Echoing this common understanding was Congressman Matthew F. McHugh, who led a Congressional fact-finding mission to the Kurdish refugee camps on April 18th. In a remarkably prescient commentary, the members of this trip, in their hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, laid out an accurate description of the nature of complex humanitarian emergencies that result in humanitarian intervention. These points suggested by Representative McHugh, in one form or another, are the common traits of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. Quoted at length from the actual hearing, the points have been categorized by the author.

²³ Telephone interview with Colonel John O. Easton, USMCR (retired), 25 May 1995.

*[Note: All ranks used in the case studies are those held at the time of the operation.]

²⁴⁵ Daniel E. Conway, then the Ankara representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. As quoted by Clyde Haberman, "U.S. Presses Military Relief Effort; Hungary Kurds Await Rescue From Mud and Cold," Special to *The New York Times*, 14 April 1991, p. 10.

1. [Sudden and overwhelming emergency]: These numbers are not only large, but came together in just a few days. This is unprecedented, and indeed, it overwhelmed the capacity of the neighboring governments and the international and relief agencies to cope with it . . .
2. [No one else can do the job]: The simple truth is that if our military were not doing it, many more people would die . . . because these people are so remotely located, because no other agency has the capacity to reach them, it is appropriate that we respond with our military forces today.
3. [The need to incorporate the professional humanitarians]: We also believe that it's important for the traditional international humanitarian organizations to assume responsibility for this humanitarian relief as soon as is practical . . .
4. [A common understanding of the nature of the problem]: It is also unanimously agreed that these people have to be brought down off the mountains into lower-lying areas because they cannot adequately be helped . . .
5. [The undeniable political dimension]: But for the most part Turkey is unwilling or unable to absorb more refugees . . . And it's for that reason that the camps are going to be established in low-lying areas in northern Iraq. This, of course, poses certain political as well as technical problems. If we expect the humanitarian agencies to take over providing humanitarian refugees in Iraq, there is the question of Iraqi government consent . . . there would have to be at least informal consent by the Iraqi government before the UN agencies, working with private voluntary organizations, could take over from us this humanitarian effort. So there is the political problem . . .
6. [The fundamental building block: Security]: But perhaps more seriously in the long run, there is the question of security. Because in order to get the Kurds to come down from the mountains, to say nothing of allowing them to go home, they must be assured that they have security . . . But we do not think that the United States military should be a long-term provider of either humanitarian relief or security in Iraq. And yet the Kurds will need that kind of assurance.
7. [Transition and U.S. exit strategy]: So the question becomes, who replaces the United States and our other friends in providing the security arrangements as well as the humanitarian assistance . . .

8. [The need for strong presidential leadership and unity of command at the operational level]: We think this requires strong political leadership. . . if we expect the UN and other international agencies and private voluntary organizations to assume responsibility for the humanitarian assistance, for example, they will need more money . . . the President should consider the possibility of appointing a high level official within his administration to facilitate the movement of these requests and help the interagency processes move rapidly. This is an emergency, and it may be that this is one of those cases where the President should have a person with political clout acting for him to clear the traps within the bureaucracy . . .²⁵

These traits manifest themselves in each of the case studies. The politics of sovereignty, security, transition, and leadership within a complex emergency problem directly affect, if not define, the context of, and the decisions made therein, the NGO/military relationship. In southeast Turkey there was thus a clear and common understanding of the problem. The question remained, however, how was it to be translated into an effective plan, a common sense that provided guidance to all participants?

E. MISSION

The mission given to the US military, according to the President Bush's 16 April announcement, was threefold. The immediate objective was to stop the suffering and dying, stabilizing the refugee camps' population to as normal conditions as possible. The second objective was to move the Kurds from the refugee camps in the Turkish mountains to transition camps around Zakho, in

²⁵ Representative Matthew F. McHugh, Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 23 April 1991. Federal Information Systems Corporation. Federal News Service.

northern Iraq. The third stage called for the return of the Kurds to their original villages and towns.²⁶ Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili was appointed to oversee the effort. This mission statement accurately described, as in Congress, a common understanding of the nature of the problem. Imperatively, it did not delineate specific military tasks, nor did it account for any political goals. The "how" would have to come out of the field according to the only guidance provided: the humanitarian intent of saving lives and returning the Kurds home.

F. RESPONSE STRUCTURE

By April 22nd, the basic structure that was to facilitate the movement of the Kurds back to northern Iraq was in place.²⁷ The Combined Task Force headquartered itself at Incirlik Air Force Base, Adana, Turkey. Two subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) were established to facilitate mission accomplishment. Spread throughout the mountains of southeast Turkey, JTF "Alpha" was headquartered in Silopi and largely responsible for the first component of the mission: stop the dying and suffering while stabilizing the situation. Commanded by Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA, Alpha was composed primarily of the 10th Special Forces (SF) Group.

²⁶ Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Opening Statement Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 March 1992.

²⁷ US forces were able to respond so quickly because the infrastructure was already there to support the Gulf War. European Command was still running Proven Force and the reservists, particularly the Civil Affairs personnel, were still activated and in southern Iraq.

Sent in, at first, to coordinate drop zones and food distribution on April 6th, the Green Berets were soon involved in much more than that. With little to no initial NGO presence, they quickly became an integral part of such traditional humanitarian tasks as census taking, camp organizing, and food distribution. As NGOs (based out of Diyarbakir, Turkey, just to the north of the camps) began to trickle in, the Special Forces looked to hand-off their responsibilities to them as the SF troops focused on facilitating the movement of the Kurds down to Zakho. The 10th accomplished this task by setting up way-stations, or Humanitarian Service Support Detachments (HSSDs), along the primary routes to Zakho from the eight major refugee camps.²⁸

The second component formed was JTF "Bravo." Commanded by Major General Jay Garner, USA, Bravo's mission was to prepare Zakho for the incoming Kurds and facilitate their eventual transfer back to their homes. More specifically, Bravo was to integrate civilian agencies into the second and third elements of the military's mission statement, thereby providing for a seamless transfer. This effort took form when JTF Bravo moved its headquarters from Silopi to Zakho on April 20th, setting itself up at the old headquarters of the 44th Iraqi infantry division.²⁹ This time period witnessed NGOs slowly coming to Zakho from Diyarbakir, and later, directly from Incirlik. It also marked the first time in the operation that

²⁸ There were a total of forty-three refugee sites in the Turkish mountains. The eight largest camps ranged in size from 5,000 to 120,000 people in one location.

²⁹ Bravo soon moved to the grain elevator complex on the outside of town because the complex was closer to the transit camps later built 1.5 miles away; it had better and more space for the command element; and because it was more secure.

NGOs and the military were formally working hand-in-hand in a loosely structured and agreed-upon format.

While Alpha's mission was imperative, Bravo was the fulcrum. Assuming the Kurds decided to come out of the mountains at all (1) if they were not handled properly in transit; (2) or did not feel safe and secure upon arrival; (3) the situation risked an indefinite state of affairs. Moreover, if the preceding three conditions were met, how to transition to the UN and the NGOs? These tasks were easier said than done; especially when one considers that Provide Comfort was the largest and most complex humanitarian operation attempted by the military since World War II.

Finally, before discussing the humanitarian implementation of such a structure, it is extremely important not to lose sight of the dual nature of this operation. The humanitarian effort was successful only because a secure environment was created and then sustained. Bill Coops, formerly of IRC and now of Northwest Medical Teams, provides the most telling evidence of this logic. Coops, who is of the philosophy that true relief and development means a commitment to the community after the emergency, stayed on in northern Iraq for another two years. He unequivocally states that "everything [from relief to the continuing development effort] is made possible because of that F-15 or 16 that flies overhead" and the power that it represents. "Nothing is possible without it;

all the relief on the ground is nothing without security . . . relief work is a creative act, it is much easier to destroy: anyone who has the freedom to destroy it, will."³⁰

G. OFDA: EMPOWERED TO FIND THE "HOW"

Within two weeks of the first US troops deployed to the region, there was the skeleton of a structure to facilitate the three goals of the coalition effort. Thanks to the universally acclaimed efforts of the 10th Special Forces Group, the stopping of the dying and suffering was well on its way to being accomplished, as NGOs complemented the response in an ad hoc manner. Situated in Zakho to effect the transfer of the Kurds to their homes as it prepared to transition to civilian agencies was JTF Bravo -- but a problem remained. The Kurds were still in the mountains and were not going to come down until they felt safe to do so.

It was impossible, however, to maintain that number of people in the remote mountain passes. To begin with, the snows would soon be melting, thus removing a significant source of water. In the opinion of an OFDA expert, it just was not economically feasible to bring in water and food for 400,000 people.³¹ Additionally, the Turks, despite conducting diplomacy in the name of humanitarianism, did not want the Kurds there.³² Finally, as David Jones, then Deputy Director for Oxfam,

³⁰ Telephone interview with Bill Coops, 5 June 1995.

³¹ Telephone interview with Ronald Libby, OFDA, 19 May 1995.

³² For instance, according to multiple sources, the Turkish government, vis-à-vis the Turkish Red Crescent Society, did not stop NGOs from coming, but they "certainly did nothing to facilitate" them either. Most NGOs ended up, for example, doing their banking through a private oil firm because the Turkish government insisted on everything being done in cash.

UK, relates, the Kurdish condition was the result of the Gulf War and "we were morally responsible. The only option was to get them down."³³

But how to bring the Kurds down? The military had no doctrine of how to conduct such an operation. The NGOs had not been in place prior to the crisis; nor had they any experience in working with the military. They also did not have any collective or comprehensive experience with an emergency of this magnitude. It was a new world for both parties. It was a new world for the OFDA DART as well. Although recognized for their professionalism and emergency expertise, OFDA had almost no experience working side-by-side with the military in the field.³⁴

It was not, however, a new world for Fred Cuny, an emergency expert that OFDA had specifically contracted for this situation. With decades of experience in these matters, to include working with militaries around the world, Cuny would prove to be the center of gravity, a touchstone of vast expertise, that allowed everything to fall into place.³⁵

The OFDA DART team had arrived at Incirlik on April 11th. They had several things going for them. First, they were recognized as experts in their field

³³Telephone interview with David Jones, 10 May 1995.

³⁴ This inexperience did not manifest itself tactically. Beyond the purpose of this paper, there were, however, strategic manifestations of this inexperience. Incirlik and European Command were not quite sure what the DART's relationship was to the command structure. There was also consternation over the relaying of information back to Washington. DART had a direct line to the Department of State. The military, by definition, had several layers of bureaucracy through which to sift its information before it got back to the Pentagon. The resulting disparity witnessed State finding out things before the Pentagon.

³⁵ His recent death in Russia is not only mourned by friends, but by those future complex humanitarian emergency victims who would have been helped.

and were well-known to the NGOs. Second, they commanded universal respect based on their past efforts. Third, they were comparatively small, initially only twelve people (the DART later grew to nearly thirty, the biggest team ever sent to the field by OFDA). Fourth, due to their expertise and numbers, they were able to identify the crucial nodes of coordination and establish appropriate "liaisons" in Incirlik, Diyarbakir, Zakho, and in the camps themselves.³⁶ Moreover, the DART was generally self-sustaining. For example, their organic satellite communications enabled real-time information to one another and back to Washington D.C.

Finally, their credibility was immeasurably enhanced by the money behind them. By law, once a region has been declared a "disaster area" by the Department of State, the DART can spend United States government money on the spot. Importantly, they are not implementing funded programs themselves; instead, they are selecting and funding NGOs according to the area need and the expertise of the NGO. Rare is the NGO that has not taken money from OFDA. In any humanitarian emergency, the DART is a powerful force and instrumental to a successful resolution. Mao's famous dictum, revised for humanitarian consumption, is more than appropriate: "power flows out of the barrel of a checkbook."³⁷ The DART would spend close to twenty-seven million dollars.

³⁶ "Liaison" is a relative term because it only manifested itself as a permanent position at the most important levels, i.e. Incirlik and Zakho (and even then, as necessary). Otherwise, the team members were "floating," keeping a pulse on the situation and tapping into all the various sources of information.

³⁷ Telephone interview with Bill Coops, 6 June 1995.

The DART was headed by Dayton Maxwell, a career foreign service officer, and assisted by Fred Cuny, the president of Intertech, a humanitarian emergency consulting firm. It was Cuny who came up with the strategy of ensuring that the Kurds came out of the mountains while Maxwell, who had the equivalent rank of Major General, approved the strategy and had the final say. As Maxwell points out, it was much more a matter of strategy than common sense or even a specified plan. The plan can change from day-to-day and the common understanding of the situation can be obvious, but if there is no over-arching strategy, or conceptual end-state to delineate daily operations, then there can be no success.³⁸

H. CUNY'S STRATEGY

The "how" of moving the Kurds off the mountain was a delicate political issue. As mentioned before, the Turks did not want them there. The Kurd leaders, on the other hand, had publicly stated that they were not leaving until their security in northern Iraq could be assured.³⁹ If this position were allowed to become cast in bronze, there was no way the proud Kurds would come out of the mountains. As long as Saddam Hussein was in power and they were not protected from him, they were guaranteed more death below in northern Iraq than above in the untenable camps.

³⁸ Telephone interview with Dayton Maxwell, 26 May 95.

³⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR, the Marine historian in northern Iraq with the 24th MEU, quotes an anonymous Kurd: "We would rather live like dogs than be slaughtered like pigs." [Unpublished manuscript, "With Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: U.S. Marine Security and Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991," p. 74.] Originally, the Kurds had stated that they would not come down until Hussein was removed from power.

Before describing Cuny's actualization of the "how," the obvious should be stated: that it was not premeditated, but emerged spontaneously over a few weeks; and that it had to be approved by higher authorities. But make no mistake, this strategy of operationalizing the common understanding came from Cuny.⁴⁰ The strategy was fivefold, based on the conceptual end-state that the Kurds had to be returned to their homes and that the continuing operation had to be run by the UNHCR and assorted NGOs.⁴¹

The first step was the placement and construction of the transit camps. As originally intended, American forces were to build the camps directly across the border in a traditional military grid. Cuny pointed out that this location was poor for two reasons. The closer the camps were to Zakho, the easier it would be to extend municipal facilities like water and electricity. Additionally, the closer the camps were to Zakho the more likely it was that actual Zakho residents returned to their former homes. This process would build immediate local stability and make further room for Kurds in the camps who were not from the Zakho area.⁴² Moreover, Cuny was the primary designer of the camp itself. The basic configuration -- an eight tent square, with two a-side, centered on a common space -- encouraged relative privacy and the strong familial ties of the Kurds.

⁴⁰ Blaine Harden went so far as to call Cuny the "chief designer" of the allied plan. "U.S. Troops Order Iraqi Police Away; Marines Step Up Work on Tent Camps; Kurds Remain Wary," *The Washington Post*, 23 April 1991, p. A1.

⁴¹ This plan necessarily assumed that SF would indeed be successful in stabilizing the situation in the Turkish mountains.

⁴² Maxwell, 26 May 1995.

Second, the Kurds had to want to come out of the mountains. There was only one key to this locked door: the Kurds had to *feel* that they would be safe back in northern Iraq. It was not enough to announce a security zone and state that it was safe; nor was it enough to build transit camps and assume that they would come. The Kurds had to be convinced. It had always been Cuny's philosophy to work with the leaders of refugee groups and utilize and invigorate their existing internal infrastructure.⁴³ This concept was applied in two ways. Kurdish men were invited down to help construct the camps. Ostensibly to include them in the solution, the main objective was to demonstrate the safety of the area. Of the some 872 men brought down, very few stayed to help construct the camps. Most went back to the mountains to get their families.⁴⁴

The second step towards solving this dilemma came in the form of *Peshmerga* leaders approaching General Garner, seeking to establish how they could help. General Garner directed them to Cuny and Maxwell.⁴⁵ Cuny invited them, and eventually other Kurd leaders, to see the camps for themselves. Soon, the military was flying Kurd leaders down from the refugee camps to visit Zakho and the transition camps. This effort had a tremendous impact. After two to three weeks of just sitting in the mountains, doing nothing, and watching other people

⁴³ Natsios, 16 January 1995, Washington, D.C. This philosophy had been unknowingly complemented by the SF practice of seeking and working with village elders wherever they went.

⁴⁴ Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hess, USAR, 11 May 1995. LTC Hess commanded the CMOC in Zakho.

⁴⁵ This simple act of General Garner's is symbolic of his understanding of the situation. He left the refugee problems to the refugee experts. In other words, he did not attempt to provide answers to problems with which he was not experienced.

support your own people, it was a big deal to be a part of the solution -- not to mention the prestige of being singled out as a VIP by the military and given access to the helicopters.⁴⁶

Even with the apparent safety of the transition camps, the presence of the 24th MEU, and an eastward expanding security zone, there remained the problem of the 300 Iraqi regular police who were still in Zakho. As long as they were there, the Kurds would not feel secure. Cuny's solution, based on his experience with the Kuwaiti Task Force, was simple. If the police were publicly identified, to include wearing an ID badge, then they would be accountable. This concept worked perfectly as the 300 Iraqi police soon fled the area.

The fourth measure taken to operationalize the common understanding was the inclusion of Dohuk into the security zone at the end of May. (As many as 300,000 of the refugees were originally from Dohuk). Maxwell necessarily took the lead here as the senior government official on hand. If Dohuk were not included, then a permanent, 'winterized' refugee camp of 300,000 would have to be established around Zakho (something far more costly). This possibility not only directly influenced Zakho's ability to return to normal, it also brought up political questions of how long the camp would stay there and who would administer it. Eventually, Dohuk was edged into the security zone.

Finally, Cuny would eventually be responsible for drafting the transition plan to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

⁴⁶ Telephone interview with Major David Elmo, USAR, 14 May 1995. Major Elmo, was a Civil Affairs officer working up in the refugee camps and had been there from the beginning.

No matter the organization represented, the rank held, or the contribution made, one and all had the same two words for the role played by the OFDA team: they were absolutely "pivotal" and "integral" to the success of *Operation Provide Comfort*. It was their efforts that laid the groundwork for a successful NGO/military relationship. Cuny should be singled out. As Andrew Natsios, then director of OFDA, recalled, Cuny was "the mind behind it . . . he [was] the premier master strategist in complex humanitarian emergencies."⁴⁷

I. NGO/U.S. MILITARY COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION

Given the political context and the emergency situation, it was the above structure and, more importantly, strategy that framed the relationship between the NGOs and the U.S. military. Again, it should be emphasized that both communities had no previous experience working with the other or with an emergency of this overwhelming nature. As Lieutenant Colonel Hess remarked, "I didn't know what a NGO or DART was -- never heard of them before."⁴⁸ The NGOs certainly had no idea either about the American military. This discussion now examines the various NGO/military fusion points before focusing on the all-important NGO/military coordination in Zakho.

⁴⁷ Natsios, 16 January 1995.

⁴⁸ Hess, 9 May 95.

J. IN THE MOUNTAIN CAMPS

When the military and the first NGOs arrived, the death rate was somewhere between 500 and 1000 deaths a day. The Special Forces companies were assigned refugee camps and instructed to stop the dying and suffering.

The SF deployment evolved into what was, essentially, a four-phase program. The Assessment phase lasted about five days as Operation Detachment Alphas (ODAs) deployed to figure out just what was going on in the forty-three different refugee sites. The second phase witnessed the creation of infrastructure support such as communications, security, and landing/drop zones (LZs/DZs) for supplies. This phase was approximately two weeks in length. The sustainment and support phase included working with the Kurds, getting to know the clan structure and its various leaders, as well as integrating the NGOs. It also meant the development of technician teams, engineers or medics, in support of the humanitarian effort. (Often, NGOs would simply attach themselves to these teams and nominally become a part of the infrastructure). The final stage was the relocation stage as the Kurds were escorted off the mountains.⁴⁹

Simply by their presence, the Green Berets provided reassurance and an instant infrastructure through which to alleviate the suffering. This presence was imperative to the effort's success. The SF cultural training, particularly their understanding of peoples, and reputation did much to diffuse tensions between

⁴⁹ Interview with Captain Askold Kobasa, USA, Monterey, California, 31 May 1995. Captain Kobasa was a member of Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG. These phases descriptions were terms Kobasa used to paint the conceptual picture. They are not official doctrine. They do, however, serve the purpose of describing how order is brought out of sheer chaos.

and among the Kurds, and between the Kurds and the Turks.⁵⁰ By addressing basic health concerns and working intimately with the local leaders, the SF were able to ascertain needs and prioritize them as food and medical supplies were airlifted into the camps.

As the NGOs began to trickle in, two different types of people and organizations came into contact for the first time in the post-Cold War era. NGOs, according to their charter, interests, expertise, and personalities essentially set up wherever they wanted. The military's first impression was not a positive one. SF officers trying to administer would inform NGOs that they were in their "sector." The NGO response would be: "What sector? Who are you? So what?" And thus, the military was introduced to the greatest strength and greatest weakness of the NGO community: the ability to go anywhere anytime with no one's approval, linked to an initial inability to come to grips with the crying need for coordination in the face of such an overwhelming situation.

Military personnel tell of NGOs "just appearing," wanting to help. Human rights inspectors would show up, seeking to examine the SF methods. A typical uniformed response was "Who are these freaks? I'm an American trying to do my job." Moreover, these "disaster junkies/groupies" all seemed to know each other from someplace, some other crisis. There was also the feeling that the NGOs needed to go where the media was and that this need sometimes drove where and

⁵⁰ Libby, 19 May 1995. "Rambo movies have done wonders for the military." People all over the world, for better or for worse, watch these movies and associate them with the Green Berets -- making for an immediate impact on a situation.

how they set up instead of the refugees themselves. Military officers found it ironic that these altruistic organizations were very much aware of the politics of raising money back home (hence the pursuit of the media) and the development of their own "turf" ("here is what *our* organization is doing in the present crisis"). The NGO dynamics were clearly as political as they were humanitarian.⁵¹

The NGOs had some concerns as well. There was the fear that the military would bring a "big, cumbersome bureaucracy that couldn't learn quickly." There was also the general feeling that the introduction of the military would be a "disaster." Given the general political leanings of the NGO community, incumbent perceptions were still manifold. One NGO representative described himself as a "child of the '60s and '70s." He had been in college during Kent State and his resulting impressions of the military were "extremely negative." A generation that had come of age after the TET offensive now made up "a lot" of the NGO community. Negative impressions were inevitable.

These mutual stereotypes were overcome the same way other stereotypes are overcome: one-on-one interaction. While there may have been some initial tension, it was dispelled in the face of the task at hand. The worker-bees of each community had to work together. It was the individuals at the lowest level who had a common enemy, organizational red tape, and a common purpose: stop the

⁵¹ Bill Coops notes that the "relief business is a business" and that there is "clearly a political angle" to it, something confirmed by several NGO interviews. (Telephone interview, 5 June 1995).

suffering. As LTC Jim Powers, USA, observed, life-saving is still an inherent skill of soldiering.⁵²

The coordination involved in this common purpose was extremely decentralized. To illustrate this process, it is useful to consider the camp at Isikveren, where Major David Elmo was the Civil Affairs officer who helped in the NGO coordination.⁵³ As the NGOs came in, the SF interfaced with them according to the people they met in their sector. After a few days, it was established that all concerned were welcome to attend a meeting to be held at 1000 every morning.⁵⁴ There was no name for this meeting nor a structure into which it was tied. The meeting was convened under the auspices of the UNHCR (U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees). At best, this meeting was an exchange of introductory and location information. "Hi, my name is so-and-so, and I'm with . . . We're located up there." It should also be noted that these meetings were not just for civilian agencies. Major Elmo also interfaced with other military units unfamiliar with the various civilian processes in order to facilitate their efforts.

All meetings were completely voluntary. In the first weeks, there were always new faces as the various NGOs began to come in. Different organizations would send different people or they would not send anyone at all after their first

⁵² Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Powers, USA, 25 May 1995. Powers was the operations officer for JTF Alpha in Silopi.

⁵³ Elmo, 14 May 1995. In actuality, the terms "coordination" and "collaboration" may be a euphemistic description for the first week or so in the mountains. Because the situation was so fluid, it had not had a chance to settle into even a nominal structure.

⁵⁴ In Cucerka, for example, the NGO meeting evolved into a weekly one, meeting on Friday to discuss the next week's events. (Kobasa, 31 May 95).

meeting. Consequently, there could be no structure to the 1000 meeting in camp number one at Isikveren. Each meeting was a free-for-all, whereby the conversation worked its way around the meeting, ensuring that everyone present had the opportunity to participate. Major Elmo relates that this type of thing was "personality driven. It has nothing to do with rank, organization, or position."

This basic process took place throughout the camps. Slowly but surely, the individual "comfort zone" of the two communities began to increase. Dague Clark of Save the Children found the SF to be "much less military than I thought."⁵⁵ He was particularly impressed with SF cultural sensitivities like drinking tea with the clan leaders before talking business. Dr. Michael Toole, a long time disaster assistance expert for the Center for Disease Control (which is a part of the U.S. government), remarked that in Yekmal "I was impressed by the willingness of field people to listen, take advice on prioritizing public health, and then get on with the job with the extra enthusiasm, discipline, and muscle that comes with military culture."⁵⁶ Or, as Henryka Manes, of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) put it: the military was "reliable, on time, [they] report . . . [they] do it all."⁵⁷

The military had the same awareness and appreciation for the NGOs as well. "As the chaos normalized and people got to know one another," relationships

⁵⁵ Telephone interview with Mr. Dague Clark, 6 June 1995.

⁵⁶ Dr. Michael Toole, fax to author, 8 June 1995.

⁵⁷ Telephone interview with Henryka Manes, 24 May 1995. Ms. Manes is the Program Director for JDC.

improved.⁵⁸ Indeed, Colonel Stanley Florer, who made a point to pursue NGO integration from the very first day, recalls that the "NGOs were wonderful;" their only problem was logistics and communications, something the military could provide.⁵⁹

Eventually, as attitudes changed and the situation normalized, a pseudo-structure began to emerge. This emergence was closely tied to the SF ability to produce accurate risk assessments of the population. Because the NGOs did not have the assets or personnel to be everywhere, the SF reports provided a comprehensive continuity to the situation and its progress. The SF information would then be compared to the NGO information. The synthesized information allowed everyone to track what was needed (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) to stabilize the situation. The result then was a prioritization-of-sorts in which coordination manifested itself in the following basic manner: "OK, here's the greatest need, this is the job, who can do it?" According to need, interest, expertise, location, etc., an NGO would then take the job.

It is in this simple description that the leading and most fundamental tenet of NGO/military first appears: coordination requires that something be exchanged. NGOs will not come to a meeting unless there is something to gain (i.e. logistical support or information). The converse is also true: the military hopes to gain efficiency and economy of effort from the NGOs.

⁵⁸ Elmo, 14 May 1995.

⁵⁹ Telephone interview with Colonel Stanley Florer, USA, 9 June 1995. Colonel Florer was the 1/10 battalion commander and the very first element into the Turkish mountains.

While information was the general currency of exchange, the real asset that the Special Forces had to offer the NGOs was the mobility and logistics of the military aircraft (and, later, trucks). These aircraft -- from H-60 Blackhawks to C-130 Hercules -- provided free pick-up and delivery of NGO supplies to a degree that no NGO could hope to match. Thus, if the NGO was willing to be associated with the military, it gained immediate credibility with the refugees for delivering aid rapidly, and long term credibility with donors as their projects materialized overnight. In return for information and logistical support the NGOs would come to the "table," (the tent, really) with their own information and de facto accept the infrastructure of the military. The military had no problems with this exchange since NGOs doing the humanitarian job faster meant the military going home sooner.

Thus, friends were friends even if the relationship was based, at least initially, on self-interest. While the two communities did not always warmly welcomed each other, relationships emerged once each community recognized the comparative advantage of the other.⁶⁰

K. DIYARBAKIR

Diyarbakir, Turkey, was a natural center of activity for the various players involved in the relief effort. The closest town to the refugee camps, it was also the

⁶⁰ Colonel Florer tells the story that during the first week the MSF (Doctors Without Borders, a French NGO supported by the French government) doctors had absolutely nothing to do with the Green Berets. Once they witnessed the SF medics saving lives, the soldiers (cross-trained by the medics) administering to basic health needs, and some speaking French, the situation changed dramatically. By the end of the first week, the MSF doctors had invited them over for dinner.

provincial capital, accompanied by a military base and an all-important airstrip. The NGOs positioned themselves there to help stabilize the refugee camps in the mountains to the south. By the end of the second week, the chaos of the situation was beginning to settle: UNHCR was in town and the NGOs were taking count of their interactions with the Turkish government as they simultaneously began to figure out the coalition military forces.⁶¹

It was about this time (April 17th) that Lieutenant Colonel John Petrella, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel Jean Ronsick, USAF, were assigned to Diyarbakir to liaison with civilian agencies. They were to assist in the stabilizing of the refugee camps by working with the regional Turkish government and interfacing with the NGOs. LTC Ronsick assumed the more traditional role of civil-military relations with the Turkish governor. In this role, he functioned as a "two-way window."⁶² LTC Petrella assumed the non-traditional role of NGO collaboration and coordination. Both civil-military "tracks" contributed significantly to the coordination effort.⁶³

⁶¹ The Turkish government required all NGOs to coordinate through the Turkish Red Crescent Society, an administrative challenge.

⁶² Telephone interview with Colonel Jean Ronsick, 2 June 1995. Ronsick worked directly with the Turkish "super-governor." Thus, the governor had a view into exactly what the coalition forces were doing in his realm. Ronsick's role also gave the US military an eye into the governor's office and what they were trying to do (or not do).

⁶³ Both men operated under the full blessing of Major General William N. Farnen, USA, the head of the Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (the "JUSMAT"). Both were given full-rein to accomplish the mission.

When Petrella arrived, there were no coordination meetings taking place, besides very informal NGO meetings in the downtown hotels. It was in this arena that Petrella would act as a "one-man CMOC."⁶⁴

Petrella, according to his understanding of his new job, had one mission: "to put myself out of business."⁶⁵ This awareness indicates a second tenet of the NGO/military relationship: that it was "OK" not to be in charge, as the military is accustomed and trained to do. In short, it was Petrella's job to facilitate the humanitarian expertise of the NGOs with the logistics and infrastructure of the military. Consequently, he established himself with the American embassy team in Diyarbakir as the military point of contact for the NGOs.

The Turkish government had granted the American team a run-down office building in downtown Diyarbakir. It was here that all interested participants were invited to attend. As in the refugee camps, this meeting was voluntary and open to anyone who wanted to come. Regular attendees included UN organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF), as well as the most involved NGOs (CARE, IRC (International Rescue Committee), Save the Children, MSF, etc.). Speaking to a full-house every night, the head of the embassy team orchestrated the meeting. The structure of the meeting amounted to going around the room, listening to the various reports/observations, as a current situation was developed by the group for that morning. The multiple sources of information indicated where the greatest need

⁶⁴ Hess, 12 May 1995.

⁶⁵ Petrella, 14 May 1995.

was. This process resulted in group agreement on prioritization and how to maximize resources. Once completed, the comparative advantages of the NGOs and the military were matched with the needs in the field.

Petrella would never sit at the head of the table nor would he ever lead the discussion. "You have to be very diplomatic and aware of the political implications -- never create the impression that you're in charge . . . in essence, we were, but you can never give that impression."⁶⁶ Petrella's success hinged on the proper demeanor and personality he put forth (being user-friendly) and the assets he was able to bring to the table.⁶⁷

While this particular meeting may be termed the unofficial CMOC, or, more properly, as NGO access to the Civil-Military Operations Cell within the embassy team, the need for collaboration and coordination did not take place only there. For example, Petrella made it a point to stay "very close" to the Red Crescent Society and the projects on which they were working. He also spent time down at the tarmac, where Ronsick operated when not with the super-governor (he had set up a tent in order to stay abreast of as much information as possible). By staying here during the day, Petrella was able to stay current on any "news" while simultaneously having a feel for exactly what materials were being flown in. In

⁶⁶ Petrella, 14 May 1995.

⁶⁷ Beyond representing the military's logistics, Petrella was able to occasionally bring people to the table that could help the NGOs. For example, both Cuny and Maxwell spoke at different times up in Diyarbakir (OFDA equals money). Also, Major General Farman, the senior logistician in theater and the "JUSMAT," would also come by. Having a two star logistics general in a logistics dependent exercise at the table will always increase the credibility of the liaison officer.

the meantime, he and Ronsick would cross-coordinate between their two civil-military tracks.

Finally, there was also interaction with other military units. For example, Petrella had to have a very good relationship with the SF Blackhawk pilots in order to produce at the nightly coordination meetings. While there was some initial ambivalence, they soon bought the Petrella logic: "We need to get the NGOs downrange to let them do their thing; otherwise, we will continue to do our thing."

This coordination circuit suggests the obvious: that there is no one single point of coordination in a system that, by definition, has no structure except for the one the military artificially, and temporarily, supplies. Because money, food, and related supplies are literally coming in from all over the world, there can be no comprehensive response structure. As a result, there can be no single point of contact through which all coordination is done. Some of the best coordination done, for instance, was when Petrella and Ronsick had dinner at the local hotel where all the NGOs were staying.⁶⁸

The successful CMOC then, is inherently a "floating" concept. While there may be a designated spot, the process naturally occurs according to the moment and the personalities. If this is the case, particularly in an initially fluid environment, a pre-conceived wire-diagram will hinder coordination before it begins.

⁶⁸ General Farnen also worked to encourage this process. He would invite the NGO leaders over, one at a time, to encourage, convince, and exchange information. This process did much to contribute to the NGO/military coordination.

The overall coordination network established in Diyarbakir and the mountain refugee camps proved most conducive to the common purpose of stopping the dying and the suffering. But, a purely humanitarian effort could not go on indefinitely. The continuing NGO/military relationship would reflect the political dynamics of bringing the Kurds out of the mountains.

L. TRANSITION TO ZAKHO

On April 18th, at 1800, General Shalikashvili had met with Iraqi generals to inform them of the coalition's intent to move into northern Iraq, according to UN Resolution 688, and that they should not interfere. On that same day, UN Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan signed an agreement with the Iraqi government permitting the UN to provide humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq.⁶⁹ On April 19th, JTF Bravo moved into Zakho (with Iraqis still in the surrounding hills). The next day, to demonstrate their humanitarian intent, the Marines began building the first temporary refugee camp. By late April, the security zone was pushing eastward in order to accomodate the returning Kurds.

If the Kurds had not been initially ready to go to Zakho, neither were the NGOs. "It was clear from the beginning that non-governmental organizations were reluctant to work in the operation. They especially feared being made pawns in American political policy and were fearful of the consequences of too close an

⁶⁹ This higher diplomacy was necessary in order to allow UNHCR to work in northern Iraq. According to its charter, the U.N. must be invited in by the host nation. Eventually, this logic rang true for the Iraqis if for no other reason than it was preferable to have the U.N. occupy their country over the long-term instead of a full-fledged coalition force.

association with the Coalition process."⁷⁰ NGO credibility rests on the ability to act independently. This independence is integral to the NGO identity and cannot be ignored. To be identified with the American or European governments, let alone their militaries, immediately brings to mind questions of motivation and purpose for the host government and its people, as well as an association with past imperialism.

Moreover, by mid-May, a well-established system of immediate relief had taken root in the mountain camps. Many of the NGOs felt that the refugee population was not medically or psychologically ready for movement.⁷¹ "Where the military and NGO cultures may have clashed most was when the political decision was made afar to move the refugees back to northern Iraq. The military put all or most of their efforts into that task, whereas the NGOs were still, quite rightly, concerned with the actual situation in the mountain camps."⁷² The NGOs also had concerns about their own safety. Indeed, as the original JTF Bravo Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs, Colonel John O. Easton, recalled, "it was difficult to blame the NGOs for not coming down from Diyarbakir earlier."⁷³

⁷⁰ "Kurdish Relief And Repatriation: DOD/AID-OFDA Partnership, The Kurdish Response After-Action Report," Operation Lessons section, p. 2. Washington D.C., December, 1991. [Hereafter cited as OFDA AAR].

⁷¹ This subject remains debatable among the participating military personnel. One member of JTF Bravo distinctly remembers that JTF Alpha very much had a "push" mentality (trying to get the Kurds out of the mountains, without waiting for the "pull" (establishing the right infrastructure to facilitate the entry and eventual departure of the Kurds from the temporary transit camps). It should also be noted that international law prohibits the forced movement of refugees.

⁷² Dr. Toole, 8 June 1995 fax to author.

⁷³ Easton, 25 May 1995.

On the other hand, according to several military observers, the Kurds were becoming more "picky" about the type and amount of aid given, particularly food stuffs.⁷⁴ Open to argument, what such an interpretation suggests is that the suffering and dying had been neutralized and that in order to prevent dependency, it was time to move the Kurds.

Ultimately, and to their credit, what brought the NGOs out of the mountains was the continuing need of the Kurds once they eventually decided to return to Zakho. This process was initiated by OFDA. As memories have already begun to blur regarding the specifics of time and words used, on or about May 2nd, and maybe over two to three visits, the DART's Ron Libby, Fred Cuny, and LTC Mike Hess went up to Diyarbakir to talk to the NGOs at the Majestic and Touristic Hotels. The strategy applied was one of Libby and Cuny doing most of the talking as they tried to persuade the NGOs to come to Zakho. (They were tough to ignore; Libby was a senior USG representative and Cuny was already internationally respected for his handling of previous emergencies). Second, and of equal importance, they were civilians trying to convince fellow civilians. Hess, as uniformed personnel, remained in the background.⁷⁵

This psychology was reinforced by a powerful reality: OFDA's checkbook and the military's logistics. OFDA, according to section 491 of the 1961 Foreign

⁷⁴ These types of requests from the refugee population suggest an intangible measure of effectiveness and transition marker for such operations. If the refugees have the strength and desire to complain about how they are being helped, then, perhaps, they are no longer in an unstable position and should therefore be encouraged to move.

⁷⁵ This background role becomes ironic later on because of the universal respect that Hess wins from the NGOs for being the military interface. However, in any initial interaction, stereotypes are ever present.

Assistance Act, is authorized to spend money on the spot to help alleviate a disaster. In short, with no regard for who gets the accolades, OFDA funds NGOs of their choosing in order to save lives in a cost-effective manner.⁷⁶ The military, on the other hand, offered the capacity to transport the relief supplies and build the transition camps for free.⁷⁷ Working with OFDA and the military could have its advantages.

For the American government and its military, the money was a small price to pay for a quick transition to civilian agencies and the exit of American military forces. The relationship, therefore, remained mutually beneficial to both the NGOs and the military. Thus the concept that Elmo had witnessed in Isikveren; the lesson that Petrella had learned in Diyarbakir; was also true in getting the NGOs to Zakho: leveraging the NGOs into the coordination game involved a subdued military presence as the money of OFDA, DOD, and the military's logistics and infrastructure presented its own additional logic through the personalities of key leaders.

M. ZAKHO TOWN

It was in Zakho that a unique phenomenon in the NGO/military relationship occurred: the NGOs established their own internal coordinating committee (to which Cuny and Hess were invited as observers). This congregation of NGOs was

⁷⁶ For example, OFDA gave a grant of \$1,336,174 dollars to the International Refugee Committee and \$821,340 dollars to CARE. "OFDA Situation Report No. 25 (Final)," July 17, 1991, p. 3. [Hereafter cited as OFDA No. 25].

⁷⁷ As of July 17, 1991, DOD had spent \$328,320,000 dollars on operation Provide Comfort. "OFDA No. 25," p. 4.

officially established on May 8th and became known as the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI). The first chairman of the NCCNI was elected by vote (Mark Gorman of IRC).⁷⁸

IRC, in keeping with the NGO stereotype, had come into the Kurdish mountains of its own accord during the third week of April. IRC was somewhat unique in that because it deals specifically with refugee issues, its knowledge base is not limited to one specialty (as it is with some other NGOs). Their command of such issues as camp administration, water purification, and sanitation earned immediate respect with the military. Moreover, IRC was unique because, contrary to all military stereotypes of NGOs, it provided a tactical capacity for NGO coordination. This development was of the utmost importance because it was at the NCCNI that NGO/military coordination actually took place.⁷⁹

N. THE NCCNI

When the plight of the Kurds first made the international headlines, Mark Gorman was in Thailand. He was IRC's representative to the refugee situation along the Cambodian border. He also happened to be the Chairman of the Coordination Committee of Displaced Persons (CCDP).⁸⁰ Given this experience,

⁷⁸ This process was, in part, facilitated by Stefan DeMistura, the U.N.'s special coordinator.

⁷⁹ Although a CMOC was established on May 4th at the JTF headquarters at the outskirts of Zakho near the granary complex, the coordination of NGOs and the military took place 1.5 miles away in refugee camp Number One (also known as Camp Jayhawk).

⁸⁰ The CCDP met daily with anywhere between forty and sixty NGOs participating. It also met monthly with other civilian agencies such as the Thai government and the UN. (Gorman, 16 May 1995).

Gorman called IRC's headquarters in New York and volunteered his services at the end of April. By May 3rd he was in Zakho and by the 8th, the NCCNI had been established under the auspices of the UNHCR.⁸¹

Because of its unprecedented use with American military forces, it is important to quote some of the NCCNI by-laws:

- NCCNI Goal: To ensure that returning refugees and displaced persons are provided coordinated and appropriate services until that time that indigenous systems can assume primary responsibility.
- NCCNI Objectives:
 1. Coordinate with Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, International Military Forces, Embassies, and the Host Country Government to ensure that the level of services are appropriate and coordinated.
 2. Provide a mechanism which evaluates assistance needs and makes recommendations as to how those needs can most appropriately be met.
 3. Foster an environment which encourages collaboration rather than competition between the implementing agencies.
 4. Establish a system which agencies wanting to become operational in Iraq can interface in order to capitalize on resources and avoid duplication of services.⁸²

The NCCNI also established basic by-laws for meetings, chairmanship, and the processes by which decisions were reached. Essentially, issues were decided by votes with the NCCNI Executive Committee resolving any particularly contentious issue.

⁸¹ Gorman's quick results were made possible because of Fred Cuny's and Mark Frohardt's (of Cuny's Intertech) initial endeavor to organize the NGOs already present in Zakho. (Gorman, 9 May 1995).

⁸² "NGO Coordinating Committee -- Northern Iraq Charter and By-laws," 8 May 1991, p. 2. Courtesy of Mark Gorman.

The conceptual and tactical importance of the NCCNI, then and now, cannot be emphasized enough. This mechanism allowed for a single NGO voice with which the military could coordinate. It is in the NCCNI and the resulting collaboration and coordination that a model for the future presents itself.

O. THE CAMP

First and foremost, the NCCNI was located in Camp Number One, not at the JTF headquarters. Additionally, the material support for the NCCNI, as well as the NGO personnel who lived in the camp, came from the military.⁸³ Absolutely critical to the collaboration process was the fact that Hess and Cuny lived in the camp itself. In fact, they shared the same tent next to the NCCNI. In so doing, the people responsible for coordinating could not help but get to know one another outside the professional responsibilities they represented at the coordination meetings. For example, all interviewed remember shaving at the "water bull," fighting for cold water in the morning, and standing in the mess lines together. While there was inevitable tension as everyone grew accustomed to each other's living habits, the stereotype walls quickly came down.

Gorman, for instance, had had a previously negative impression of all militaries. Based on his extensive experience in the third world, he associated military personnel with oppression. "Militaries," he observed, "are usually party to

⁸³ The NCCNI tent was later moved across the street to the UNHCR compound.

creating refugees."⁸⁴ By the end of his month-long experience of living with the military he had the following impression: "If they hadn't have been there, it would have been much different. They provide horsepower and efficiency . . . [The relationship was] a real honest partnership [and I have] a profound respect for the military."⁸⁵ On the other hand, Hess reflects that the NGOs are "dedicated, caring, unselfish, and very giving."⁸⁶ It was during the meetings of the NCCNI that this emerging mutual respect further delineated itself.

P. THE MEETING

Meetings were held every night at 2000. Much like the other NGO meetings described, it was voluntary and any participant was welcome to comment. Gorman, as the first chairman, acted as orchestrator in an action-oriented atmosphere. The various NGOs presented reports, unmet needs were decided upon, and surfacing problems/potential issues were discussed. Hess also provided situational reports to the NCCNI. This information proved important because it presented the bigger picture and a certain continuity and connectivity to the rest of the emergency effort.⁸⁷ Both sets of assessments were compared against each other for veracity.

⁸⁴ Gorman, 9 May 1995.

⁸⁵ Gorman, 9 May 1995.

⁸⁶ Hess, 11 May 1995.

⁸⁷ Initially the military assessments reflected the number and condition of the refugees still in the mountain camps; later, they were about the status of villages in the rest of the security zone and their readiness for refugee return.

Based on the synthesized information, priorities became apparent. Then it was simply a matter of assignment: "who would like to provide food/water distribution for Camp Number Two? Who can do sanitation for Camp Number Three?"⁸⁸ Within this framework, another phenomenon took place: NGOs developed "joint" support teams according to the need. For instance, sanitation experts from different NGOs would combine to maximize their efforts. A very unique act for the NGOs, it was welcomed by the military as essential to a comprehensive effort.

However, the evolution of the NCCNI, the sharing of information, the prioritizing of needs, and the "jointness" of the NGOs were encouraged by two final factors, both equally human. First, the NGOs were driven together out of necessity. As Gorman notes, the UNHCR was very weak and did not take any lead role in organizing the NGOs. Consequently, the NGOs were the only ones there: the common sense of a need for a comprehensive effort could not be ignored. Complementing this fact was a simple shortage of NGOs. Because the need was so great, they did not have time to worry about inter-NGO rivalries or the development of turf.

Finally, a weak UNHCR and lack of NGO competition aside, all participants were brought together by the power of the moment. Realizing the precarious precipice that the Kurds had been on, it was nothing short of miraculous to witness

⁸⁸ As the Kurds came out of the mountains, Camp Number One quickly filled up (20,000 people by 10 May). Camp Two was full by 18 May. Eventually, four camps were built although the sole point of coordination remained with the NCCNI in Camp Number One.

them come out of the mountains. One and all remember the feeling of watching the Kurds coming home. This feeling in and of itself was enough to make for a cohesive coordination effort. The significance of these efforts are indicated in the following statistics.

<u>Mountain Camp</u>	<u>20-25 April Population</u>	<u>23 May Population</u>
Isikveren	87,000	Closed
Uzumlu	50,000	900
Amaskopru	30,000	2,200
Cukurca	60-100,000	56,500
Pirincken	15,000	200
Yesilova	7,500	Closed
Semdinli	15,000	6,500
Karasu	30,000	Closed
Kayadibi	10,000	Closed
<u>Silopi</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>5,700</u>
Total:	394-434,000	69,500 ⁸⁹

By the end of May, CARE had set up in the actual CMOC in Zakho as they prepared to take over all food distribution on June 1st.⁹⁰ In the camps, the Civil Affairs personnel were turning over the administration of the transition camps to the NGOs. On June 4th, the CMOC shut down. Operation Provide Comfort, now in stage III, continues today.

⁸⁹ 30 May 1991 Operation Provide Comfort Brief for General Colin L. Powell, Incirlik AFB. Courtesy of LTC Patrick Murphy, USAR. Murphy ran the CMOC at Incirlik. The camp at Cukurca had the most refugees and was located the furthest east. Its drawdown necessarily took a little longer.

⁹⁰ Almost five years later, this seemingly insignificant event becomes very symbolic. Certainly there was a transition plan and it involved a number of fusion points. However, when Kevin Henry and Paul Barker of CARE physically move into the CMOC in late May and begin to assume the responsibilities of the military's infrastructure, it is here that the "transition to civilian agencies" actually takes place.

Q. CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS

What can we learn from this first case study of the CMOC and NGO/military relations? The lessons learned, like the above story told, are a matter of placing the collaboration and coordination of the NGOs and the military within the proper political and emergency context. Only by understanding the impact of military and NGO presence within a continuum of humanitarian effort can one truly grasp the strategic, operational, and tactical lessons of bilateral coordination between the NGO community and the military.

R. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT

Security and humanitarian efforts will inevitably encourage a people, creating various expectations. How these expectations manifest themselves depends on the people being helped. For example, Jalal Talabani, the leader of one of the largest Kurdish factions, stated that "We are closer than ever to autonomy, this is the best chance [for autonomy] that we've had this century."⁹¹ This opinion was exactly what Turkey and the United States feared most. Talabani's statement materialized in Dohuk where the *Peshmerga* were emboldened to take military action against the Iraqis at the end of May.

Also, remember again the general SF perception of the NGOs in the mountains: that the outside aid was beginning to encourage complacency and

⁹¹ *The St. Petersburg Times*, "In Iran, Politics Thwarts Efforts To Help Refugees," 9 May 1991, p. 3A.

dependency. In every humanitarian intervention, the overall effort creates different expectations and interpretations among the helped as well as those helping. It can sometimes be a world of unintended consequences. At a minimum, the NGOs and the military have a responsibility to repeatedly state the limits of their efforts to each other and to those they help. False expectations are easily created, and dangerous, if not confronted daily with the simple basic truth.

The example of CARE illustrates this positive awareness. "Establishment of clear objectives and unacceptable risks was a key element of CARE's strategy. By fixing such a framework early on, the project, paradoxically, had great flexibility for being linked to goals and circumscribed by some parameters."⁹² CARE defined its mission and refused to be involved in anything else. The following conditions will require that CARE close down its Food Management Operations:

1. Lack of security for CARE's staff.
2. Lack of security of Stocks.
3. Inability to support North Iraq operation through Turkey.
4. CARE is able to accept its current lack of legal status for itself as an organization and for its staff, provided it is able to support its staff and operation in North Iraq through Turkey and that UNHCR continue its presence.

The specifications of risks which CARE cannot accept will guide field operations and help CARE ensure the safety of its staff. CARE is conscious of its

⁹² CARE International, "Emergency Commodity Management Project, Northern Iraq, Final Report," July 30, 1991, p. 17. Unpublished report courtesy of Dr. Sandra Laumark, then CARE country director for Turkey.

role as a "human shield" for the security of Northern Iraq. This role has definite limits.⁹³ By clearly stating its objectives and its awareness of the larger picture, CARE protected its own self-interests while simultaneously making it easier to incorporate CARE into the comprehensive transition (everyone knew where CARE stood).

CARE's actions reflect a keen awareness of its responsibilities, to itself and within a multifarious effort. The SF training and ethos also recognized this necessity. Due to a distinct lack of NGO presence, the military, particularly in the mountain camps and also in Zakho, was responsible for addressing the immediate needs of the refugees. De facto, the military was handling the security and relief. In many ways, the SF were an instantaneous continuum encompassing the role of the U.N., OFDA, NGO, and military security.⁹⁴

In part, this effort was handled so well because this phase of the emergency -- life-saving -- is intrinsic to soldiering. It was also "pure humanitarian" and, therefore, in keeping with the directives of the National Command Authority for Provide Comfort.⁹⁵ This "purely humanitarian" understanding of the situation, however, begs the most difficult question of humanitarian relief: What to do when

⁹³ CARE International, "North Iraq Food Management Operation, Strategy Paper," June 1, 1991, pp. 4-5. Unpublished report courtesy of Dr. Laumark.

⁹⁴ Dayton Maxwell remembers conversations with various NGOs about the superb performance of Special Forces. Not only were the NGOs impressed with their skill in basic life sustaining skills, they were surprised at the SF sensitivity to the refugees and the way they collected information for their assessments. (For example, the SF asked the mothers for information, as opposed to the men. It is the women who are instrumental to assessing the emergency health needs).

⁹⁵ Powers, 25 May 1995. Also, remember President Bush's April 16th words: the decision to go into northern Iraq was "purely humanitarian."

however, begs the most difficult question of humanitarian relief: What to do when the emergency has been stabilized? What does a military force and a humanitarian community provide to a population that is politically emboldened and possibly humanitarian dependent?

The "military didn't know what to do. It had been tasked to provide assistance, but didn't know what that meant."⁹⁶ How would the military have acted if there had been no OFDA DART or Fred Cuny? Could a transition to civilian authorities have taken place so smoothly with the transit camps built right on the border as originally intended in tight military grids? Could the military have come up with the necessary carrots and sticks to motivate the civilian agencies and the refugees to come down off the mountains? These are tough questions to which the answer is: "probably not."

This hypothetical answer is not an indictment of the US military. There are so many factors and components to a complex humanitarian emergency such as this that no single organization could possibly account for them all. However, to not be aware of these other factors -- to not realize one's place in a continuum of effort -- is to not understand the inherent socio-economic-political-civil dimensions of such an emergency.

"They still don't get what they did right; they talk in terms of logistics: the number of tents put up, the number of latrines built . . . the military thinks the goal is feeding people, giving medical attention . . . that's wrong, *they must change the*

⁹⁶ Libby, 19 May 1995.

*course of conflict in a way that saves lives.*⁹⁷ While the military may have understood the immediate answer to the situation, it, as a whole, did not quite comprehend how it should fit itself into the overall continuum of an effort that had to be a building block towards a lasting solution.⁹⁸

The rebuttal to this supposition is that the military does not need to understand this continuum, if it exists, because it is the instrument of the NCA. True, theoretically speaking. However, recall that while there was a common understanding of the nature of the emergency, there was no strategic end-state coming from Washington. In fact, Washington, although playing catch-up with the situation, viewed the situation much differently than those on the ground.

At a time when the major objective was getting people [U.S. Troops] home, actions that could have accelerated the repatriation and reintegration process, such as economic incentives, assistance with harvest, etc., were often restricted or discouraged from Washington. In extraordinary operations, extraordinary flexibility needs to be granted. What appears to be "reconstruction" to Washington may be practical or operational necessity at the field level.⁹⁹

Substitute "nation-building" for "reconstruction" and the potential for a significant problem begins to emerge. With the perception that a short troop commitment was the key to success, the primary purpose of the troops and the

⁹⁷ Natsios, 16 January 1995.

⁹⁸ The obvious and significant exception to this generalization is Special Forces (even though they, too, would have been hard-pressed to address the political dimension of a humanitarian continuum). Beyond the scope of this work, what if a conventional force had been asked to do the job of the 10th SFG? The only reason that 1/10 was the first group in was because they happened to already be in the area of operations (Florer, 9 June 1995).

⁹⁹ OFDA AAR, "Lessons Learned From Operation Provide Comfort," p. 3.

duration of their stay now becomes political -- they must come home, soon. As a result, any "reconstruction" (nation-building) impedes that possibility. "No quagmires" thinks the Washington policy-maker. With such a position, the military's humanitarian purpose becomes secondary because its primary political purpose is to get out soon. Fortunately, this logic did not have a chance to manifest itself as, with no time to waste, the military and humanitarian operator on the ground was forced to solve the problem according to the humanitarian intent.

Yet, while the NGO community or the military may or may not be driving the policy, as Cuny did, each has the responsibility to be aware of a conceptual end-state. Dayton Maxwell suggests what all military commanders would recognize in a "military" situation: that "strategic planning is absolutely necessary. There must be a conceptual end-state. This end-state will dictate the day-to-day operations. That definition may and likely will change as the realities of a situation evolve, but that definition is essential to determining actions to be taken."¹⁰⁰ The military and NGO must seek each other out pursuant such a general definition as they both recognize the relief continuum and its relationship to their individual and collective efforts. "It is also clear that the military is most effective in the earlier stages than in the intermediate and longer term activities. By

¹⁰⁰ Maxwell, 26 May 1995.

coincidence, the NGOs tended to be less effective in the earlier stages and more effective in the later period."¹⁰¹

Regarding the military, specifically, it must be aware of the other factors beyond the simple and relatively short stage of "pure humanitarian" work. If it is not aware of the total civil dimension -- socio-economic-civil-municipal-and political -- and the various bridges that must be maintained in order to reestablish these facets of the total civil dimension (if for no other reason than to turn these links back over to the NGOs, UN, or host nation), it may negate the overall continuum of effort before it begins. If nothing else, the military will potentially hurt its own endeavors once the humanitarian situation stabilizes as the expectations and thoughts of the afflicted people return to other than life-threatening matters. This conceptual end-state awareness should be provided by the Executive Branch. As discussed above, this awareness may not always be the case.¹⁰² If there is no end-state awareness, then the military must work to create it in conjunction with the indigenous and other humanitarian authorities at the operational level.

¹⁰¹ OFDA-AAR, "Operational Lessons," p. 6.

¹⁰² This brief discussion does not suggest that US forces be engaged in "nation-building" wherever it goes. It simply suggests that the building blocks to recovery, rehabilitation, and restoration must be nurtured in the immediate response stage. If not, the effort becomes little more than a band-aid that cannot be built upon by those who replace the US effort. Natsios' words come to mind: [it is the opportunity] "to change the course of the conflict." If this attitude is not adopted or at least attempted, the problem will simply resume course after US departure, eventually inviting its return.

S. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Strategically, NGOs and the military must ensure that their senior decision-makers are not only talking, but that they are encouraging their stateside counterparts to be talking. There is no evidence that NGOs or the DOD was making an effort to coordinate with one another. The only effort of this kind was made by OFDA.¹⁰³

Secondly, there can be no solutions without security. The reader is reminded that while this chapter's argument focuses on the humanitarian track of the military's relationship with NGOs, the security mission existed simultaneously throughout the effort. The Kurds would not come out of the mountains until they were assured their security. The same went for the NGOs. Security is a critical necessity for any US military/NGO relationship to take place in an operation with potential for a significant armed threat.

The final strategic lesson need not be belabored: the common understanding of the problem was self-evident. The ability to actualize the "how" and turn it into a strategic vision that is politically acceptable is the difference. The NGO/military personnel can contribute to this process by actively participating in their own "chains-of-command," pressuring their stateside leaders to advocate for a certain policy, and by seeking each other out at the operational level.

¹⁰³ Maxwell was calling back to Fred Cole at the State Department to solicit further NGO help. This interaction produced positive results as CARE sent additional people directly to Zakho (Kevin Henry and Paul Barker, for example, were pulled from other areas of the world to meet the emergency need).

T. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

NGO/military personnel must realize that collaboration/coordination is taking place everywhere within an affected area between and among the people implementing the various policies of the participants. Implied herein is the imperative assumption that there is no structure. Food, money, organizations all fly into an emergency situation from all over the world. The military can present a nominal infrastructure, but there are too many moving parts for it to be coordinated from one spot, at least initially. Therefore, there must be an extraordinary effort at redundant communication (which does not mean micro-management) and the development of a 'network' that can comprehend the overall emergency and response. The Civil Affairs and OFDA personnel personify this understanding best.

At every significant fusion point -- in the mountains, at Incirlik and Diyarbakir, and in Zakho -- the Civil Affairs multi-layered presence did much for the coordination process. Partly the result of infrastructure, partly the result of foresight, the CA connectivity was essential to understanding the overall situation.¹⁰⁴ Of course, this type of fusion is precisely what they are designed for: "CA units are specifically structured to serve as the commander's executive agent

¹⁰⁴ An interesting vignette is Major General Campbell's encouragement of this process. John Petrella and Major Ted Higgins were from the same reserve unit and knew each other well (Higgins had actually come at Petrella's request). Undoubtedly a good team, Campbell quite consciously kept them separated, knowing full well that they would talk to each other to make sure that each had the "real scoop." (Petrella, 14 May 1995).

for Civil-Military operations."¹⁰⁵ It should be recognized, however, that the mere presence of Civil Affairs officers did not guarantee the CA success. A liaison does not constitute a relationship. They were also both personable and aggressive in their effort. Largely because these men and women hold civilian jobs (making them a natural bridge to other civilians) and have been trained to think about other than military considerations in a military environment, they will always make a considerable contribution to the success of a humanitarian operation. To ignore these organic skills, is to considerably lessen the Department of Defense's opportunity for success.¹⁰⁶

OFDA, due to its humanitarian expertise, remains the quintessential example. Because they had a relatively large team, they were able to "plug" in at almost every fusion point. Their greatest strength, however, was to stay "plugged" in while "floating."¹⁰⁷ With their finger ever on the pulse of the situation, and acting as a "mobile comptroller," they were able to anticipate problems and develop a strategy.¹⁰⁸ "If the role of DOD is to arrive first with the best capability, the role

¹⁰⁵ Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, "Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance," NO. 92-6, December 1992, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Interestingly, they were almost not included in the operation. The original EUCOM plan for Provide Comfort did not enlist the CA support. Because LTC Hess called it to the attention of Brigadier General Anthony Zinni, CA was included. Zinni responded to Hess's suggestion by saying: "this is the glue that will hold it together." (Hess, 9 May 1995; Zinni, 5 October 1995).

¹⁰⁷ In the terminology of 1995, the DART team was a "floating HOC" (the Humanitarian Operations Center, to make its debut in Somalia) that dovetailed quite nicely with the CMOC and its de facto coordination site, the NCCNI.

¹⁰⁸ Maxwell suggested one major mistake on his part in this floating structure. There needed to be a permanent 'senior' OFDA representative at the decision making level back in Incirlik. This step would have kept the CTF headquarters better informed as to the pace of events and the strategy being devised. At the least, as Bill Garvelink has suggested, the DART team leader should have been back in Incirlik three times a week.

of OFDA is to expedite the transition from a unilateral government response to a multilateral international one."¹⁰⁹ All together, the DART was the "floating glue" that transcended the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of play and interaction. They are imperative. Both the CA and OFDA efforts serve as a prototype for how to form an information network in response to such a spread-out emergency.

A second lesson is that the military cannot be in charge. It must work with the NGOs in order to alleviate the suffering and quicken the military's departure. "There is no structure; if you tell the NGOs what to do, they say piss on you and then you've lost them; and that is the worst thing that can happen."¹¹⁰ It is in a spirit of accommodation and collaboration that coordination takes place. For example, the acknowledged success in Diyarbakir occurred because "we [the military] didn't come on like gangbusters . . . we facilitated, swapped information, and let them [the NGOs] know what we could do for them."¹¹¹ It is this physically subdued and attitudinally supportive presence that ensured success in Provide Comfort.

This type of attitude and support sometimes invites the military snicker against those doing the NGO coordination that "they've gone native." The response of every Civil Affairs officer, for example, was the same: NGOs are the ticket

¹⁰⁹ OFDA--AAR, "OFDA Joint Operations With DOD in Kurdish Emergency," p. 3.

¹¹⁰ Libby, 19 May 1995.

¹¹¹ Petrella, 12 May 1995.

home. Or as Major General Campbell said, "they [the NGOs and the other civilian agencies] were the only thing that made sense."¹¹² While this type of interaction with the NGOs may seem "touchy-feely" to the warfighters of the military, this interaction is also a calculating rationale. In short, the military needs the NGOs to exit. To exit, the military cannot assume, assert, or act in control.

Moreover, the military needs to be aware that its very nature may present a self-defeating byproduct: being "in charge" actually contributes to mission creep. Four examples will suffice.

1. "The amount of money spent by the military on latrine in the Zakho camps was more than the entire amount spent by UNHCR for sanitation last year [1990] in its world-wide operations."¹¹³
2. In Zakho, military surgeons wanted to bring in three MASH units to administer aid. There were already three Kurd hospitals in Zakho.¹¹⁴
3. After initial points of contact had been established between and among the various players in early April -- to a point that was comfortable to OFDA and the NGOs -- the military embarked on what Dayton Maxwell calls the "stacking phenomenon." Essentially, despite a comfortable and appropriate number of coordination people in early April, the military came in and built its stovepipe, layering or stacking the levels of bureaucracy. Each new unit or layer had its own definition of "humanitarian aid," had a tendency to start from scratch, and ignored prior planning while coordination was inevitably hindered. These units, in his opinion, "would charge forth from this perspective," making it very hard to coordinate them with the original players who already understood the situation.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Telephone interview with Major General Campbell, USAR, 16 May 1995. General Campbell was the Civil Affairs component commander under General Shalikashvili.

¹¹³ OFDA--AAR, "Operations Lessons," p. 1.

¹¹⁴ Hess, 11 May 1995.

¹¹⁵ Maxwell, 26 May 1995.

4. When some superior officers visited LTC Petrella in Diyarbakir, they asked, "Lieutenant Colonel, why isn't this outfit better organized?" (implying that there needed to be a neat, military structure with the appropriate wire-diagram). Petrella's response: "My job is not to take this thing over."¹¹⁶

These examples reflect a conventional mindset that sought to develop a familiar construct; one in which everything had its proper place and role. It also reflects a mentality that will apply the tools available just because they are in the tool chest -- as opposed to applying them because they are appropriate.

The military complains about "mission creep," but its very nature encourages it. Why build one of the best refugee latrine systems in the world when your admitted end-state is to transfer the refugees back home? Why bring in MASH units and administer health problems with imported doctors when there was no immediate emergency? If there is a minimal infrastructure in place that is working, why add to it? Why organize a pristine flow chart if your desire is to be there for as little a time as possible? Even General Garner admits that, if he had to do it over again, he would have kept the 24th MEU staff as his primary staff and not have brought in his own.¹¹⁷

Ronald Libby drives the conceptual point home: "Don't try and do other people's jobs . . . Help those who are doing the job." Imperatively, he notes, "If you [the military] take charge, you can't leave. *If you take charge, you lose.*"¹¹⁸ As

¹¹⁶ Petrella, 12 May 1995.

¹¹⁷ Telephone interview with Lieutenant General Jay Garner, USA, 12 July 1995.

¹¹⁸ Libby, 19 May 1995.

Fred Cuny repeatedly told Michael Hess, the military "does infrastructure. No programs."¹¹⁹

U. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Humanitarian intervention is a people intensive process. For example, the successful role of OFDA and CA is not about institutional structure. OFDA, CA, and the overall effort succeed because of the people involved. In short, the personalities of key billet holders make an essential difference throughout the relief effort. Although no news flash to those accustomed to leadership, this point is an important one to make given the unique circumstances of the situation. Thus, we should take some time to grasp the full impact of military leadership in this type of environment.

This adaptive leadership style started at the top. General Shalikashvili's guidance in the face of an unencountered phenomenon was simple: do the right thing.¹²⁰ The right thing was a supportive style of leadership recognizing that transition to civilian agencies was the key to the military's exit strategy. No one better personified this than Major General Jay Garner. Ron Libby notes that Garner repeatedly stated purpose was: "tell us how we can support you."¹²¹ According to Captain Lawrence Naab, Garner "gave general guidance and didn't

¹¹⁹ Hess, 11 May 1995.

¹²⁰ Campbell, 16 May 1995.

¹²¹ Libby, 19 May 1995.

get into specifics [i.e., micro-manage]; he let the experts handle what they knew."¹²² This attitude permeated the entire structure of the response. Kevin Henry of CARE, who arrived in northern Iraq in early May, recalls that "every time support was requested it was there. There was no, 'I'll get to it or that is not in keeping with the regulations;' [they] made it happen."¹²³ Simply, if Garner had had an "I'm in charge attitude, we'd still be there."¹²⁴

In one sense, the situation demanded this type of personality from the military's commanders. As Colonel Robert Beahm matter-of-factly observed of General Shalikashvili's guidance, it was the right guidance because he "didn't know what to do either . . . They don't teach you at war college what to do when a 1/2 million people are dying."¹²⁵ The situation, however, did not necessarily dictate the above type of personality with everyone. General Potter, for example, seemed to fit the humanitarian stereotype of the military. According to several reports, he did not care about Civil Affairs, nor did he hold the NGOs in high regard. There was also the general feeling that all he wanted to do was shut down the mountain camps and get out of there. If all of the military's leadership, rightly or wrongly,

¹²² Telephone interview with Captain Lawrence Naab, USAR, 24 May 1995.

¹²³ Henry, 17 May 1995. Henry also adds that General Campbell even gave him a ride back to Incirlik once; something he found atypical for a general. Bill Garvalink relates how, as soon as he showed up, Garner took him out in his helicopter for almost ten hours, getting him appropriately acquainted with the emergency.

¹²⁴ Telephone interview with Brigadier General Bob Beahm, 24 May 1995. Then Colonel Beahm replaced Colonel Easton as Garner's Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs.

¹²⁵ Beahm, 24 May 1995.

had been perceived as such, the end-result of NGO/military coordination might have been quite different.¹²⁶

An additional extrapolation results from this discussion of personality and perception. Because personality has such a large role to play in a situation for which there is no blueprint, the wire-diagram of coordination relationship is a reference point, at best. In JTF Alpha, for example, there was no time, or sufficient CA personnel, to set up even unofficial CMOCs. There were simply meetings because necessity called for it. In JTF Bravo, the CMOC existed, but the place where it had been set up was not the primary site to realize the transition to civilian agencies. LTC Hess had taken the CMOC to the NGOs.

In doing so, Hess vitalized the "O" in CMOC. By attending the NCCNI meetings with Cuny and living with the NGOs, Hess created a conducive atmosphere through which to meet the needs of the NGOs. This simple point cannot be overemphasized. If a traditional officer had waited at the CMOC 1.5 miles away, he would still be there waiting. Hess' proactive example of taking the coordination to the field while simultaneously establishing a working rapport with the NGOs is the proper conceptual model for all contingencies.

These points beg two questions: 1) Does Kurdistan succeed because of a decided lack of doctrine; and/or 2) Does the development of doctrine up to 1995

¹²⁶ General Potter's stereotype is held up in purposeful juxtaposition to illustrate just how much perception is an important part of reality. To his credit, everyone agrees that he did consult Ronald Libby and Dr. Ronald Waldeman (of CDC) before making any humanitarian moves.

prohibit the likelihood of such a response in the future, *i.e.*, does it encourage the military mindset of checklists over proactive personalities?

Although, at this point, the purpose is not to answer these basic questions, some general thoughts should be noted. On the one hand, due to the suddenness of the mission and the deployment of SF first, one has to wonder whether or not the conventional military, despite the "stacking phenomenon," was stripped of the opportunity to behave according to its organizational self: taking charge. With no precedent and no chance to develop any checklists, did the circumstances of the situation force the conventional military to be more receptive to the humanitarian concerns?

Additionally, from the NGO perspective, did the circumstances strip them of the opportunity to behave traditionally? Because there was no NGO presence prior to the emergency and that there were only nine NGOs in Zakho on April 26th, were they not forced to work together because the need was so great (instead of competing for "turf")? Because the UNHCR provided no infrastructure, did not the NGOs have to come to grips with the situation themselves, even before the CMOC suggestion? Has the NGO community, like the military, even attempted to codify some of their experiences, at least within their own organizations, if not community-wide? As we will see in *Operation Support Hope* (Rwanda), both the military and the NGOs welcomed the chance to be their traditional selves.

While it is useful to raise these issues for future discussion, it is perhaps more important to note the final two tactical, and most important overall, lessons of coordination. First, there is the principle of "altruistic self-interest." This

principle suggests that there is indeed an "invisible hand" to the humanitarian effort. As the reader will recall, each time the NGOs and the military coordinated, each side had something to offer the other. The NGOs offered expertise and transition; the military offered security, an instant infrastructure to address the situation, and the logistics to enable the response. Implicitly, the military also offered, like OFDA, a lot of money up front to make the mission happen.

In return, the NGOs received help, in a supportive and conducive manner, that they never could have developed or harnessed according to their corporate community. Moreover, not only were they helped, but they were empowered to remain and sustain. The military received a ticket home. By using their comparative advantages of security, infrastructure and logistics, they leveraged the NGOs into a comprehensive effort that is generally anomalous to their condition.

The way this exchange of services was achieved was at the meeting table, tent, or area. Again, it was not achieved simply because both sides completely trusted the other. It was achieved because the various players at the coordination meeting meant one thing: transparency. Because there were so many methods of receiving information -- OFDA, the various NGOs, the SF assessment reports, the conventional military reports, and, later, UNHCR -- a clear picture could not help but emerge. And even if it was not clear, someone pushing an agenda too hard would be. By seeking to be all-inclusive and to invite the participation of all the agencies that had something to offer, truth emerged at the coordination meeting. Although speaking about the NGO/military effort in Zakho during May, Kevin

Henry's summation is a fitting description of the entire initial stage of the emergency:

All the parts fell into place. All had their own reason to cooperate -- personal, institutional, or altruistic -- and it fit together perfectly. (Unlike Somalia). Hess was atypical military, not meeting any stereotypes; the NGOs had good people; and OFDA, an important part of the success formula, also had the authority on the ground to spend money.¹²⁷

V. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT COORDINATION PRINCIPLES

It is helpful, based on the specific lessons above, to conclude this chapter by signifying some emerging Principles of Coordination between the NGOs and the military.

1. The military should not be in charge. Given a decided misunderstanding of how it fit into the overall continuum of effort and its political role; its own desire to "stack" layers of bureaucracy; and its desire to exit quickly, the military must seek to help the helper as it works to ensure that its relatively quick departure enables the overall humanitarian effort.
2. There actually may be things in common: professionalism, can-do attitude, respect for life, unity of effort in the face of the overwhelming power of the moment, etc. These elements need to be carefully examined as building blocks between two different types of organizations. Interestingly, both organizations pride themselves on their sensitivity to the cultures of the world, yet they did not initially apply this type of sensitivity towards each other. In the end, success resulted because individuals were able to shed old mindsets as the situation itself stripped both organizations of a chance to be themselves.

¹²⁷ Henry, 17 May 1995.

3. The CMOC, or the idea of coordination, is a floating concept that may even manifest itself individually (witness the Petrella scenario in Diyarbakir). While ultimately manifested at a particular place and time, this place and time may not necessarily be where military doctrine appoints it to be.
4. The selection of the NGO/military interface personnel is critical. The selection of the military commander is equally important. Although this thesis has attempted to describe the key personalities in such a way that specific lessons can be taken away and institutionalized, the intangible of personality is undeniably a central factor.
5. The coordination structure is one of descending decentralization. The CMOC in Incirlik had overheads and daily briefings; the CMOC in Zakho actually coordinated with the NGOs in the refugee camps; in the mountain refugee camps, the coordination with NGOs took place in a catch-as-catch-can manner before it evolved into a regular meeting time.
6. In particular, the Zakho NGO/Military coordination succeeds because there was a secure environment and the coordination structure (*i.e.*, Hess) was trusted by higher authority to collocate and collaborate with the NGOs.
7. Not to be expected, a viable NGO coordination center is extremely helpful to the overall comprehensive effort. The idea of the NCCNI is a powerful one that needs further examination from the NGO community.¹²⁸
8. A relief/dependency mindset must not be encouraged at any cost. Encourage self-reliance and be careful of creating dependency. Odd measures of effectiveness become important. Refugees bickering with the relief and military personnel over the food delivered, for instance, could be a sign that they are ready to move.
9. Call it what you may, but the cornerstone of NGO/military interaction is "altruistic self-interest." There is a common goal for different purposes and ends. There is nothing wrong with this observation, in fact, it is perfectly human. Each side must walk away from the coordination process with something in hand.

¹²⁸ Julia Taft, President and CEO of Interaction, suggests that this concept could easily be developed into a "rapid deployment kit." (Telephone interview with Julia Taft, 11 July 1995).

10. Transparency is the only way to guarantee that altruistic self-interest is practiced. Truth will only emerge in the presence of multiple surveyors of the same reality.

III. OPERATION SEA ANGEL

A. INTRODUCTION

As the first Kurds began to trickle into Zakho, Tropical Cyclone 02B, "Marian," battered the coast of Bangladesh from Chittagong to Cox's Bazar. For eight hours during the night and morning of April 29th-30th, 140 mph winds created and drove a twenty-foot tidal surge into a coast that is barely above sea level. In a country possessing 2000 people per square mile, with thousands living on *chars* (literally sand banks that are at sea level during high-tide), the devastation was immediate and overwhelming. The final death toll was somewhere between 139,000 and 152,000 people.

In the face of this catastrophic loss -- to include infrastructure, particularly communications and washed out roads -- the newly elected Bangladeshi government and its military struggled to meet the needs of its people. Equally affected were the national and international NGOs, primarily based in the capital of Dhaka, who could not get their supplies and foodstuffs to the coast, the outer shore islands, and the hundreds of *chars*. On May 6th, American Ambassador to Bangladesh, William B. Milam, officially inquired of Pacific Command in Hawaii about the possibility of military support for the relief effort. On May 11th, President Bush announced that a joint task force (JTF) would be sent to Bangladesh to aid in the relief effort.

On May 12th, Major General Henry Stackpole, commander of III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, Japan), landed with an

advance party in Dhaka, where they established a JTF headquarters. Already en route back from the Gulf War, the 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) arrived off the coast of Chittagong on May 15th. The force, ultimately under the guidance of Ambassador Milam and the Bangladeshi government, but directed by General Stackpole, quickly liaised with the coordination center in Chittagong established by the JTF forward command element. This center became the focal point for the relief effort.¹²⁹ By May 29th, 5th MEB had sailed for home. On June 7th, the JTF forward element shut down operations in Chittagong. On June 13th, the emergency over with, and the Bangladeshi government fully enabled to address the remaining problems, the last American JTF personnel redeployed.

The NGO/military relationship would again prove pivotal in this humanitarian relief effort. Despite little or no knowledge of each other prior to their mutual effort, this relationship, like the one in northern Iraq, resulted in new-found respect. "The NGOs proved to be highly efficient organizations, adept at identifying needs and procuring needed supplies."¹³⁰ Indeed, "one of the greatest lessons to come out of SEA ANGEL was the efficacy of [the NGOs]."¹³¹ Overall,

¹²⁹ A coordination point at Cox's Bazar was later created (19 May 1991). This study does not take into account the nine day effort there.

¹³⁰ Paul A. McCarthy, "Operation Sea Angel, A Case Study," (RAND), p. 15. [Hereafter cited as OSA, McCarthy].

¹³¹ Colonel Gary W. Anderson, "Operation Sea Angel; A Retrospective on the 1991 Humanitarian Relief Operation in Bangladesh," an unpublished Naval War College paper, p. 39. [Hereafter cited as OSA, Anderson]. Then Lieutenant Colonel Anderson was the J-3 (in charge of joint operations for General Stackpole) in Dhaka.

according to one senior NGO representative, the coordination between the two communities was "very successful."¹³²

Operation Sea Angel was almost the exact opposite of *Operation Provide Comfort*. In many ways, *Sea Angel* was a classic civil-military operation in which the American military supported a sovereign state pursuant to its humanitarian needs. As a result, there was an established national structure with clear command and control relationships to support the relief process. Additionally, there was an American embassy that provided guidance to the Joint Task Force commander.

Although not nearly as complex as the situation in northern Iraq, to view *Sea Angel* as just a logistics operation is misleading. Indeed, the great success of this operation has, perhaps, nullified its own study, reducing it to just a "simple" logistics operation.¹³³ While definitely not a complex humanitarian emergency, the subtle complexities of this humanitarian intervention should not be ignored, particularly in discussing the NGO/military relationship.

This chapter argues that there were several underlying tensions that could quite possibly have been exacerbated by the intervention of US forces. The fact that they were not is a testimony to the leadership of General Stackpole. By communicating a clear, simple, and repeated intent for the Joint Task Force,

¹³² Telephone interview with Robin Needham, CARE, 8 June 1995. Mr. Needham was Acting Country Director for CARE in Bangladesh when the cyclone hit.

¹³³ In general, most participants of these humanitarian interventions do not remember, or do not associate, Bangladesh with the other case-studies. *Operation Sea Angel*, because it is understudied and underestimated, commands little memory despite the important lessons it has to offer.

everyone -- from his own men to the Bangladeshi government to the NGOs -- understood the purpose and scope of the American action. His diplomatic methods, primarily his consistent effort to subordinate himself to the American Ambassador and to Prime Minister Zia, was integral to isolating the relief effort in Chittagong from political considerations. Moreover, at the coordination level, it was the overwhelming logistical leverage that the Americans brought to the emergency that also reduced these political complexities to an inconsequential role.

Relatively isolated from these underlying tensions, the coordination effort witnessed the convergence of the two civil affairs "tracks" discussed in the previous chapter: 1) the traditional civil-military relations with the established government; and 2) the non-traditional civil-military relations with the NGOs. Both tracks took place simultaneously in the same room every morning in both Dhaka and Chittagong. Under the lead of the Bangladeshi government, as manifested in government or military officials, both the NGOs and the American military worked together to address the problem.

B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

So far [the] international effort has yet to materialize on anything close to the scale western aid experts believe is necessary to avert another calamity. Aid has come in dribs and drabs -- the United States, for instance, has provided \$125,000 worth of water purification tablets and medicines. Meanwhile, a few international relief agencies, such as CARE, World Vision, and Oxfam are struggling to assist cyclone victims . . . [said one Bangladeshi official]

'what the country really needs is the means of getting that food to the people in the hardest hit areas.'¹³⁴

This May 6th assessment in *The Boston Globe* provides several initial indicators of the situation the US military would encounter in Bangladesh. The first and most obvious is that the relief effort began without the United States military. It was a full two weeks before the military joined the relief effort. As a result, there would be NGO concerns that the military would come in with a "take-charge" attitude while not being sensitive to the hard work already in progress.¹³⁵

Second, and equally obvious, was the limited response of the international community, particularly the United States. When compared to the immediate financial and military support made available to the Kurdish refugees, help for Bangladesh was initially infinitesimal. There was even the feeling in Bangladesh that the United States would not send any help, beyond some money, because it did not have confidence in the new government.¹³⁶ The A.I.D. mission director, Dr. Mary Kilgour, recalls the relative embarrassment of small European countries being able to contribute more to the effort faster than the United States.¹³⁷

The Boston Globe story also reveals the missing ingredient necessary to resolve the emergency: "the means of getting that [stockpiled] food to the people

¹³⁴ Colin Nickerson, "Misery Outstrips Relief in Bangladesh," *The Boston Globe*, 6 May 1991, p. 1.

¹³⁵ The A.I.D. mission, for example, had been working extremely hard, with a very limited budget, to get funds/grants to NGOs involved in the response.

¹³⁶ Ambassador Milam's interpretation of Bangladeshi government officials' feelings. As described in Charles R. Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR, "Angels From the Sea: The Humanitarian Relief Effort in Bangladesh," 1991, DRAFT, p. 20. [Hereafter cited as *Angels From the Sea*].

¹³⁷ Telephone interview with Dr. Mary Kilgour, 16 May 1995.

in the hardest hit areas." It was not a question of supplies or organization, it was a matter of logistical infrastructure. That same article quotes a Bangladeshi military officer who states, "Just a few heavy lift helicopters could mean the difference between life and death for thousands and thousands of people. We are able to throw only a few pebbles into an ocean of need because of lack of transport." Given this sense of common understanding, a solution could not therefore be operationalized without the necessary air and sea transport. Without appropriate transport, the Bangladeshi government would have to wait until the water completely receded. This patience, however, would be useless for the thousands of people living on the islands and sand bars off the coast. Helicopters and sea transport were the answer and it would take a decision by other states to help Bangladesh in this way and magnitude.

The excerpt finally suggests that the NGOs were "struggling" to meet the need. In fact, everyone was struggling to meet the aftermath of the tidal surge. Although the cyclone had been devastating, the "struggle" to address the problem was made worse by several underlying tensions that pre-dated the arrival of the storm. To begin with, there were tensions in the Bangladeshi government itself. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia had only been elected just thirty-nine days prior to the storm. Zia was the first elected President since the end of the military dictatorship of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who had ruled the country since the assassination of Zia's husband, General Ziaur Rahman, in 1981. This relief effort was the first real test of the newly elected government.

Consequently, "there was no effective tradition of intergovernmental cooperation in the country as yet."¹³⁸ Three months after the cyclone, at a conference in Honolulu, Brigadier General Ibrahim of the Bangladeshi Army, commented on the relationship between the new government and its army. In his paper for the conference, he suggested that there had been "inadequate political guidance" and that both the Bangladeshi military and the government "must understand each other and work jointly to reduce the sufferings of affected people. In the recent cyclone, the civil administration and armed forces worked together but there is enough room for improvement and understanding."¹³⁹

Additionally, the Bangladeshi public could not help but compare this disaster with the one in 1988, when the military, under General Ershad was in control. Whereas, in 1988, the death rate was low (it was a gradually rising floodwater) and prices had been controlled, the 1991 disaster witnessed sudden and catastrophic death coupled with a 30% price increase (in the affected areas). Collectively the tension between the military and its newly emplaced democratic government (not to mention the complete breakdown in the national communication system and continuing bad weather) resulted in the following ineffectiveness:

No Bangladeshi official has been given authority to coordinate and command relief efforts. No substantive assessment of damages has been made. No evacuation of stranded people have been attempted

¹³⁸ OSA, Anderson, p. 10.

¹³⁹ Brigadier General Ibrahim and Colonel Moazzem, Bangladesh Army, "Disaster Preparedness in Bangladesh and the Role of the Bangladesh Army in Disaster Management," pp. 3, 24-25. Presented at Pacific Command conference, 16-19 September 1991. [Hereafter cited as Ibrahim, DPB].

. . . No comprehensive list of needs and priorities had been distributed to embassies and international organizations.¹⁴⁰

Another macro-level tension was the Gulf War. During the war, there had been protests against America. A mob had even broken into the American Club (near the embassy) in January of 1991.¹⁴¹ Moreover, once the American force arrived, certain political parties raised the issue, on the parliamentary floor, of American forces trying to establish a permanent base in Bangladesh.¹⁴² This perception was one more tension that would dictate a delicate American presence.

At the operational level there were more underlying tensions. As is often the case in the third world, the Bangladeshi government/NGO relationship (to include national and particularly, international NGOs) was one mired in mutual suspicion. A NGO, by definition, represents something mostly beyond the control of the government. In a country like Bangladesh, where seven of the ten deadliest tropical storms in history have struck, NGOs also represent a considerable cash flow into the country. (CARE's annual budget, for instance, was \$40 million dollars). Consequently, the "control issue" looms larger in Bangladesh where each disaster beyond the normal state-of-affairs brings an influx of millions of dollars.

¹⁴⁰ *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, "Relief For Bangladesh Hampered; Lack of Coordination, Disease are Concerns," 5 May 1991, p. 1A.

¹⁴¹ Telephone interview with Ambassador Milam, 7 June 1995. Dr. Lisa Prusak, a family physician with ADRA at the time relates that while the Bangladeshi government supported the U.S. lead coalition, the people themselves supported Iraq. In their slum neighborhood, effigies of George Bush were burned in front of their house. (Telephone interview with Dr. Lisa Prusak, 25 July 1995).

¹⁴² The Baksal Party even held a rally in Dhaka with placards proclaiming, "We Need Relief Not Foreign Soldiers." *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, "U.S. Speeds Relief to Bangladesh; Supplies Finally Reaching Remote Areas; Some Efforts Draw Criticisms," 19 May 1991, p. 6A.

The influx of hard NGO cash makes for more tension at the local level, particularly during emergencies. In this sense, "it's not so much [endemic of] the third world, but more like Chicago: it's city politics."¹⁴³ The distribution of humanitarian aid will lend credibility to the local, provincial, or governmental politician who seeks it. In this manner, politics is no different in third world than it is in the United States. Someone will claim credit for the good being done in his/her area.

Also, in the eyes of the more traditional members of the Bangladeshi government, another element to be controlled was the perception that NGOs came to Bangladesh to proselytize the population or empower the women. Hence, NGOs were often perceived as a threat to cultural norms.

There were additional tensions between A.I.D. and the NGOs. Much like the "control issue" for the national government, these tensions were inevitable and not unique to Bangladesh. Because it has the power of the purse, A.I.D. factored significantly in many NGO budgets. (CARE's budget, for example, was 50% A.I.D. money in Bangladesh). Inevitably, there was the perception, rightly or wrongly, among the NGOs that A.I.D. had its favorites.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, according to its mandate, the A.I.D. program (and mentality) was focused on development instead

¹⁴³ Interview with Colonel Jon Weck, USAR, Mountainview, California, 3 June 1995. Colonel Weck was a member of the Civil Affairs team sent over to augment the joint staff in Dhaka.

¹⁴⁴ According to U.S. Statute, however, A.I.D. can only work with financially responsible and operationally proven NGOs. A.I.D.'s unwillingness to work with any other type of relief agency also invited the "favoritism" complaint.

of relief. As a result, it was, in general, very conscious of spending tomorrow's development on today's relief. Moreover, when the cyclone hit, the A.I.D. mission was extremely limited in what money it could offer. It was unable to redirect monies that had already been allocated to existing development programs. New funds were needed from Washington for the disaster.

At the implementation/tactical level, there was also the underlying tension of NGO competition. Due to the inherent possibility of disaster and the chance to raise more money, there existed a competition, mostly healthy, among the NGOs. Gerald Whitehouse, then country director for Adventists Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), confirms that the "politics is there -- it is the most competitive relief situation around." Whitehouse also rightly notes that this fact-of-the-matter is not necessarily detrimental, but that it does have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of a response.¹⁴⁵

Finally, despite the past disasters, there was no comprehensive plan for responding to such an emergency. The Association for Developmental Agencies of Bangladesh (ADAB, an umbrella NGO for national and international NGOs) had tried to formulate a plan, but with little result. Although great efforts to improve the disaster response had been made since a 1970 cyclone (in which an estimated 500,000 people died), and despite early warning issued by the government as to the severity of the storm, the Bangladeshi government was simply overwhelmed. Even if a comprehensive plan had existed, it would have been near impossible to

¹⁴⁵ Telephone interview with Gerald Whitehouse, 30 May 1995.

implement. Inevitably, there was some consternation among the Bangladeshi people with its government. Mohammed Yunus -- known world-wide for his bank program to empower entrepreneurs of the poorest background -- demanded that the government take control: "To those who say NGOs are the only way out, I say this is opting out, the government is supposed to do all these things. If the government cannot serve the people -- if we say let's forget about the government and call the NGOs and let them do this -- then why do we have to have a government?"¹⁴⁶

C. THE EMERGENCY CONTEXT

The political perceptions and underlying tensions aside, the magnitude of the disaster remained. A full two weeks later, the initial survey of the scene made an indelible impression upon General Stackpole: "I have seen combat, but I have never seen greater carnage."¹⁴⁷ Approximately 139,000 people were dead. Adding insult to injury was the inability to bury the dead. The land itself, as long as it was immersed, was not ready for the dead. Moreover, there were ten million affected by a flood zone spread over the four coastal districts of Bhola, Noakhali, Chittagong, and Cox's Bazar. The survivors were coping with numerous problems, the most important of which was the water supply. Most local wells and water sources had been contaminated by the saline surge that had only stopped after

¹⁴⁶ Barbara Crossette, "Relief Officials Say Bad Planning Proves Calamitous in Bangladesh," *The New York Times*, 5 May 1991 p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole III, as cited in Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown's Occasional Paper, "The 5th MEB During Operation Sea Angel," an unpublished paper, courtesy of Lt. Col. Brown, p. 4.

moving three miles inland. Included in the tidal surge was the oil from a tanker that had sunk in the storm. As in the mountains of southeastern Turkey, cholera was rearing its ugly head. The tidal surge had an enormous impact on the crops as well, damaging 3.5 million acres.

With little to no food, the stranded people became more and more susceptible to disease. Their ability to provide shelter for themselves was practically non-existent. When a population expands to build on the sandbars that result from the 45 million tons of silt that the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Magma rivers dump into the delta that is Bangladesh's coastline, the construction methods and available material will never be enough to withstand any significant storm. On one such island, only 37 houses were left standing of the original 700. Apart from the basics of food, water, and shelter, clothing was also an issue. If everything that they owned had not been swept away by the tidal surge, many had, quite literally, had their clothes blown off their bodies. It was a very difficult environment in which to have basic human dignity. By the time General Stackpole arrived on May 12th, the conditions were almost overwhelming:

Water supplies . . . were completely polluted by this point in time. The toxicity of the bodies, now bloated, was a serious problem for us. People were dying of cholera. They were dying of a variety of other diseases. Simple scratches had become infected; amputations were legend. We had many, many problems to solve.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Stackpole, as cited in "Angels From the Sea," p. 42.

In no way does this assessment imply that the American military arrived with the solution to a problem that no one was addressing. What the military did arrive with, which still did not exist two weeks after storm, was infrastructure. "If the road and ferry infrastructure had not been destroyed, CARE and the Red Crescent would have been largely capable of handling relief efforts with organic and contract assets as they had built up adequate supplies of emergency food and relief supplies for just such an eventuality."¹⁴⁹ (These previously stored foods were provided by A.I.D. before and during the first week of the cyclone aftermath).

But the infrastructure was not there. The government had lost eight ships and 60% of its helicopters. Roads had been completely washed out. Chittagong's port was clogged with sunken vessels. The city's airport was initially under six-feet of water. The power supply system was non-operable. Perhaps most important, communications were down. There was no way to assess the damage as there was no way to get there and no way to hear about it. It was five days before the Ambassador or A.I.D. Director could fly down to the coast to inspect the area from the air. International communications were wiped out as well.

Combined with the aforementioned tensions, to include the absence of a comprehensive response plan and a lack of funds, the destruction of the infrastructure and communications system made for a response effort that could only be, at best, sporadic.

¹⁴⁹ OSA, Anderson, p. 40.

D. THE BANGLADESHI RESPONSE STRUCTURE

Before discussing the Bangladeshi response structure and how the American military and various NGOs "plugged into" it, it is very important to emphasize the sovereignty of Bangladesh. It is all too easy, particularly within the context of humanitarian intervention, to forget about the government of the people being helped. Indeed, all too often, the host government and its military are perceived as a hindrance. It is equally easy to assume away the government from the point of view of the United States military. With its internal hierarchy and self-sustaining capacity, it is almost a natural thing for the military to take charge.

Thus it is that much more imperative to note that the Americans -- under the guidance of the ambassador and joint task force commander -- quite consciously made every effort to empower Bangladeshi leadership. By insisting on deference to the Bangladeshi government at every level, the American forces presented the official position that it was just a tool of a Bangladeshi comprehensive effort. What would result was an American advisory role to the Bangladeshi leadership in Dhaka as the joint task force implemented Dhaka's guidance through its forward command element in Chittagong. (Although the JTF forward was also subordinated to a Bangladeshi official).¹⁵⁰

The Bangladeshi response effort was coordinated at two levels in Dhaka. At the highest level, there was the National Coordination Committee (NCC). This

¹⁵⁰ Obviously, given its expertise and logistical capabilities, the American force was more than a tool of the Bangladeshi government. Everyone recognized the power and enabling presence of the Americans. Given this fact, the manner in which the Americans conducted themselves becomes that much more noteworthy and conducive to the overall effort.

committee met at the cabinet level and included such ministries as Health and Family Welfare, Food, Agriculture, and Women Affairs. An American equivalent to this committee might be a National Security Council, of sorts, dedicated solely to relief efforts (a FEMA with greater clout due to the frequency of disasters in a much smaller country).

Directly beneath the National Coordination Committee was a standing cell known as the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). "This cell centrally headquarters all activities with all ministries, services headquarters and all other civil agencies."¹⁵¹ Essentially, in the American analogy, it was a standing interagency subcommittee to the NSC. General Shaffat headed the RACMC and was the liaison back to the NCC. The RACMC was located in the Presidential Secretariat at Zia International Airport. This cell implemented its decisions through the various organizations represented at the council.

Besides the national ministries and other governmental organizations represented in Dhaka and Chittagong, two other key players were represented. The first participant, was the NGO community. Although any NGO was welcomed, the NGO participants, largely due to size, numbered only three. ADAB, a nominal representative of the NGO community was there, as well as the Red Crescent Society. The Red Crescent Society was a quasi-government organization, enjoying a status analogous to American Red Cross's relationship with the American government and military. The third NGO represented was CARE. CARE, with its

¹⁵¹ Ibrahim, DPB, p. 13.

\$40 million dollar budget and 1400 employees, was sure to be an integral part of any relief effort. Finally, A.I.D. had a liaison desk officer present at the meetings.

It was according to this coordination structure that the Bangladeshi government, largely without a plan and certainly without an infrastructure, struggled to meet the overwhelming need of "Marian's" aftermath.

E. THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENT

On May 3rd, President Bush had sent his condolences to Prime Minister Zia. In the meantime, pressure mounted for some sort of reaction. Most compelling was the universal understanding of the nature of the problem: the supplies were already there, it was just a matter of distribution. That same day, Renny Nancholas, head of the British Red Cross international aid department, stated the plain fact: "no organization apart from the military has enough transport available."¹⁵² Hamed Essafi, the coordinator for the UN Relief Organization, stated at the time, "it is quite impossible for the [Bangladeshi] government to carry the burden alone." The article continues, "Bangladesh has enough food to feed the millions who lost their entire crops, most farm animals, their homes, clothing and household utensils. But it lacks transport and medicine."¹⁵³ On May 11th, President Bush ordered the Department of Defense to respond.

¹⁵² Raymond Whitaker, "Disease Follows in Wake of Bangladesh Disaster," *The Independent*, 3 May 1991, p. 13.

¹⁵³ Colin Nickerson, "Aid Slow to Reach Cyclone Victims; Red Tape, Chaos in Bangladesh," *The Boston Globe*, 8 May 1991, p. 1.

In less than a month, the Armed Forces of the United States were again acting in the name of humanitarianism. "What is now changing, in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, is sending the military to provide some relief directly. When the military gets a mission, it's awesome. They have orders, command, resources, planes. Others wouldn't do it as fast."¹⁵⁴ The military was deployed so quickly that General Stackpole, attending a conference in Manila, was in Dhaka with his advance party assessment team, via Okinawa, within 24 hours. As the assessment team flew in, they quickly realized that there was little in the way of doctrine for relief humanitarian operations. They took the available information on *Operation Provide Comfort* in northern Iraq, but found that it was not too applicable.¹⁵⁵

F. MISSION

General Stackpole was essentially given one command: help them. "My orders were clear. I was to report to the U.S. Ambassador and provide humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, period. Nobody told me how to do it; no one gave any additional instructions. As a matter of fact, the lack of real-time intelligence was such that they really didn't know what we were standing into."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Al Panico, American Red Cross Director of international relief and development. As quoted in, David Binder, "First U.S. Troops Arrive in Bangladesh to Begin Large-Scale Relief Effort," *The New York Times*, 13 May 1991, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ OSA, Anderson, 8. Also, interview with Colonel Anderson, 14 April 1995, Camp Pendleton, California. Additionally, Admiral Clarey, the naval commander of the Amphibious Ready Group transporting the 5th MEB, notes that they received no message traffic on current lessons learned in northern Iraq. (Telephone interview with Rear Admiral Stephen Clarey, USN (retired), 5 June 1995).

¹⁵⁶ Lieutenant General H. C. Stackpole III, "Angels From the Sea," *Proceedings*, January 1992, p. 112. [Hereafter cited as "Stackpole, *Proceedings*"].

Immediately after touching down in Dhaka, on May 13th, Stackpole's plan began to emerge according to the simple humanitarian intent he had been given. The advance party soon began to establish liaisons with the Bangladeshi government, the American embassy team, and the NGOs. After his initial survey of the disaster area, Stackpole decided upon a three-step plan, centered on the logistics of distribution, phased over a period of 30 days.

1. Immediate efforts to stabilize life-threatening situation (about one week)
2. Make limited efforts to restore infrastructure in manner that allowed for the Bangladeshi government to take full control of effort (about two weeks)
3. Preparatory for U.S. withdrawal and actual assumption of responsibility by Bangladeshi government (about one week)

G. THE ART OF MAKING COMMON SENSE OUT OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING

There were five essential elements to operationalizing this common understanding into an approach that provided all participants with a common sense. First and foremost, there was the clearly understood emphasis that the Bangladeshi government had to be in charge.

Because of the fragility of the existing government, Ambassador Milam and I talked . . . and decided . . . that we would continue to provide our technical expertise under the control of the sovereign nation of Bangladesh for this endeavor. We would support them, give

them advice, and encourage them, but the final decisions would be theirs.¹⁵⁷

This deferential mindset respected the sovereign responsibility of Bangladesh, emboldened a newly elected government, and kept the military's mission limited to providing support to the humanitarian effort. (To be discussed later, such a purposeful and continuous effort inevitably set a democratic example of a military's relationship with its elected leaders). Stackpole, in light of Bangladesh's fragile democracy, even limited the presence of this humanitarian support. Never were there more than 500 American military personnel ashore each night. (Even the ships, for the most part, were kept over the horizon). This point cannot be overemphasized. The consequences of an application of "overwhelming force" in this situation could have been quite de-stabilizing.

The second element was continuum awareness. "The JTF commander realized that the three phases of the campaign were being culminated at different times. It was not possible to characterize the entire operation exactly into any given time."¹⁵⁸ This point is a rather remarkable recognition when one considers that the military generally enjoys having standard templates and rules that can be applied across the board. In allowing for this type of awareness, Stackpole essentially said, 'I will provide the guidance, but it is up to you on the ground to determine what phase your particular sector is in.' In establishing this precedent,

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ OSA, Anderson, p. 19.

the military operator on the ground necessarily did not define his mission according to "so many bags of rice delivered" but according to the needs of his sector. Thus, from the military's own point of view, there were multiple continuums of effort in the country that could not possibly be gauged by one standard.

The next means by which this strategy was operationalized was to split the command between Dhaka, the capital, and Chittagong, the coastal city at the center of the damage.¹⁵⁹ This strategy allowed the establishment of policy and general coordination at the national level, while allowing the implementors to do the final coordination in Chittagong. By May 17th, the JTF was headquartered at the old international airport, about a mile away from the Presidential Secretariat (the location of the Relief Activities and Coordination Monitoring Cell).

The fourth element of General Stackpole's guidance was to encourage the NGOs. "You must bring aid-giving agencies on board early. You must update them and anticipate future requests. There is a natural distrust of the military because, in most countries where they operate, these aid-giving [NGOs] have been burned repeatedly by people in uniforms."¹⁶⁰ This supportive attitude permeated the JTF. As Lieutenant Colonel Bill Norton, the deputy operations officer in

¹⁵⁹ There remains a minor debate among military personnel as to whether this measure should have been taken. Some feel that the split did not facilitate coordination enough; that a staff, already limited to 500 people a night, was spread too thin; that the focus should have been primarily on Chittagong. Others feel that there had to be a JTF element in Dhaka and that it insulated the relief operation from the politics of the capital. Research indicates that there had to be a staff element in Dhaka. The government, the embassy, and the lead NGOs were all there. There also had to be an element in Chittagong because that was the focus of the operation. The question remains then as to the proper balance of staffing.

¹⁶⁰ Stackpole, *Proceedings*, p. 116.

Chittagong, remembers, "General Stackpole clearly stated that we were there to support the Bangladeshi government and NGOs in the relief effort."¹⁶¹

The fifth aspect of Stackpole's plan was how the American's handled and implemented themselves in the name of Bangladeshi directives. Perhaps the most delicate of matters, given the multiple and underlying tensions between and among all the agencies party to the relief effort, the *de facto* coordination leverage and power that the American military represented was obvious. Nothing was going to happen, Bangladeshi government officials in charge or not, without the accommodation and acceptance of the JTF. As one American officer declared "it was the logistics that provided the impetus for everyone to show up."¹⁶² Because the American military effort represented an outside force capable of solutions with no political ties to anyone, they quickly became the honest broker that could suggest impartial priorities. As Brigadier General Peter Rowe, 5th MEB commander states, the American infrastructure provided the "forum" and the "mediator."¹⁶³

This methodology of subdued presence and appropriate advice echoes the personality of the commander. Everyone agrees that Stackpole's presence was an essential ingredient to the mission's success. Robin Needham of CARE makes the tactical point that Stackpole was never "locked up behind his sentries," but rather,

¹⁶¹ Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel William Norton, 12 June 1995.

¹⁶² Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Frasier, USMC (retired), 3 June 1995. Frasier was the JTF liaison officer to the A.I.D. cell at the embassy.

¹⁶³ Telephone interview with Brigadier General Peter Rowe, USMC (retired), 30 May 1995.

he was out and about "on the shop floor" with the men; something that made an impression on the more rigid Bangladeshi Army.¹⁶⁴ At the operational level, Lieutenant Colonel Norton remembers clearly that Stackpole "ran things with a light touch," always providing enough guidance and minimal control. "Problems were not always solved the way you wanted them, but they were solved" in a supportive manner.¹⁶⁵ Admiral Stephen Clarey, commander of the amphibious task force carrying the 5th MEB, makes the strategic point that Stackpole "always felt it was not his objective to take over the place," as he avoided the "easy trap of self-aggrandizement."¹⁶⁶ In short, he was engaged, understood the actual implementation, but he did not micro-manage.

These are important lessons for any JTF commander. As Ambassador Milam put it, Stackpole was the "epitome of the best officer to have in this type of situation."¹⁶⁷ Or, as Mary Kilgour put it: a major reason for the success of the operation was the "high quality of Stackpole's leadership; he was a sophisticated and subtle leader who was a good listener;" his style anticipated and removed antagonisms.¹⁶⁸ When one recalls the multiple and overlapping complexities that existed prior to the JTF's entrance onto the scene, and that the JTF did exactly what President Bush had told it to do in less than thirty days, it is hard to disagree.

¹⁶⁴ Needham, 8 June 1995.

¹⁶⁵ Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel William Norton, 28 May 1995.

¹⁶⁶ Telephone interview with Admiral Steven Clarey, 5 June 1995.

¹⁶⁷ Milam, 7 June 1995.

¹⁶⁸ Kilgour, 16 May 1995.

H. NGO/U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS

Despite the plan put forth by the JTF commander in support of Ambassador Milam and the Bangladeshi government, there remained the potential for conflict between the NGOs and the American military at the coordination level. This was not to be the case, in part because both parties accepted the logic and comparative value of the other.

On the part of the NGOs, CARE recognized that despite its size, it and other NGOs sometimes have an "inflated sense of our own logistic importance."¹⁶⁹ Gerald Whitehouse of ADRA, too, recognized the need of the logistics, particularly the military's, because of the implied prioritization process inherent in a lift/transport scenario. The military is "impartial, because of the rational logistics component."¹⁷⁰ In sum, "the military brings a little leadership and brokering. The NGOs will never have the organizational structure, command and control, the delivery, that we do."¹⁷¹

Likewise, the military almost immediately recognized the innate strengths of the NGOs. Colonel Gary Anderson describes this awareness best in his observations seven months after the operation.

U.S. military personnel must learn to draw on these organizations as assets; we should not be too proud to request their advice and assistance. In Bangladesh, a *synergistic relationship* [emphasis

¹⁶⁹ Needham, 8 June 1995.

¹⁷⁰ Whitehouse, 30 May 1995.

¹⁷¹ Clarey, 5 June 1995.

added] developed in which both the military forces and the NGOs provided the talents they were each best suited to bring to the table. The NGOs had the advantage of a sound day-to-day knowledge of the area of operations, the trust of the locals at the village level, and years of experience in disaster relief operations; all of this can be invaluable in the initial assessment process as well as in actual operations.¹⁷²

The above points are made prior to the discussion of NGO/military interaction for two fundamental reasons. First, the research indicates that these generally reciprocal feelings were felt and recognized from the outset. And while some make note of competing "agendas" -- between and among the JTF, the NGOs, A.I.D., and the Bangladeshi government -- they were relatively benign in the face of the emergency. This second point, seemingly obvious, occasionally needs reiteration. One can never forget the "power of the moment," and the subliminal and uniting sense that everybody was "in it together." "Sure, people came with baggage, but we soon moved to mutual respect instead of being protective and defensive -- got beyond that in a hurry."¹⁷³

¹⁷² Anderson, OSA, p. 40.

¹⁷³Clarey, 5 June 1995.

I. NGO/US MILITARY COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION

1. Dhaka

The NGO/US military relationship that resulted in Dhaka was centered on the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). The Americans interfaced with the RACMC *vis-à-vis* a JTF and Embassy representative. The J-3, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Anderson, was usually the JTF representative at the RACMC meeting. The Embassy representative was an A.I.D. officer along with Lieutenant Colonel Jon Weck, USAR, a Civil Affairs officer.¹⁷⁴ Weck was the JTF liaison officer to the A.I.D. NGO coordination cell at the embassy (about five miles from Zia International Airport). This cell's basic function was to track information and to gather NGOs requests. These requests were then taken over by Colonel Weck to the Presidential Secretariat every morning, where they were prioritized.

In some ways, this cell functioned as a strategic-CMOC in support of the RACMC. The cell kept track of all the relief efforts going on and served as a liaison to the decision-making body of the RACMC. The charts kept at the cell are indicative of the types of information they were tracking:¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ The Army Civil Affairs team arrived in country about the 16th of May. They were replaced by another Civil Affairs team on the 27th of May. (They were included only because there was an Army representative at Pacific Command when the mission was assigned).

¹⁷⁵ Colonel Jon Weck's personal operations notebook, pages unnumbered. [Hereafter cited as Weck notebook].

1. Deployment of Armed Forces
2. Stock, at a glance
3. Stock Position
4. Market Price of Food Grains
5. Map: storing place and ports
6. Shipping Schedule
7. Position of Ships
8. Unloading Details
9. Food Movement Program
10. Internal Procurement
11. Map: situation map of affected areas
12. Relief Activities
13. Cash Allocated
14. Damage Report
15. Foreign Relief Arrivals

Yet, this cell was also fulfilling a normal function for A.I.D., whether or not the American military was there or not. Thus, to apply a hindsight label to its function is somewhat misleading. Suffice it to say, that the A.I.D. cell acted as a support mechanism for the RACMC as it forwarded NGO logistics requests for transport to Chittagong.

The RACMC, consisting of representatives from the senior agencies and organizations involved in the relief effort, met every morning at 0900. After some

tea, General Shaffat would bring the meeting to order and discuss the prepared agenda. Essentially, General Shaffat, with the advice of those present, would decide on the priorities of need and then develop a general plan to meet those needs. The priorities were determined according to the various assessments presented -- from Bangladeshi, NGO, and American Special Forces sources.¹⁷⁶ Emerging from this collective information was a comprehensive picture, as much as possible anyway, of the emergency situation and where the greatest needs were. These needs were then "married up" with the available transport.

A few examples from Colonel Jon Weck's personal notebook illustrate the various topics of these meetings.¹⁷⁷

Friday, 17 May:	NGO delivery of supplies to Zia Airport for transportation to Chittagong 1) Who can authorize entry into Zia International Airport? 2) What are the procedures?
Sunday, 19 May:	ADAB will hire and organize labor force at hangar
Wednesday, 22 May:	20 tons from government need to go out; - Care needs nine tons, 6 kilos x 2000 cartons delivered; will bring to gate 8 between 1200-1600 - 6 C-130 sorties to Chittagong today - Bangladeshi Army identifies ponds to be pumped; Care asked to give pond information in Chittagong area

¹⁷⁶ Army Special Forces from First Battalion, First Group (out of Okinawa, Japan) had been deployed in support of the JTF.

¹⁷⁷ Weck notebook.

These are the issues of humanitarian coordination. It was a process of identifying needs/problems and developing the solution/mechanism to solve it. Importantly, as will soon be discussed, the RACMC represented strategic awareness of the overall situation and a tactical discussion of how to move the assorted supplies to Chittagong. The RACMC did not provide directive guidance to the Chittagong effort because that effort was being run by the JTF forward command element.

The face of humanitarian coordination proved to be amicable. Robin Needham, the primary CARE representative as assistant country director, recalls that all parties "tried hard to be transparent."¹⁷⁸ This effort is evident in the relationship between Needham and Anderson, the primary NGO/military interface at the Dhaka level.

Anderson, admittedly, came into the operation with a "U.S. in charge attitude." However, according to Stackpole's guidance, he quickly realized the delicate political situation, to include the tensions between the NGOs and the Bangladeshi government. In this sense, the US had a definite role to play as "honest broker." Yet, this role did not mutually exclude the US need to learn. Specifically, CARE provided Anderson, and therefore the JTF, with several pieces of advice.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸Needham, 8 June 1995.

¹⁷⁹ This discussion based on interview with Colonel Anderson at Camp Pendleton, California, 14 April 1995.

The most important piece of advice concerned the Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs). Wanting to help, and thinking it had the appropriate answers, the military wanted very much to bring these ROWPUs to bear on the emergency.¹⁸⁰ The problem was threefold: 1) What happens when the military has to take its ROWPUs back? 2) While the ROWPUs were running, did they not create dependency upon a system alien to the culture? 3) Even if the ROWPUs were left behind, was the technology appropriate to the people and long-term sustainment? Essentially, the ROWPU was a good idea but in the wrong context. Deployed in large numbers, the ROWPUs had the potential to soon exacerbate the situation. (Indeed, they might have even meant a longer US military presence). Although a few were deployed, they were mostly kept out of the effort.

CARE also advised the JTF not to get involved in the burial of dead Bangladeshis. While the number of bodies was a health issue, it was first and foremost a cultural one that the Bangladeshis had to solve for themselves. Another lesson learned from CARE was its practice of making the healthy Bangladeshis work for food. This process encouraged an already disciplined people to move towards self-reliance.

Perhaps the most interesting advice that CARE provided was the role their protein power bars played as a measure of effectiveness. In a crisis such as the

¹⁸⁰ Everyone remembers the "ROWPU issue." The general impression of the research is that the American military wanted to assert its technology. This concept is directly analogous to the desire to introduce MASH units into Zakho.

aftermath of "Marian," food is not as important as clean water and shelter. Consequently, the food-bridge to the time when regular staples can be distributed is the high protein power bar. When these protein bars began to show up on the black market as well as being used as a means to barter, CARE recognized that the first stage of the crisis was over. If the people could physically afford not to eat the bar and thus trade it, they were no longer in a life-threatening situation. It is measures of effectiveness like this one that signaled the end of Phase One and the transition to Phase Two.¹⁸¹

The type of relationship exhibited by Needham and Anderson demonstrates several emerging themes. First, as Colonel Robert Schoenhaus has stated, "NGOs are the most critical source of information. They tell you if you're meeting the mandate."¹⁸² Second, it is not "the rule of law, but the rule of personality." Moreover, it is at the common table that these personalities are brought together "eyeball to eyeball" as issues/events/problems are thrown out "right in front of God and everybody."¹⁸³ Thus, irrespective of members trying hard to be "transparent," transparency is guaranteed by multiple perspectives with their multiple information sources. While there will always be political sensitivities to an

¹⁸¹ Another point worth mentioning, and learned from the NGOs, was the concept of plastics. Plastic five gallon containers were needed to transport fresh water back to homes; plastic pipes were essential in reestablishing wells; plastic sheeting made for makeshift shelters and provided cover to relief materials on the tarmac. Telephone interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, 16 May 1995. Colonel Blythe was part of the original Civil Affairs team sent to Bangladesh.

¹⁸² Interview with Colonel Robert Schoenhaus, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, 27 April 1995. Colonel Schoenhaus was a member of the Civil Affairs team that replaced the first one deployed.

¹⁸³ Telephone interview with Colonel Jon Weck, 17 May 1995.

organization, personality, or government, in this type of environment, a clear picture inevitably emerges as to the true state of things.

Finally, one point must be made clear regarding the CARE/J-3 illustration used: contrary to the common perception held by those in the military now, CARE did not represent, nor did it coordinate, the international NGOs in Bangladesh. "We didn't seek a coordinating role for CARE precisely because we were the biggest; if I had been a smaller player I would have resented [our] coordinating role . . . we didn't look for a coordinating role, we only sought to encourage, facilitate the coordination."¹⁸⁴

It is equally important to recognize why CARE came to be viewed as the coordinating NGO. First, Phil Johnson, the President of CARE, happened to be in country at the time and was present at General Stackpole's first meeting with the NGOs. His presence, as CEO of a globally recognized NGO like CARE, might have helped create the impression that the other NGOs would be coordinated by CARE.¹⁸⁵ Additionally, the American military found a distant cousin in CARE. Almost quasi-military, CARE has hardship tours, an established structure, and is used to bureaucracy. Because it is the most institutionalized of the NGOs, it was only natural that American military personnel viewed CARE as a kindred spirit. In the end, CARE was "primus inter pares"¹⁸⁶ because it was "only natural for CARE

¹⁸⁴ Needham, 8 June 1995.

¹⁸⁵ Telephone interview with Sandi Tully, 12 June 1995. Ms. Tully was in Bangladesh from the end of April to the third week in May. She was then Special Assistant to Philip Johnson.

¹⁸⁶ Milam, 7 June 1995.

to take the leading part. CARE was the most cooperative of any NGO, and with their reputation, many of the smaller NGOs followed their example."¹⁸⁷

2. Chittagong

"The real coordination took place in Chittagong."¹⁸⁸ The relief effort in Chittagong was headed up by the forward command element of the JTF. "Plugging in" to this element were representatives from the Bangladeshi government, the 5th MEB coordination cell (collocated at the airport), the NGOs (national and international), and the various international helicopter components (the British, Pakistanis, and Japanese all contributed helicopters to the effort; the Army Blackhawks worked for the JTF). It was the JTF element's responsibility to coordinate the response.

Although people remember this coordination cell with different titles, the one that seems to work best is the Military Coordination Center (MCC). It was from the MCC that supplies were transported to Distribution Points (DPs) throughout the affected area. Linking the DPs with the MCC and the various NGO/government warehouses were seventeen Marine communications teams that were primarily collocated at CARE sites.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Major Stephen Yoshimura fax to author, 8 June 1995. Then Captain Yoshimura was part of the two-man Civil Affairs team sent to Chittagong. The other member was Major Latham Horn, USA.

¹⁸⁸ Milam, 7 June 1995.

¹⁸⁹ Telephone interview with Major Steven Yoshimura, 8 June 1995. Despite this innovative idea, most remember communications as, at best, consistently poor. In terms of relative expectations, that the military would be able to provide a working communications system, this comparatively poor performance was a major disappointment.

In general, this structure performed as follows. Dhaka pushed the supplies down to Chittagong. Anywhere between six and eight C-130s came down daily with so many tons of the assorted supplies (mainly grain and rice). Once at Chittagong, these supplies were distributed according to the priorities that emerged from the MCC. Dhaka had no say in how this process was configured nor where the relief stuffs went. Dhaka only came into the picture to pass on pertinent information (*i.e.*, "we heard about village "x" that still needs "y" amount of "z."). Dhaka also played the pivotal role of isolating Chittagong from the politics. If governor "a" of province "b" had a problem with the distribution system, it was handled at Dhaka. Isolated from the politics of relief, Chittagong was able to focus solely on the humanitarian intent of coordination and implementation.

3. The Meeting

The operations officer (J-3) of the JTF forward command, ran the all-important coordination meetings at the Patenga Airport Recruit Training School facility. Located at the Chittagong airport, this building had two floors. The first floor was used as a workplace for all the interested parties. The second floor was where the MCC meeting took place every morning at 0900. Captain Edward Anglim, USN (J-3), Lieutenant Colonel William Norton (Deputy J-3), and Major Don Bloom, USA (Assistant Deputy J-3), were the men responsible for running this JTF meeting. (To be sure, there was a Bangladeshi representative, usually an

Army major, at these meetings).¹⁹⁰ Anglim, as the J-3 ran the meeting about 50% of the time; Norton about 40% and Bloom about 10%.¹⁹¹ Additionally, Anglim or Norton would run the meetings/watch during the day while Bloom was primarily responsible for the night watch.

The meetings were run according to one basic criteria: where was the dying? The highest mortality rates drove the priorities to be delivered. The reason behind a high mortality rate -- cholera, disease, or starvation -- therefore decided how much of what was delivered where and how fast. Each meeting began by examining that day's priorities, adjusting to what ever issue/problem had arisen since the last meeting. Next, the group looked to the upcoming two days as it tried to set up a tentative schedule according to the transportation assets available (the helicopters, LCACs, and trucks all had mechanical problems at one time or another). During this process, the MCC was as flexible as possible, always adjusting to continually meet the top priorities. There was only one inflexible rule: if you were not on time for the helicopters, you were "bumped." The "birds" were too precious and expensive an asset to wait on someone.

This common sense approach, which resulted in a general agreement on priorities worked about 90-95% of the time. The question of course, and the test of the MCC's effectiveness, was how the remaining 5-10%, "open to debate" issues

¹⁹⁰ M. Mokammel Haque was the government secretary responsible for the disaster effort in Chittagong region. On May 16th, Haque had sent a memorandum out to the municipal relief committees, establishing how the Bangladeshis would interact with the US military.

¹⁹¹ Norton, 12 June 1995.

were resolved. Which brings us to the issue of personality, particularly the J-3's. "Anybody can look at the numbers, but that doesn't tell the story of what happened."¹⁹² "What happened," was that the two men most responsible for NGO coordination understood the conceptual and day-to-day approach to coordinating NGOs.

In dealing with the NGOs, Captain Anglim makes two fundamental conceptual observations. First, given the political context of a fledgling democracy (the Bangladeshis had to be making the decisions) and the context of several NGOs (all nominally deserving equal access to the US infrastructure), the US military leaders "did not want to appear in charge." Second, as a coordinator/consensus builder, one had to recognize that "every NGO was his own personality . . . [that] you must prove yourself to them individually . . . we saw them as individual customers."¹⁹³ Norton complemented this attitude with his understanding of the "proving" process: "[1] if it made sense, we'd do it . . . [2] what I've done for the past twenty years may not be the right way . . . [3] you must try to persuade [the NGOs], recognizing that you have absolutely no control; that it's common sense, not because I tell you¹⁹⁴ . . . [4] make everyone happy, use common sense, no hard and fast rules."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² Rowe, 30 May 1995.

¹⁹³ Telephone interview with Captain Edward Anglim, USN, 13 July 1995.

¹⁹⁴ Norton, 28 May 1995.

¹⁹⁵ [#4] from Norton, 12 June 1995.

It was in this manner that Anglim, Norton, and Broom dealt with those grey areas where the common sense was not so readily recognized by all. When a problem arose -- say a *mullah* wanting to send out pots and pans or a NGO wanting to distribute its supplies -- the J-3 would reiterate the group's agreed on common sense. The next step was to consider the unofficial score of "close calls" (kept intuitively by the J-3). This procedure implicitly recognized the natural and competing agendas of the various NGOs. If the decision as to which NGO got the last priority was a "toss-up" the J-3 would remember two facts: 1) which NGO had "won" the last "close call;" and 2) which NGO needed to "show;" i.e. who had to show their immediate or international headquarters that they were getting "their" stuff out.¹⁹⁶

This process was complemented by two key factors. First, there was the additional awareness of altruistic self-interest. "The NGO will work with whomever makes its job easiest; that is, you have to satisfy their self interest."¹⁹⁷ If the military was not user-friendly, the NGOs would simply go out and do it on their own. But, it was also in the military's self interest to be user-friendly. The more NGOs leveraged into coordination by its logistical capability, the less

¹⁹⁶ For example, if CARE had won the last three close calls for whatever legitimate reason, and it was about to win a fourth time simply because it was more efficient than the next competing NGO, the call went to the less efficient NGO. Given these subtle political dynamics of distribution, the overall operation was probably operating at 90-95% efficiency, on an absolute scale. On the intangible scale of cohesion and a smooth working environment where everyone felt that their needs were addressed, the coordination was operating at 100%. It was this kind of awareness that made all the difference.

¹⁹⁷ Norton, 12 June 1995.

duplication, the more coordinated and comprehensive the effort, the quicker the military went home.

Second, the atmosphere surrounding the meeting and the interaction between and among the NGOs and the military was very informal. The NGOs were essentially in the heart of the military's operations center and found it comfortable. Importantly, they were not interfacing with a liaison that took requests somewhere up the faceless "chain-of-command" and then came back with a "yes" or "no." The person telling the NGO "yes" or "no" was the same person that they were around all day, drinking coffee or sharing lunch, and had proven that the military could be user-friendly.¹⁹⁸ It is much harder to develop animosity when the common sense logic of the prioritization process is recognized by all and coming from someone that people respect. "I know it sounds like a love-in, but no one was saying I'm more important than you."¹⁹⁹

It was this type of environment, at the last point of coordination before implementation that ensured the success of Operation Sea Angel.

¹⁹⁸ For example, some of the national NGOs did not initially make their agreed on flight times and the helicopters took different loads to different places -- something that irritated the local NGOs. This impression changed, however, when the military offered to help pre-stage their supplies the night before on the tarmac and also provide a guard.

¹⁹⁹ Norton, 12 June 1995.

J. CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT

The primary issue in *Operation Sea Angel* was sovereignty. While there were political tensions, most Bangladeshis realized that the U.S. military was just there to help. Yet, the manner in which the help was presented was absolutely critical. This appropriate methodology was the essential contribution of Stackpole. Taking a step back, consider the backdrop of a newly elected Bangladeshi government which was not fairing well in its attempt to deal with the aftermath of "Marian." In comes a outside military force that was going to provide something that the host nation could not provide for its own people. Throughout the administering of aid, the military commander makes explicitly clear his subordination to his ambassador and to the leader of the host nation. All in the face of an obvious fact: it was the American military that enabled the relief effort.

Colonel Anderson makes a very interesting analogy:

The point here is that the management of humanitarian relief operations is very similar to counterinsurgency operations in that they require that the host nation be the leading actor if they are expected to truly assist the national government in achieving the short term objective of treating the symptom. In both cases, the ultimate objective is to reinforce the confidence of the host nation population in the ability of the national leadership to govern effectively. In so doing, U.S. forces must walk a fine line between mission accomplishment and the danger of creating unrealistic expectations among the local population. The reminder of the Hippocratic Oath "to do no harm" is operable here.²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰ OSA, Anderson, p. 39.

This logic suggests several key ideas. First that the center of gravity were the people themselves. Second, that the immediate disaster is a symptom and that reinforcing a functioning government is the first step towards the stabilization of the larger issues/problems behind the crisis at hand. Third, given the short duration of the American military deployment, a conscious effort must be made to recognize the continuum of effort: to help but not to create dependency and false expectations. And fourth, that given this continuum, the most basic goal, must be to do no harm. These ideas will resurface in the following case studies.

This type of effort and understanding, however, had to have had an impact on the Bangladeshi military and government. The world's mightiest army returning from its greatest triumph in over forty years and it was bending over backwards to be subordinate in a country that arguably had little to nothing to do with its national security. As General West summed up, "it was a classic swords into plowshares operation."²⁰¹

But, perhaps, it did have something to do with national security. General Rowe remarks that the greatest contribution the JTF made was the example it set for the newly elected government and its people. Every day "we showed them how you can sit around with different people with different agendas and how it can work."²⁰² Given the previous tensions, the different agendas -- or the perception of such -- was obvious to those who lived in Bangladesh. Yet, everything was

²⁰¹ Telephone interview with Brigadier General Randy West, USMC, 9 June 1995. Then Colonel West was the wing commander of 5th MEB.

²⁰² Rowe, 30 May 1995.

discussed right there in front of everyone as a decision was reached. In setting an example that was consciously subordinate while seeking to include all in the coordination process, the intangible impact of the US example grows. When combined with the acute effort to have such a small physical impact, the genius of Stackpole's operationalizing a common understanding of the problem at hand into an effective response shines bright. It is hard to argue that such an example does not contribute to the United States' national security.²⁰³

The second point is that the US military was not in charge. It supported and enabled the effort. It never assumed, nor wanted, leadership. Moreover, it only did reconstruction of infrastructure in support of its limited mission.²⁰⁴ "We never had any intent to restore the infrastructure; that is not a task for the military. It is something for the international community to do."²⁰⁵

The support mindset always present, but in such a way that did not have the military operating outside its expertise, continuum awareness emerges as the next point. Stackpole kept his force focused, always supporting, but never crossing the line into long-term infrastructure projects. His means of achieving this conceptual

²⁰³ This observation is not to suggest that it is always in America's interest to do "good things" for other nations. Irrespective of how or why US troops are committed, however, there will be an impact on national security.

Additionally, the response gave the US military a chance to interact with various other nations as well. "Nations that might not otherwise consider combined military operations are more likely to cooperate in humanitarian measures, which, in turn, could lead to confidence-building ventures and possibly act as a building block toward a standing regional-stability block." [Stackpole, *Proceedings*, p. 116]. The geo-strategic impact of these operations is not within the scope of this study. But Stackpole's point is important to keep in mind. Also, it can be applied at the grass roots level. NGOs are made up from members of many nations as well as sponsored by many nations. The impressions made in the coordination process ineluctably make their way back, officially or unofficially, to the people and government of many nations. The military will always be an ambassador of sorts, particularly in its relations with NGOs.

²⁰⁴ Norton, 28 May 1995.

²⁰⁵ Stackpole, *Proceedings*, p. 114.

end-state was rather basic: he repeated it again and again and again. "We didn't create false expectations, as happens all too often in operations of this nature. We clearly stated what we intended to do and kept stating it over and over again. Therefore, they were prepared, as much as possible, to take over upon our departure."²⁰⁶

This point warrants further discussion. It is only by clearly delineating the parameters of one's effort that, paradoxically, enables that effort to achieve its goals. (CARE's example in northern Iraq comes to mind). If every interested party acutely understands the limits of the other participants, a working framework will present itself. Of course, there are two caveats. First, that each member must consistently repeat its mission to the other participants. Moreover, there is the assumption that the limits each party assumes is in response to a common understanding of the nature of the problem and that their limits are appropriate. The point remains, however, that it is better to be consistently clear and wrong, than to be ambiguous, create false expectations, and to still be wrong.

K. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The first strategic observation concerns the absence of traditional humanitarian emergency players. The UN was not involved in any form apart from UNICEF's decontamination of water supplies. OFDA was not involved

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 115.

either.²⁰⁷ Similarly, because the scope of the disaster could be addressed from essentially two places, Dhaka and Chittagong (Chittagong supported the Cox's Bazar effort), the response was more easily controlled and coordinated between and among the Bangladeshi government, the US forces, and the NGOs. The simple conclusion is that the fewer players and locations, the more likely effective coordination is.

The final strategic lesson, is the hidden third member of humanitarian emergencies: the people being helped. This observation is not so much about the government as it is about the people themselves. Most interviewed talk of the "resilience" and "self-discipline" of the Bangladeshi people. Throughout the effort, there was never "a breakdown of order" or any security threat whatsoever. When working in an environment of desolation with a people who hold their head high, the response effort inevitably draws energy from their example. Mutual respect becomes the *modus operandi*. This point assumes great importance. If the provider/enabler does not feel appreciated, nor does he respect the people he is helping, there cannot help but be an effect on the cohesion of the overall effort. General West, who spent most of his days flying and thus had the most interaction with the Bangladeshis and Marines helping them, said simply, "the Marines *wanted* to be there; they saw the situation -- you would have to have a tremendously cold

²⁰⁷ Andrew Natsios, then Director of OFDA, did accompany Mrs. Marilyn Quayle to Bangladesh for a visit, but that was the extent of OFDA involvement on the ground (OFDA did contribute and seek grants for the effort). OFDA was fully engaged in northern Iraq.

heart not to want to help."²⁰⁸ While refraining from a "people are people" argument, the power of the moment can be overwhelming; even more so when helper and helped appreciate one another.

It is this type of intangible that directly affects the cohesion of an effort. In many ways, it is the strongest force multiplier there is. If the people being helped, feel appreciated in a non-patronizing way and actively seek to engage and support their helpers, the synergy that results is a powerful momentum.²⁰⁹ Importantly, if this mutual appreciation continues, the more likely the population being helped is to contribute to the effort. Dependency is less likely when the rapport between helped and helper is one of respect.

L. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

At the operational level, the issue of comparative advantage again makes its case. "Each key actor brought a critical element to the table. A summary of these follows:

- The elected civil government had the legitimacy and had to be seen as the primary agent in the operation from the Bangladeshi perspective.
- The Bangladesh Army had the ability to provide civil order at the distribution sites.

²⁰⁸ West, 9 June 1995. General West also tells the story of 5th MEB's departure. In the simple good-bye ceremony, the Bangladeshi official was moved to tears as he described how Bangladeshis had served side-by-side with the Americans in the Gulf War. And then, when Bangladesh was in its hour of need, her ally had reciprocated. This experience "was very emotional" and made a tremendous impact on all present.

²⁰⁹ This momentum had the potential to be negated by a Dhaka control center somewhat detached from the effort. Captain Anglim notes that there was the feeling sometimes that the Dhaka JTF saw things more from an efficiency standpoint. With no operational impact, Anglim's suggested cure is "to get them out every once in a while and keep them in touch." (Anglim, 13 July 95).

- The civil bureaucracy controlled the surplus grain in government granaries.
- The NGOs had the majority of relief supplies, to include the ubiquitous CARE packages, needed to stabilize the immediate situation. They also had personnel with years of experience in dealing with such disasters."²¹⁰

It was the US military's job to enable the tools already in place. By focusing on the logistics of distribution, while being aware of the above comparative advantages but not becoming intimately involved in them, the American force satisfied all participants, to include itself. The help was provided in a genuinely supportive and subordinate attitude as it remained explicitly clear that the JTF would be leaving as soon as its enabling effort was complete.

Regarding the NGO relationship, Colonel Anderson's point of developing and nurturing a "synergistic relationship" remains imperative. Certainly, it is the US logistics that make the response possible. But if it had been in a way that was not supportive, not user-friendly, it is almost guaranteed that the NGOs would have walked away and gone about their business as if the military was not even there. Colonel Blythe puts it best. "The bottom line is we had the transports and they didn't. But, we leave out the NGOs at our own peril -- they will be there whether we like it or not, and we must deal with them positively."²¹¹

One other operational point needs mentioning. Every day, the helicopters and LCACs (Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned) would come ashore from the ships to

²¹⁰ OSA, Anderson, p. 37.

²¹¹ Telephone interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, 16 May 1995.

help. Every day, they would return back to the ships. The ability to daily install an infrastructure and then to remove it as to reduce its impact on the very fragile local infrastructure is a unique ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team. This "sea-based" notion of support, furthermore, did not exacerbate any of the existing political tensions ashore. Thus the physical capacity to do so, plus the political utility of such a methodology, ensured that neither the local infrastructure or fragile democracy was burdened by the "overwhelming force" of the United States military. There is no doubt that this concept will be used again in support of a humanitarian operation.

M. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

At the tactical level, several basic lessons of coordination are clear. First, we are again confronted with two cultural organizations stripped of the chance to be themselves. In the face of a catastrophic disaster, both the military and the NGO could not have behaved according to their organizational culture, even if they wanted to. On the one hand, the military was deployed literally overnight. There was no time to gather the "right" people or build a team; III MEF took the team it had and worked from there. Once in-country, Stackpole, keeping the physical and political "footprint" small while ensuring that the mission stay focused. The military had no chance to build its stovepipes, to include such institutional roles as the CMOC.

The military's appointed means for civilian interface, Civil Affairs and their coordination point, the CMOC, did not play a significant role. When they were

deployed, they were deployed almost haphazardly, in two ten day stints (although some stayed for the entire five weeks of the operation). In an effort of short duration, there must be continuity, otherwise such a deployment prevents cohesion and becomes disconnecting. Thus, conceptually and tactically misapplied, the Civil Affairs skills "did not have a chance to manifest themselves."²¹² Although making significant contributions individually, the Civil Affairs personnel were just staff officers.

Additionally, the CMOC, as a designated title, did not occur. When one reviews the facts however, the Military Coordination Center in Chittagong emerges as a true operations center. In this example, not unlike northern Iraq, the "O" in CMOC was vitalized. One might conclude, at least in the context of this case study, that a CMOC acting as a liaison center would have been another stovepipe layer preventing the accomplishment of the mission. Indeed, the NGOs as an integral part of the "Ops" center may be necessary in some cases.²¹³

On the other hand, the NGOs did not behave according to their organizational stereotype either. Recognizing the common sense of the logistics, not to mention that they had no transport themselves to the outer-islands, the NGOs joined the response willingly and cordially. As long as there was a user-friendly face to the coordination process, the NGOs were game. Besides, why pay for or develop transport when someone is going to do it for free? (Particularly

²¹² Interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, Mountain View, California, 4 June 1995.

²¹³ Truly, a phenomenal consideration when one considers the military's penchant for secrecy and the fact that there were 122 NGOs, indigenous and international, coordinating through the MCC in Chittagong.

when there were limited funds coming in from the U.S. and the international community). The organizational autonomy and insular mindset was mostly abandoned in order to meet the need.

This discussion of uncharacteristic behavior reflects three more basic coordination lessons from Bangladesh. The principle of altruistic self-interest rings loud and clear. In both Dhaka and Chittagong, members of both communities were receiving something in exchange for their services. The military offered infrastructure and logistics and asked for expertise and coordination in return. The NGOs offered their knowledge, expertise, and supplies and asked for transport in return. Thus, there was an explicit understanding between the two communities, even if such a recognition were left implicit as Adam Smith's "invisible hand" guided the exchange of humanitarian goods.

Furthermore, the "invisible hand" derived its diaphanous state from the transparency of the meetings. Because there were so many sources of information presented before all the participating parties, it was relatively easy to arrive at a common sense agenda for the next day or so. Thus, if a representative was inclined to push his/her agenda, the group would recognize that process for what it was.

This transparency, of course, was also the direct result of the personalities involved. Needham, Norton, Anglim, and Anderson, for example, all made sincere efforts to encourage impartiality while accepting the existence of different agendas as natural.

Individual service members must also be prepared to be extremely flexible in dealing with individual NGO workers. Perhaps by definition, the individuals who gravitate to that profession are more likely to be people more prone to the Peace Corps than the Marine Corps. [This observation based on a long-time A.I.D. official to Anderson]. They will generally be more prone to seek consensus than the average military man or woman, and they will not understand military institutional cultural norms any more easily than service members will understand theirs. This can lead to friction unless both sides make a determined attempt to overcome such prejudices in order to help save lives. The SEA ANGEL operation worked well in this context because both sides realized the gravity of the situation and place considerable emphasis on harmonious relationships.²¹⁴

What this insightful observation suggests is that it is people who make up emergency responses, not organizations or cultures. It is people who are living in a powerful moment as they spend a great deal of time with one another. Importantly, it is people not necessarily worried about credit.²¹⁵

The standard for military and NGO alike at the level of implementation is Ambassador Milam's description of Colonel Anderson's contribution: "he was very effective -- he made himself invisible."²¹⁶ It would seem that for an operation to be successful, the invisible hand of altruistic self interest must not only demand transparency at the group coordination level, but from the individual as well.

²¹⁴ OSA, Anderson, p. 42.

²¹⁵ Because there are institutions and organizations involved, of course someone is worried about credit. But at the implementor level, that does not seem to be the case. It is interesting to note that NGOs share the same animosities for their headquarters as do military operators for their higher staff and Washington DC components.

²¹⁶ Milam, 7 June 1995.

N. OPERATION SEA ANGEL COORDINATION PRINCIPLES

1. The military cannot be in charge. It would have been very easy for the JTF commander as the expert on the deployment of his forces to run roughshod, in a manner of speaking, over the ambassador and host nation. After all, they generally will not know about the capacities of a JTF. By going out of his way to clearly subordinate himself to civilian authority, Stackpole accomplished three things.
 - a. A democratic example was set for the Bangladeshi army and government. These types of operations are therefore in the national interest.
 - b. By keeping the "footprint" to an absolute minimum, pursuant to the political sensitivities of the young government, the military had no opportunity to build its stovepipe.
 - c. By operating within an established infrastructure, the force was free to leave once its goals had been met.

If the military had been in charge, a democratic example would not have been set; an appropriate infrastructure would not have been established to support the effort; and departure would be predicated upon the complete resolution of the disaster.

2. Repeat your intentions over and over again. Do everything possible to prevent false expectations. By clearly stating his limited objective again and again -- based on humanitarian need -- Stackpole paradoxically increased his maneuver room. Because everyone understood exactly what the US force was there to accomplish, there were no false expectations as to the duration or purpose of the JTF. By definition, this clear statement of the JTF, as the most influential component in the relief effort, allowed the other components to gauge their own contributions in a sustained effort that would continue after the departure of the JTF.
3. Even in such a seemingly "simple" operation, there will be a political dimension. Remember that it was Stackpole who created and defined this mission/policy on-the-ground (not anyone higher or Washington). He was also savvy enough to realize the political dimension and address it in Dhaka, isolating it from the humanitarian effort in Chittagong.

4. The humanitarian intent remained primary and drove the operation. Once isolated from the political dimension, the MCC determined its priorities according to where the most dying was.
5. The fewer players involved the better (in this case, it was three: the Bangladeshi government, the US military, and the NGO community). An obvious statement, the lesson hinted at here is that the more players, the harder it will be to arrive at a common understanding of the nature of the problem and then translate it into a common sense approach that permeates the effort.
6. There must be an awareness of comparative advantage within the continuum of effort. The military is good for instantaneous infrastructure and the coordination leverage inherent therein. NGOs provide knowledge, expertise, and the transition. They were there before the military, they will resume again after the military leaves. While the two are in each other's presence, both sides, particularly the individuals at the coordination and implementation levels, must encourage and foster a "synergistic relationship." Indeed, it could very well be that this synergy results from a situation that inherently prevents both communities from behaving as they would in otherwise normal circumstances.
7. The invisible intangibles of interaction, or, perhaps, the holy trinity of humanitarian coordination between the military and the NGOs is also apparent.
 - a. Altruistic self-interest. The "invisible hand" of self-interest ensures that both parties are rewarded in the coordination process. While various agencies and organizations come together for the same nominal purpose, each comes with different motivations and interests. In the name of the common purpose, there are trade-offs between and among the interests represented. The relationship between the US military and the NGOs must be mutually beneficial.
 - b. Transparency. Coordination meetings must be conducted with as many surveyors of the same reality as possible. This prevents "agendas," no matter how benign, from taking priority over the common sense of the response effort. Participants should work to encourage it.
 - c. Invisible personalities. For the most part, the people responsible for representing their institution/organization must work to keep themselves "behind-the-scenes." It is only in this manner that true

coordination can take place. Importantly, this style implies that those coordinating cannot be looking for credit. The credit must go to whomever assumes overall responsibility once the military leaves. In so doing, both the military and NGO are allowed to return to the purposes for which they were designed.

8. Finally, the primary structural interface was a military operations center. There was no liaison to a faceless higher headquarters: problems were solved there between those responsible for the effort. This collocation decisively increased the cohesion of the effort. Not only were decisions made in front of everyone, they were agreed to by people who, after spending so much time together, knew each other as people -- not as designated positions of an institutional infrastructure.

IV. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

A. INTRODUCTION

Somalia. The very word remains a touchstone of emotion for those who participated in the United Nations sponsored humanitarian intervention that took place there from December, 1992, to March, 1995. Because the overall intervention -- to include its various stages -- was so much longer than the relatively short duration of the other case studies, it is impossible to isolate the events of the first thirty days from the rest of the experience. Whereas it is possible to soon envision the end of U.S. military involvement after the first thirty to sixty days of the previous interventions, that is not the case in Somalia. Consequently, this account takes a somewhat different and thematic approach, focusing only on the UNITAF period (December, 1992-May, 1993). First, due to the sheer complexity of the situation, much more attention is given to the political context and the emergency situation. Moreover, the discussion will focus purely on the HOC/CMOC in Mogadishu itself. It is here that there is the most consternation between the two communities and therefore where there are the most lessons to be learned. Finally, this chapter will discuss three basic concepts in its attempt to understand the NGO/military relationship in Mogadishu. These three areas -- the tangible/intangible distance between the HOC/CMOC and UNITAF; security and disarmament; and the lack of a humanitarian strategy -- were all evident from the very beginning of the intervention.

In response to an increasing American and international public opinion that demanded reaction to the man-made Somali famine, the United States, with United Nations blessing, took action. On December 9, 1992, the United States Marines -- the initial instrument chosen to conduct the policy of intervention -- came ashore in Mogadishu, Somalia. Quickly moving to establish an expeditionary infrastructure that would facilitate security and the delivery of food to starving Somalis, the Marines established a Civil Military Operations Center on December 11th. Collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center, the U.N.'s humanitarian coordination cell, the CMOC would be the national focal point of NGO/U.S. military coordination.

While the actual impact of the intervention is very hard to judge systematically, the following statistics have been suggested for the period 1991-1993 (March).²¹⁷ Of a Somali population of 5.1 million during this time, approximately four million lived in "famine-afflicted regions," mostly in the south. Of the four million, 330,000 were at imminent risk of death; of these people, 110,000 deaths were averted due to "health, food, and other interventions" over this two year period. "Of the 202-238,000 famine related deaths that did occur in 1992, at least 70 percent (154,000) could have been prevented, had proven primary health strategies been implemented earlier and more widely."

²¹⁷ These numbers based on the analysis of the Refugee Policy Group report, *Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Intervention in the Somalia Emergency*, p. 35. [Hereafter cited as *Lives Lost*].

According to this analysis it is therefore hard to ascertain exactly how many lives the military intervention itself saved.²¹⁸ Also according to this analysis, however, it is impossible to say how many more would have died had the intervention not taken place. Suffice it to say that the military intervention, under the political leadership of Presidential Envoy Robert B. Oakley, was a humanitarian success. Indeed, *every* participant interviewed did not hesitate to state that *Operation Restore Hope* was a humanitarian success.

This study characterizes the UNITAF experience as an impressive short-term success. It is an impressive success in that it achieved its basic aims despite the dynamics of the political context and the emergency situation in which it was conducted. It is a short-term success, however, because the political complexity of Somalia was not acknowledged at the strategic policy level. (This absence of political resolve would reap grim results during the second phase, UNOSOM II). As a result, the unrealistically limited U.S. mandate of "humanitarianism" prevented all intervenors from taking the steps necessary to create the condition for longer term Somali rehabilitation and restoration. The fact that so many political issues were addressed is a tribute to all the operators in Somalia -- from Oakley down. In many ways, those in Somalia were not only hamstrung by the mandate, they were left hanging without the imperative political resolve and resources to address the issues that demanded attention.

²¹⁸ Although the *Lives Lost* analysis does suggest that it is "plausible that UNITAF prevented large numbers of starvation deaths," p. 32.

It is this failure to acknowledge the political dimensions of the situation at the highest policy levels that permeates the entire effort, to include the NGO/military relationship and its more contentious conversations. First and foremost, this failure manifested itself in the disarmament issue. The disarmament issue would remain intractable as long as there was an absence of stateside political will.

Also related to a lack of senior political decisiveness is the ultimate irony of Somalia: that a humanitarian intervention did not have a humanitarian strategy. While various ideas and strategies existed, none was accepted by everyone as a common or shared approach to the situation. There was no concept at the HOC as to where the humanitarian community wanted Somalia to be in three or six months. Of course, this is, in part, the direct result of the fact that the Somalis themselves could not present a united strategy because they were so factionalized. Also, Somalis were sometimes not allowed to participate because the interests of the warlords were served by continued anarchy. Ultimately, however, a truly comprehensive humanitarian strategy would have to be integrated among the other socio-economic plans that must be a part of stabilizing a society: something inherently political.

Without a political will that acknowledged the existence of these necessary strategies and their need to be integrated, ultimately under the broad umbrella of a political vision, the entire effort was reduced to one of *ad hoc*, tactical attempts

to treat symptoms of deeper-rooted problems. As Ambassador Oakley himself has stated, "we were reduced to trying locally."²¹⁹

Finally, the overall UNITAF effort ultimately must be viewed from the following perspective: nothing had ever been attempted on that scale in a political and emergency environment so complex. Most were thrown into the endeavor with little knowledge or personal experience with past humanitarian interventions. Everyone was dealing with a situation whose sheer size and complexity still boggles the mind. Although short-term in its impact, the effort nonetheless remains impressive.

B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

On January 5, 1991, U.S. Marines evacuated the American embassy in Somalia. As the helicopters pulled away, leaving behind a recently renovated \$35 million dollar embassy, their passengers also included the Soviet ambassador and his staff.

In telling symbolism that the Cold War was over, Americans and Soviets together left behind a country that, at one time or another, they had both supported against the other. No longer in need of this proxy state, both superpowers left it to its own devices.

Armed to the teeth after nineteen years of military support by the United States and the Soviet Union, Somalia would not fair well. The state had begun to

²¹⁹ Oakley, 9 August 1995. This comment was made in reference to the disarmament policy and the lack of support from Washington. It is, however, more than applicable to the the entire UNITAF period.

disintegrate in 1988 when all American aid had been withdrawn. Previously empowered by a constant flow of military aid, Siad Barre, who had ruled Somalia since his coup in 1969, no longer had the means to maintain his support base. In fact, his policy of keeping the various clans divided against each other finally came home to roost as insurgents in the north established bases inside Somalia itself in 1988. It was Siad Barre's brutal campaign against these northern bases that caused the U.S. to renounce its aid as the Cold War waned.

Overthrown by the insurgents in January 1991, Siad Barre fled to the Kenya border as Somalia descended into anarchy. Most of the fighting between and among the various clan alliances took place between the Shebelle River and the Juba River (roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayu to the south) during the first six months of 1991. (Although sporadic fighting continues to the present day). This fighting, exacerbated by a continuing drought, created the famine that would not become familiar to the west until a year later. With continuous warfare for six months, the entire agricultural system was destroyed: from the fields themselves to the production, distribution, and market systems. Also, as many as a million people were displaced during this period, seeking refuge in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia's major cities. Moreover, the capital itself, Mogadishu, became separated between the forces of Ali Mahdi Mohamed (a former Somali businessman) in the north and the forces of General Mohamed Farah Aidid in the southern portion of the city.

With the growth of the famine, whoever had food had power. With no economy to speak of and an environment where one had to carry a gun for both

survival and income, the looting and/or extortion of NGO shipments of food became routine.²²⁰ "Stealing had become a way of life with an entire economic system built around it."²²¹

In the meantime, NGOs, professional humanitarians, had hired Somali gunmen to protect them and the delivery of food. It was very much a moral dilemma: accept 50% food losses and the fact that the food itself, if not the hiring of gunmen, was exacerbating the situation or continue to feed the needy. As one senior NGO official stated, NGOs were "damned if they didn't [hire guards] and damned if they didn't [provide food]."²²²

It was in response to this environment, and heavy media-play in the West, that the U.S. first responded in August, 1992, with an airlift out of Mombasa, Kenya.²²³ As attention of the press continued and with the acknowledgment that the airlift was probably providing only 10% of the necessary aid (and that the aid given could not be fully monitored to the end-user, i.e., to Somali families or warlords), the calls for some sort of intervention began to get louder. These cries culminated in the month of November -- just after the Presidential election. By late November, President Bush, a lame-duck, had decided to intervene. Importantly, his decision was based, in part, on a letter from Interaction, an

²²⁰ While documenting the extent of the looting is impossible, 50% of all foodstuffs seems to be as good a number as any.

²²¹ Andrew Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief Interventions in Somalia: the Economics of Chaos," unpublished paper, p. 7.

²²² Interview with Rudy von Bernuth, Save the Children, Westport, Connecticut, 7 August 1995.

²²³ This announcement, incidentally, was made in conjunction with the Republican Party's National Convention in Houston.

umbrella NGO for 160 humanitarian NGOs, with several NGO signatures calling for assistance in response to the desperate security situation. Never before had NGOs had this type of impact at the national policy level.

Recognizing the overall situation for what it was, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell sought a civilian leader to complement the military operation's commander, Lieutenant General Robert Johnson.²²⁴ Soon, former Ambassador to Somalia Robert B. Oakley was appointed as the President's Special Envoy.²²⁵

In sum, Somalia had been stricken with a man-made famine and was racked by clan rivalry and random banditry. Food had become the source of power and, as a result, was not getting to the people who needed it most. The NGOs, caught in a moral quandry, had chosen to accept 50% food loss, hire armed guards, and, for the most part, called for some type of intervention. Despite General Powell's advocacy and implementation of a political leader in a complex humanitarian situation, Oakley would still be forced to act within the narrow mandate of a humanitarian operation. In the meantime, the National Command Authority was about to go into a lengthy transition as a domestically focused Clinton Administration occupied the White House.

²²⁴ Oakley, 9 August 1995.

²²⁵ Beyond this discussion, one hesitates to consider what would have happened if there had been no Oakley, particularly during a change of administrations, to at least present political leadership at the operational level.

C. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION

If there was any general understanding of the nature of the emergency in Somalia, it was that the famine required safely delivered food to Mogadishu and Baidoa. This understanding did not, however, reflect the complexities of the situation. The result was the misidentification of the problem and therefore the solution.

The confusion and/or complexity begins with the debate on whether or not the famine truly existed at the time of the intervention. Although different endpoints are offered, most humanitarians agree that the famine had broken by September/October of 1992.²²⁶ There is also debate regarding the measures applied to the famine and its related problems. In the Refugee Policy Group's analysis, the "third wave" of the famine came between July and mid-October, 1992. This wave witnessed measles, diarrhea, and malaria sweeping through the already malnourished.²²⁷ What this analysis suggests is that it was not so much food that was needed, but a systematic and basic public health plan.²²⁸ If action is to be taken in the name of humanitarianism, the humanitarian solution itself must be examined carefully -- it is not always as simple as "food."

²²⁶ Craig Anderson, World Concern Director for Africa at the time (telephone interview, 25 July 1995); African Rights in "Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment," May, 1993, pp. 10-11; RPG report, *Lives Lost*, pp. 10-14.

²²⁷ *Lives Lost*, p. 13.

²²⁸ The RPG analysis suggests in another report that, "the overall Somalia relief effort over-emphasized till too late the provision of food over public health assistance." RPG, *Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of the U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 1990-1994*, [hereafter cited as *The Role of OFDA*] p. 12.

These issues also reflect the power of the Western media. Pictures do not lie; there were starving thousands. These pictures, however, inadvertently contributed to the understanding that the solution was simply a matter of food. It was this perceived solution that seemingly dominated the highest levels as a sophisticated and comprehensive response was largely ignored. Indeed, the humanitarian experts themselves were not included in the senior decision-making meetings about Somalia.²²⁹ The nature of the problem thus became understood as not enough food and not enough security to deliver the food. Yet there were those who recognized Somalia's complexity from the beginning and offered a nuanced response as well.

Andrew Natsios, more than anyone else -- as director of OFDA and then as the Assistant A.I.D. Administrator for the Food and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau and as President Bush's Emergency Coordinator for Somalia -- brought the Somali famine to the attention of Washington D.C. and the American public. At an August 18th State Department Briefing, in conjunction with announcing the U.S. military's airlift into southern Somalia, Natsios laid out a pragmatic and sophisticated approach that was not simply a "do something" crusade.

I should note that no relief strategy will be successful in ending hunger-related deaths in Somalia unless fundamental security problems are addressed. Elements of the United States government's humanitarian strategy can contribute to reducing tensions. However, Somali leaders themselves are ultimately responsible for the deaths

²²⁹ In general, it was felt at OFDA that once Somalia came up on the DOD/NSC scope, OFDA was marginalized from the planning process, if not excluded, thereby inevitably reducing the significance of humanitarian concerns as political and security ones dominated. *The Role of OFDA*, pp. 5-6.

of tens of thousands of their fellow Somalis . . . [he goes on to stress the three goals of a humanitarian strategy to be pursued by the DART team that would soon be working in Somalia]

1. A large-scale monetization of food to drive down and stabilize prices;
2. Decentralization of the relief effort to move people out of insecure and unstable cities to more secure areas;
3. Development of programs funded with the local currency generated from the sale of food to accelerate rehabilitation activities, particularly in livestock and the agricultural sectors, which are critical to long-term food security.²³⁰

Seemingly, here was the framework of a plan. Security was fundamental, and ultimately the responsibility of the Somali leaders. Moreover, there was no denying the need for a comprehensive approach. Unfortunately, this plan would increasingly be ignored as DOD and the NSC reduced the problem to not enough food and not enough security for food delivery, and as more international players became involved who would not subject themselves to such a strategy.

D. THE MISSION

In contrast to northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the military's mission statement was not left to a simple humanitarian intent. Instead, the mission statement slowly evolved from a humanitarian effort supported by military forces to something that came fourth after three military concerns. Indeed, what had been initially implied as a mutually supporting use of comparative advantage became an artificially delineated separation between military and humanitarian efforts. The unintended

²³⁰ August 18, 1992, State Department Briefing.

result was that a mission statement narrowly defined in the interest of a clear and achievable end-state ultimately confused everyone, including the military.

On December 3rd, U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 authorized the U.S. led intervention "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible."

On December 6th, Secretary of Defense Cheney said on Meet the Press that "our mission is to restore conditions so that the humanitarian effort can go forward, and then to turn over responsibility for securing the country to UN forces."²³¹

On December 17th, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen stated that the "United States is leading a coalition of forces under UN auspices to establish a secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in Somalia. Our mission is clear, it is defined, and it is doable . . ."²³²

At that same testimony, James Woods, the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for African Affairs defined the American mission as follows:

. . . to conduct joint and combine military operations in Somalia under UN auspices to secure major air and sea ports, ground routes, and major relief centers; to provide a secure environment; to disarm as necessary forces which interfere with humanitarian relief operations, and to protect and assist UN and non-governmental humanitarian relief operations . . . US forces will remain until they fulfill their mission: the establishment of a secure environment so that [the]

²³¹ NBC's Meet The Press, December 6, 1992.

²³² Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Situation in Somalia, December 17, 1992.

peacekeeping operation can sustain the humanitarian effort. Meanwhile, private voluntary organizations will continue distributing humanitarian aid. The purpose of our coalition efforts is to permit them to operate in a more secure and safe environment.²³³

On January 1, 1993, in Baidoa, Somalia, President Bush articulated the American mission to those present at the orphanage he was visiting.

So I think in the new administration you'll find people who are understanding of and appreciative of the mission here. And beyond that, I cannot really go, because you know our mission is limited. It's not to stay forever, and it is not to totally disarm this country. So we've spelled it out, in accordance with the U.N. -- in accordance with the U.N. resolutions, and we will do exactly what I said -- told the American people we'd do. We'd come in, we'd make -- we'd make the peace, we'd get the humanitarian aid flowing, and then our people go home.²³⁴

As one progresses through the various enunciations of the American mission, from prepared statements to conversational responses, the connection between security and its humanitarian purpose begins to fade. President Bush's statement is very ambiguous. It suggests that the presence of U.S. troops would make the peace. After that, the humanitarian flow would result. There does not seem to be a conceptual bridge between the two ideas.

²³³ It should also be noted that A.I.D. once again presented its comprehensive plan for Somalia. Both Andrew Natsios and Lois Richards, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Food & Humanitarian Assistance, were present. Ms. Richards suggested the following six phases:

- 1) Provide a regular supply of cereals and supplemental foods along with medicines.
- 2) Purchase and distribute seeds and tools by March, 1993, in time to be planted by April rains.
- 3) Fully implement food modernization programs (in order to expand food base of markets)
- 4) Launch livestock rehabilitation programs.
- 5) Return refugees to their homes (once area is secure).
- 6) Reconstitute a Somali peace force, which can operate under UN authority and management.

²³⁴ The Reuters Transcript Report, January 1, 1993, Friday, BC cycle.

Indeed, the military's mission seems remote from the U.N. mandate and Secretary Cheney's description of the U.S. purpose. According to the Department of Defense, the military's mission/objectives were to:

1. secure major air and sea ports;
2. to provide open and free passage of relief supplies;
3. to provide security for relief convoys and relief organization operations;
and
4. to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.²³⁵

Moreover, the fourth element was added as a permissive objective for the JTF commander so that he could assist as he thought appropriate.²³⁶

As Jonathan Dworken has argued, this mission statement reflected the JTF's perspective on an "ideal division of labor:"

The [military] would create a secure environment in which to deliver supplies by protecting the HRO [Humanitarian Relief Organization] distribution system, from the ports and airfields where the supplies entered the country, to the road networks over which the supplies moved to distribution points. The [NGOs] would get the supplies in country, transport them overland, and distribute them.²³⁷

²³⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Somalia OPLAN," p. 5., as quoted in "Restore Hope Coordinating Relief Operations," by Jonathan T. Dworken in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1995, p. 15.

²³⁶ Jonathan T. Dworken, *Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope*, p. 36 [Hereafter cited as *Observations From Restore Hope*]. See Dworken's footnote #37.

²³⁷ Dworken, *JTF Quarterly*, p. 15.

This well-articulated thought begins to point to an almost imperceptible fault line in the NGO/military relationship: 1) that security is necessarily the only condition for humanitarian work; 2) that, in this particular situation, the labor of security can, or should, be divided away from the labor of relief. In short, that there was a military job to do and that the humanitarian stuff would take care of itself.

Of course, the first three points of the military's mission statement are implicitly in support of the entire humanitarian relief effort. There is nothing in the statement, however, that indicates a guiding humanitarian intent or strategy that is supported by the military. By comparison, the mission statements of the first two case studies may have been much more simple but they left no doubt as to what the overarching humanitarian goal was.

Finally, one could argue, perhaps cynically, that this mission statement as such conveyed the true political mission of the military: take as few casualties as possible and do something humanitarian in the meantime. Indeed, Dr. Ken Menkhaus has argued that despite the rhetoric of good intentions the "main consideration was minimizing casualties," as evidenced by Ambassador Oakley's political interaction, primarily with Aideed. Menkhaus suggests that while Oakley may never have been given the orders, it was this concern that drove U.S. actions.²³⁸ A different interpretation, never to be documented, it demands reflection.

²³⁸ Telephone interview with Dr. Ken Menkhaus, 24 August 1995. Menkhaus suggests that by centralizing the U.S. effort in southern Mogadishu, the U.S. had to deal with the one threat that could visit casualties upon U.S. forces: General Aideed. Consequently, Oakley met with Aideed more than any other warlord.

Thus, the mission statement and its wording is important, capable of several interpretations. What does appear evident, however, is that even before the intervention started, there was already a gap between humanitarian end and military means.

E. PROVIDE RELIEF, NGOS, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

Before considering the response structure that finally developed after December 9th, we must briefly examine some additional considerations that could have made the intervention a much smoother process. To begin with, there were the lessons of Operation Provide Relief. This effort was an airlift of relief supplies into southern Somalia that began in mid-August and continued until mid-December. Run out of Mombasa, Kenya, it witnessed the close collaboration of the DART and the American military.

Commanded by Brigadier General Frank Libutti, USMC, the American contingent worked in direct support of the humanitarian intent: getting the food to the airstrips. Cognizant of his supportive role, Libutti pointed out at the time that issues of food distribution were "outside my foxhole."²³⁹ Indeed, the military "did not try to overstep the bounds of its mandate," essentially acting as a "flying firm" in a logistics operation.²⁴⁰ What resulted was a mutual understanding of comparative advantage.

²³⁹ As quoted by Keith B. Richburg in "U.S. Begins Airlift For Starving Somalis' Negotiations With Kenya Clear Way for Aid," *The Washington Post*, 22 August 1992, p. A18.

²⁴⁰ Interview with Kate Farnsworth, Washington D.C., 31 July 95. Farnsworth was a DART member.

Every morning at 0800, the DART met to discuss the technicalities of what needed to be lifted, review NGO information received since the last meeting, and consider any other issues. Later that afternoon, a DART representative would attend Libutti's staff meeting. Although not called a CMOC (or anything besides a staff meeting), this meeting, for all intents and purposes, was the CMOC. Recognizing that they did not have the "skills to evaluate and validate and prioritize distribution,"²⁴¹ the military determined their mission according to the input of the DART. This relationship proved to be very healthy. It is worth noting some indicators of success.

First, there was a clearly delineated intent: get food to the Somali airstrips. As a result, each community -- represented solely by the DART on one side and the military staff on the other -- operated according to their comparative advantage. The military stuck to logistics in support of the humanitarian intent, the DART provided the necessary expertise to prioritize the air missions. NGOs operating in Somalia were represented by radio-sent information to the DART in Mombasa. This information provided humanitarian "intel" on the situation as well as airfield conditions and capacity reports.²⁴²

Second, humanitarian decisions were made cooperatively, at the same table. As in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the coordination of the two communities took place at one focal point. General Libutti's staff meeting was very much an

²⁴¹ Interview with Thomas Dolan, Washington D.C., 31 July 95. Dolan was the Deputy Team Leader of the DART.

²⁴² Farnsworth, 31 July 95.

operations center whereby the DART, as a clearinghouse for NGO information, provided the ends as the military provided the means. Working hand-in-hand meant a true understanding of comparative advantage.

F. NGOS

Prior to all the media attention in the summer of 1992, it was just a few NGOs that had had a continued presence in Somalia through the very worst of the anarchy. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Doctors Without Borders/France (MSF), the International Medical Corps (IMC), World Concern, Save the Children (UK), and SOS (an Austrian NGO) were among the very brave few (the U.N. had left). As a result, these stout-hearted humanitarians were not just the only western source of information on Somalia, they also represented the most up-to-date information on the overall humanitarian emergency. They were not in any way utilized prior to the intervention.²⁴³

"During the planning phase for the deployment, there was no contact at the operational level [the First Marine Expeditionary Force, the unit around which the JTF was established] with representatives of the humanitarian organizations working in Somalia."²⁴⁴ The actual Marines who came ashore on December 9th,

²⁴³ Richard Vennigone, World Vision International, 28 October 1994; Patrick Vial, MSF/France, 17 January 1995; William Berquist (formerly of Catholic Relief Services) 21 August 1995; Carl Harris (formerly of World Concern) 24 August 1995; Refugee Policy Group, *The Somalia Saga: A Personal Account 1990-1993*, by Jan Westcott, p. 37. [Hereafter cited as Westcott Report].

²⁴⁴ Kevin Kennedy, "The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope," unpublished paper, p. 2. [Hereafter cited as Kennedy Paper].

were merely given a list of NGOs in the area.²⁴⁵ Their first priority, in any case, would be establishing a secure area. For an operation defined as humanitarian, and in support of those who knew the situation best, the NGOs were conspicuously left out of the equation. The common rebuttal to such an assertion is that collecting such information is virtually impossible. Where would one start?

By the end of January, 1991, the Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee for Somalia (INCS) had been formed in Nairobi, Kenya. On February 5, 1991, it agreed upon the following statement of purpose:

1. To establish open, clear and effective communication between Somali authorities and NGOs;
2. To coordinate resources and programs of agencies working in the same areas of relief, to assure maximum effectiveness thereby eliminating conflicts of efforts and duplication of capital assets;
3. To establish a forum through which all NGOs interested in involvement in Somalia can gain and share knowledge of existing and planned programs; and
4. To promote donor confidence in a coordinated NGO effort toward Somalia through effective communication to attract maximum donor funding.²⁴⁶

There was thus a well established forum through which to contact NGOs operating in Somalia, not to mention the contact made during the Provide Relief operation. Moreover, OFDA's Special Relief Coordinator for Somalia, Jan Westcott, had been operating, and continued to operate, in Somalia since

²⁴⁵ Interview with Major David Castellvi, 3 August 1995, Quantico, Virginia. Major Castellvi was a company commander for 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines.

²⁴⁶ Westcott Report, p. 6.

November of 1990. As it turned out, Ms. Westcott was eventually contacted by the military in a ship-to-shore phone call in early December.²⁴⁷

G. CIVIL AFFAIRS

Another seemingly inexplicable missing component from the intervention preparation was the lack of Army Civil Affairs units involved or eventually sent. Given their stellar performance in Operation Provide Comfort, it appears unusual that they would not be fully utilized. While Charlie Company of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (the Army's only active duty Civil Affairs unit) was sent to Somalia, the reserves, despite receiving call-up orders, were never activated.²⁴⁸ One suggested reason for this conspicuous absence is that the Marines thought they did not need them. Moreover, the call-up of such units generally indicates a longer-term commitment. The Civil Affairs units also implied nation-building, something that was clearly not part of the mission statement. The Marines, as a short-term expeditionary unit, fit the political climate of Washington D.C.

H. RESPONSE STRUCTURE

It was against this backdrop of lessons mis-learned and opportunities lost that the Marines came ashore to an established U.N. structure amidst the anarchy of multi-clan warfare. Designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator for the U.N.,

²⁴⁷ Westcott Report, p. 31. "The voice on the other end announced that he was calling from the SS Tripoli and wanted more information on the landing since a "Mr. Westcott's" name was included on his list of people involved in the advance party for the landing of the Marines." (p. 31).

²⁴⁸ The 452nd Civil Affairs Battalion, for example, was told that some of its elements would be going.

Dr. Philip Johnson, an American and President and CEO of CARE, had been the Director of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) since October, 1992. A supporter of military intervention, Johnson was ready to work with the JTF.²⁴⁹ Southern Somalia was soon divided into eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS), with a sectoral HOC established in each one (to include a CMOC that represented the local military forces). This sectoral HOC worked directly with the forces in that HRS. Importantly, the Mogadishu HRS HOC also served as the national HOC. As a result, this HOC would work directly with the UNITAF staff, according to its national charter, but it would not work directly with the military forces directly assigned to Mogadishu (First Marine Division).

The HOC was to provide for the following conceptual needs:

1. serve as a focal point for the humanitarian relief organizations;
2. increase the efficiency of humanitarian operations through planning and coordination;
3. gather and disseminate information among all humanitarian relief organizations;
4. provide the link for the humanitarian community to UNITAF and UNISOM military forces.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ On December 11th, the Marine JTF, according to its international make-up, became known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in support of UNOSOM, the U.N. Operation in Somalia.

²⁵⁰ Kennedy Paper, pp. 7-8.

In short, the HOC was responsible for developing and implementing humanitarian strategy and for coordinating logistical and security support for the relief organizations.

Once ashore, the Marines established their command center at the former U.S. embassy compound. This decision, a natural one given the compound's security attributes as well as its central location in southern Mogadishu, meant a ten minute separation (by vehicle) from the location of the already established HOC. Hence, a means was needed to establish a permanent liaison with the HOC and the U.N. itself.

On December 11th, the UNITAF CMOC was collocated with the HOC. Colonel Kevin Kennedy, of I MEF's G-3 shop (operations) was its Director. He would focus largely on NGO/UN relations. Colonel Bob MacPherson, a chance fill, would focus on the CMOC's relationship with UNITAF. The CMOC operated according to four "principal missions:"

1. serve as the UNITAF liaison to the humanitarian community and UNOSOM headquarters;
2. validate and coordinate requests for military support;
3. function as the UNITAF Civil Affairs Office;
4. Monitor military support in the Regional HOCs.²⁵¹

²⁵¹ Kennedy Paper, p. 9.

The collocation of the CMOC with the HOC ameliorated a number of critical concerns. First, the physical presence of the CMOC at the HOC was viewed as the military's "reaching out" to the humanitarian community²⁵² -- an important first perception because the NGOs did not know quite what to expect from the military (not having met or talked with the military until December 9th). Second, the resulting coordination proved to be "tremendously effective" as there was "no other means of getting security information" to the NGOs.²⁵³ (Security was the issue around which all coordination was centered). Third, the collocation provided a fulcrum through which the DART could input its expertise. As in northern Iraq, the DART members -- due to their many trips to the field, their own previous experience, and their checkbook -- were able to keep their finger on the pulse of the effort and help effect coordination.

Finally, the HOC needed to be separate from the UNITAF operations center. The UNITAF compound was the center of the American command element (with all the security accouterments of barbed-wire, bunkers, and machine-guns). By definition, information and meetings there were not meant for anyone but Americans, and access was accordingly restricted to those who had a need for entry. The HOC, on the other hand, had to be completely accessible to everyone.

²⁵² Interview with James Kunder, Vice President of the Save the Children (US), 7 August 1995, Westport, Connecticut. Mr. Kunder was the Director of OFDA at the time and present in Somalia for the first month.

²⁵³ Interview with Lauren Landis-Guzman, Save the Children (US), 1 August 1995, Washington D.C. Landis-Guzman was a member of the DART and worked in the HOC.

Anybody with any humanitarian concern was welcome to attend the meetings and share information.

The actual structure of the HOC reflected the different players involved. As the U.N.'s Humanitarian Coordinator, Phil Johnson was the HOC Director. He had two Deputy Directors, one civilian, one military. The civilian Deputy Director was the DART leader (first Bill Garvelink, then Kate Farnsworth) while the military Deputy Director was Colonel Kennedy. Theoretical subordinates, the Deputy Directors' first responsibility was back to their respective organizations. It was these people who ran the daily HOC meetings.

I. THE MEETING

It should first be noted that there was a pre-existing forum for NGO coordination called the NGO consortium. The Consortium had originated as the natural gathering point of the NGOs which had remained behind in Somalia when everyone else had left, including the U.N. With the advent of the CMOC, this informal meeting assumed a more official role as the major NGOs pitched in to hire a person who was responsible for their collective issues.

It was here that NGOs, big and small, had a chance to centralize their voice about other related issues. Like the military's staff meeting in the UNITAF compound, it was also a place where they determined the agenda and could talk among themselves. Occasionally, Kennedy and MacPherson would be invited to attend as observers. According to Joelle Tanguy of Doctors Without Borders, this meeting proved to be a "fundamental coordination mechanism" because it took the

burden off of the HOC/CMOC staff to address every single NGO.²⁵⁴ In this manner, the HOC could refer smaller NGOs to the Consortium and, when various issues arose, could themselves ask to speak to the Consortium.

The actual HOC coordination meetings were held at the U.N. headquarters (on the 2nd floor of a rented house in southern Mogadishu). Given its big, open space, the 2nd floor was a natural place to host meetings that generally included between eighty and one-hundred participants. Typically opened by Kennedy or Kate Farnsworth of the DART,²⁵⁵ the meeting would start out with some basic military reports (weather, security) from G-3 representatives. In exchange, the NGOs would offer their information. General discussion followed. According to topic, sector, or relevant organization, the conversation worked itself around the room, giving everyone the opportunity to speak.

As a general consensus emerged on what had to be done and in what order, the meeting broke down into smaller meetings whereby further coordination was done relevant to specific tasks. It was during this process that the DART earned its money. For example, as one NGO representative noted of Lauren Landis-Guzman, she was a "floating broker" who set up quick meetings and made appropriate coordination changes with a sense to the overall planning process.²⁵⁶ From these meetings came the actual NGO Requests For Action (RFAs) that were

²⁵⁴ Telephone interview with Joelle Tanguy, MSF, 6 September 1995.

²⁵⁵ Phil Johnson was sometimes unable to contribute as much as he liked. Diagnosed with amebic dysentery, malaria and an ulcerated intestinal tract in December, 1992, he was very sick at times in Somalia. (*Somalia Diary*, by Philip Johnson, Ph.D, p. 76).

²⁵⁶ Telephone interview with Carl Harris, 24 August 1995.

taken back to UNITAF for approval or disapproval. (Most of these requests were for convoy security).

All participants agree that both forums were "congenial" and very "healthy." Of course, in reference to the CMOC, "some NGOs just didn't want the military there at all and went out of their way to make it difficult as possible."²⁵⁷ But these folks proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, there was probably even a hidden blessing among those NGOs perceived as outspoken. Carl Harris of World Concern described one of his peers as "irreverent, profane, yet searching and honest." He found these particular NGO representatives to be a "catalytic influence that brought out the best in people." Importantly, Harris points out that at "no time was there a loss of respect" for the CMOC staff because there remained the feeling that "we were all in this together."²⁵⁸

Which brings us to the atmosphere in which these meetings were conducted. While everyone was equal, the military obviously assumed a *primus inter pares* place at the table by virtue of its ability to provide security. Yet, the people most responsible for the military's representation, Kevin Kennedy and Bob MacPherson, did not act in a condescending or arrogant manner.

Instead of giving orders, they asked questions. Instead of taking over, they took inventory of all the people and supplies they could use to help create solutions . . . We also shared a concern that the humanitarian community, while it numbered in the hundreds, might feel overwhelmed by a force of 30,000 soldiers, sailors and Marines.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Elizabeth Lukasavich, 1 August 1995, Washington D.C. Lukasavich was a DART member.

²⁵⁸ Harris, 24 August 1995.

The first time the issue was raised, Kevin didn't hesitate to speak up. "The military should be in the background. We want the humanitarian community to know that we're responsive to *their* needs, that we're here to cooperate. If we can be open and candid with each other about our needs and expectations, I think we make this a team effort."²⁵⁹

By all accounts, the CMOC did everything possible to collaborate and contribute to a coordination atmosphere. Besides an obvious respect for the NGOs and personalities conducive to consensus building, Kennedy and his team brought one further element to the table: a forthright and transparent honesty. One-and-all appreciated the CMOC staff for their blunt honesty: "we can do that, I'll get back to you on that, we will never do that" If Kennedy said it could happen, it would.²⁶⁰

Bob MacPherson further emphasizes that sometimes what one has to offer in exchange for NGO collaboration and coordination is simply sincerity of effort. It is not always a "matter of ability, but a *willingness*" to listen and cooperate.²⁶¹ The NGOs responded in kind to this effort.

This overall interface worked well. Carl Harris, a retired State Department officer who had worked refugee problems and NGO coordination for twenty years in Vietnam, Biafra (Nigeria), and Cambodia, stated that Somalia was the best

²⁵⁹ *Somalia Diary*, pp. 77-78.

²⁶⁰ As further testimony to this respected integrity, several observers recall meeting various Somalis in random places throughout the country who would cite "Colonel Kennedy's" approval for something they were doing (usually while having no idea who the man was or what he looked like).

²⁶¹ Telephone interview with Colonel Bob MacPherson, USMC, 9 September 1995.

NGO/military interface he had ever seen.²⁶² Kate Farnsworth, who has extensive experience throughout Africa on this matter, reflected that "more was done there [Somalia] to build the NGO/military relationship than any other place."²⁶³

J. PROBLEMS

Despite these efforts, however, the NGO/military relationship was plagued by persistent parochial perceptions. There was the feeling among the NGOs that the information sharing was a one-way street, with the military's penchant for secretiveness preventing a reciprocal flow. There was also the perception that the military simply did not want to be bothered with the NGOs. As William Berquist recalled, there was eventually the sense that "either the CMOC was lying, or that Johnson [the UNITAF commander] was lying to the CMOC, or that the chain-of-command" did not work.²⁶⁴

On the military's side, there was the feeling that the NGOs simply had no concept of how the military operated. There was also the sense that the NGOs generally kept their distance but called upon the military only when they needed them. Moreover, there was a general difference of opinion among the UNITAF officers as to what their exact relationship with the NGOs was: direct or indirect support? Or both?

²⁶² Harris, 24 August 1995.

²⁶³ Farnsworth, 31 July 1995.

²⁶⁴ Berquist, 21 August 1995.

Thus, two views on the nature of the mission emerged. One view held that the mission was only to provide security; this would allow the HROs [Humanitarian Relief Organizations] to provide relief . . . Those holding this view pointed to the focus on security in the mission statement as a whole. They also noted that there was no other discussion of helping HROs anywhere in the OPLAN [operations plan]. Another view held that the military was there to help the HROs -- both directly and indirectly . . . They also said that helping the HROs was so obviously underlying the reason for being in Somalia that of course the military should assist the HROs in any possible manner. Most of the officers on the CMOC staff held the second view. Other officers -- especially on the MARFOR staff [Marine force] -- held the first view.²⁶⁵

These competing interpretations were the direct result of a mission statement that did not provide any specific guidance as the humanitarian intent was conspicuously absent.

Finally, if one accepts the simple logic that even the best people will have trouble dealing with a completely unprecedented situation, then the coordination process is necessarily exacerbated by what the Mogadishu CMOC had conceptually become. For the first time, the CMOC was no longer a CMOC. It was not an operations center where people solved problems at the same table. Instead, it had become a CM--L--C: Civil-Military Liaison Center. Despite the best of intentions and personnel, the Mogadishu HOC/CMOC was twice removed from reality. Not only did the CMOC have to coordinate with the local Marine forces in Mogadishu

²⁶⁵ Dworken, *Observations From Restore Hope*, p. 37.

through the UNITAF staff; decisions made about NGO security were removed away from the NGOs to a faceless chain-of-command.²⁶⁶

The cohesion that results from decisions made in conjunction with one another at the same table -- as in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Somalia Airlift -- necessarily fades once the liaison process becomes the primary means of communication. With no significant face-to-face interaction as fellow problem-solvers in a difficult situation, negative stereotypes soon emerged as organizational behavior permeated to the operational level for the first time in our study.

We now examine three general areas, already evident in the first thirty days, in an attempt to flesh out the NGO/military relationship: 1) the tangible/intangible isolation of the HOC/CMOC from UNITAF; 2) security/disarmament; 3) the lack of a humanitarian strategy.

K. CULTURAL CHASM: THE TYRANNY OF A TEN-MINUTE DRIVE

The ten-minute drive from the HOC/CMOC to UNITAF was symbolic of the increasing cultural chasm between the NGOs and the military in Mogadishu after the first month. This tangible and intangible separation came to taint every military/NGO discussion. The essence of this separation was that there was no permanent humanitarian representative at the operations shop in UNITAF. Consequently, Kevin Kennedy and, primarily, Bob MacPherson became the single

²⁶⁶ For example, when an NGO called into the CMOC about a real security emergency, the "chain-of-command" (UNITAF) did not respond. The CMOC, however, responded when it could with its own personnel (sixteen times). This iteration made for stronger ties between the NGOs and the CMOC while simultaneously hurting the overall NGO/UNITAF relationship.

point of contact between the military and the NGOs. Once narrowed to this extent, the overwhelming lesson of past CMOCs is negated: that there must be multiple surveyors of reality, making decisions, at the same table, in order to ensure that everyone stays on the same wavelength.

As Jim Kunder put it, the general impression was made that "discussions with Kevin Kennedy were discussions with the military."²⁶⁷ Kennedy and MacPherson may have thus done their job too well. Because of their honesty, their fair brokerage, and their work ethic, it may have become quite easy for the NGOs to simply accept them "as the military."²⁶⁸ With such a mindset, it would be easy to assume that the UNITAF folks all thought and acted like Kennedy and MacPherson.

A second, related, observation is that the HOC/CMOC became the only point of planning and input for the NGOs. It did not generally occur to the NGOs - - until they felt that Kennedy and MacPherson themselves were having problems communicating to UNITAF -- that there might be another separate and distinct military operations center. Additionally, this separation is accentuated by the fact that the HOC was the highest institutional access the NGOs had to UNITAF. The U.N. for example could apply pressure on UNITAF *vis-à-vis* its New York office and its official relations with a member state. Besides going to the press, the NGOs had no other recourse.

²⁶⁷ Kunder, 7 August 1995.

²⁶⁸ This logic is born out by the previous quote from Bill Berquist who suggested that the CMOC was being lied to.

The rebuttal to this line of argument is that while the official liaison was limited to one or two people, there was plenty of unofficial communications to ensure that the humanitarian/NGO perspective was represented. Indeed, OFDA personnel, particularly Kate Farnsworth and Lauren Landis-Guzman, had the ear of Ambassador Oakley whenever they wanted.²⁶⁹ Certainly the DART knew the humanitarian pulse and the military listened to Oakley. Moreover, as Ambassador Oakley points out, besides the regular staff meetings that he held nightly (at which there was OFDA representation), he also invariably had Farnsworth or Garvelink, along with UNITAF officers, over for breakfast to discuss issues: "there was plenty of dialogue."²⁷⁰

The final counterpoint, however, is: how well did anybody, apart from Kennedy and MacPherson, know the Marines? This thought is certainly not disparaging of Oakley, the DART, or the Marine Corps. But the point remains, what was the influence of the Marine warfighting mentality on the overall understanding of the situation and the communication between the military and the NGOs?

Mark Biser, an infantry officer himself, sheds light on this subject, setting up a typical Marine perspective of the CMOC.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Farnsworth, 31 July 1995; Landis-Guzman, 1 August 1995.

²⁷⁰ Oakley, 9 August 1995.

²⁷¹ Telephone interview with Mark Biser, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (ret), 22 August 1995. Biser had served in the greater Horn region from January, 1990, to July, 1992, as a member of the Marine Embassies staff. (A process through which he got to know a number of the NGOs operating in Somalia). He returned with the JTF as a member of the Forward Support Service Group (FSSG). When asked to, Biser portrayed a typical Marine view of the CMOC and its relationship to the Marine's warfighting culture.

CMOC? What's that? Who knows? Who cares? Those guys are over there living under UN rules with air-conditioning. They're skating [getting off easy]. Who wants to be in a CMOC? Nobody wants to be in a CMOC. That's like asking ten brand-new Second Lieutenant infantry officers just out of The Basic School [where all Marines officers learn to become infantry officers first] if they want to be the adjutant [an administrative position with little command opportunity]. Ten out of ten would say no. They are warfighters and they want to practice their craft.

Biser is quick to point out the irony of this perspective (which is not just common to the Marines) in a humanitarian situation. "What is least important at D+10 [ten days after the landing, with security still very much an issue] emerges as the most important later on . . . it [the CMOC] must eventually become the FOME [focus of main effort]."

MacPherson, a combat veteran with twenty-four years experience as an infantry officer at the time, suggests similar observations about the warfighting nature of the Marines. "Nobody really wanted to embrace the CMOC . . . at best it is still a couple of dirtbag Colonels, at worst it is just another box in the schematic set-up."

MacPherson points out, however, that, despite this general mindset, he essentially had unlimited access to the JTF commander and the Director of Operations, Brigadier General Anthony Zinni. He also notes that he was clearly empowered to support the NGOs as best he

could. But, MacPherson still described his job of UNITAF/CMOC liaison as trying "to keep peace in the family."²⁷²

Although malicious UNITAF intent can generally be discounted, the point remains that it was not the institutional nature of the Marine Corps -- or any military personnel trained as warfighters from day one -- to elevate the CMOC to the priority of Focus of Main Effort. As one Marine officer reflected, "does the Marine culture prevent the right questions from being asked?"²⁷³

The communication argument is therefore again narrowed back to the two person liaison theory because only a Marine would truly comprehend this mindset. Again, credit goes to the two Colonels for being so effective as translators to both communities. They understood and spoke for the NGOs. Eventually, however, all they could do was present UNITAF policy. Inevitably, according to their professionalism, theirs must have been a deep and silent frustration.

The third lens through which to view the figurative and literal space between UNITAF and the HOC is NGO expectations. For example, with the announcement of the intervention and Boutros-Boutros Ghali calling for disarmament, many of the NGOs assumed "security"

²⁷² MacPherson, 9 September 1995.

²⁷³ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel George A. Biszak, USMC, 15 March 1995, Twentynine Palms, California. Biszak worked for the G-3.

would be both corporate and personal. How could 30,000 troops not be enough to accomplish that mission?

There was also the initial feeling that Restore Hope would be like Provide Comfort.²⁷⁴ While very few NGO personnel had actually been in northern Iraq, word had spread as to what an unexpected and great experience it had been working with the military. Not the least of this experience was the fact that the U.S. military provided everything from tents and cots to food and water for the NGOs. Although it was not quite a "free ride" mentality that pervaded the NGOs, there certainly was the expectation that they would be more appreciated.

Charles Petrie, a senior DHA²⁷⁵ official in Somalia at the time, provides a telling perspective on these optimistic expectations. Provide Comfort, in his opinion, was a situation where the military basically sub-contracted the NGOs to do the humanitarian work.²⁷⁶ Indeed, with no NGOs present prior to the emergency, the military was the first on the scene. Everyone recognized and accepted the military's role as a necessary leader and facilitator. The Somali situation was almost the exact opposite. This time, the military was coming into a situation where

²⁷⁴ Landis-Guzman, 1 August 1995.

²⁷⁵ Department of Humanitarian Affairs, located within the Secretariat of the United Nations. DHA had been created after the emergency in northern Iraq in recognition that one agency had to be responsible for coordination. Besides the natural growing pains of a newly created organization, DHA has still not been empowered to carry out its mandate.

²⁷⁶ Telephone interview with Charles Petrie, DHA, 23 August 1995.

the humanitarian operation was well-established. For better or for worse, because the situation was completely different than northern Iraq, the working relationship would not be replicated.

A final approach to understanding and/or preventing the cultural gap was to collocate the HOC/CMOC with the UNITAF compound, thereby allowing for a constant humanitarian presence in the military's planning cell. As indicated earlier, there are problems with this proposal. First, the HOC was already established and the only suitable building for the UNITAF headquarters was the embassy. Second, there were legitimate security concerns about who came and went out of the military's command post. Third, the UNITAF staff meeting was no place for a consensus type meeting. Staff meetings are action-oriented towards military means, not necessarily about information sharing, and end according to the senior officer present. Simply, because of its inherent nature and purpose as UNITAF's own coordination cell, the staff meeting was the wrong place for an additional 80-100 people. The entire First Marine Division, for example, had only two representatives at that morning meeting. Fourth, the NGO community as a whole would have objected to being that closely associated with the military.

Thus, the coordination framework between the two communities was not the most conducive one for daily planning and the consideration of overall strategy. With essentially two different operations centers, no matter how good the liaison, there inevitably had to be a divergence

between the two planning processes. The victim would be the primacy of the humanitarian intent. Unfortunately, while the next two issues -- security and humanitarian strategy -- were somewhat beyond the control of the NGOs and the military, the coordination process had been theirs alone to understand and control.

L. SECURITY (AND DISARMAMENT)

The issue of security and its immediate offspring, disarmament, was the major point of contention between the NGO community and the military in Mogadishu. Like the literal and figurative space between the HOC/CMOC and the UNITAF compound, this issue involves many angles.

The establishment of security for the forces coming in and their follow-on logistics is, and will always be, primary. Like adults who are instructed to first put their oxygen masks on before helping their children, so it is with an armed force in pursuit of a mission. The mission can only take place once the force is prepared to take it on. Having said that, the question becomes: how long does this process take and how should it be accomplished? These concerns are the first points of contention, largely resulting from different perceptions of "security" and the expectations that these perceptions create.

The military was stepping into an uncertain situation -- the military threat was relatively unknown. Accordingly, the Marines took a worst-case approach, displaying overwhelming force in everything they did,

from the amphibious landing to convoy protection. The NGOs had a different perspective because they knew the ground and the people. In general, the Somalis were looking forward to the intervention. Although not military experts, the NGOs did appreciate that in a situation where most Somalis supported the intervention, the armed clans and bandits would probably take a wait-and-see approach. More importantly, however, they felt that the very *presence* of military forces would prevent violence and allow them to address the imperative humanitarian needs of the moment.

The Baidoa example is illustrative. Baidoa is 142 miles west of Mogadishu. Hundreds of children were dying there daily. But there were also eleven technicals in town.²⁷⁷ NGOs who had recently returned from Kenya, thought that, given the need and the threat, Baidoa would be occupied in the same fell swoop as Mogadishu. Unfortunately, what was Phase I to the military, lasting for a week or so, meant the simultaneous occupation of Baidoa to the NGOs.

U.S. forces landed in Mogadishu on the 9th, but it was not until the 15th that they arrived in Baidoa. These six days became an eternity according to NGO expectations. With the Marines ashore, the "technicals" took a final opportunity to loot the rest of the supplies in town, knowing that once U.S. troops arrived, they would not have another

²⁷⁷ Technicals were old pick-up trucks with heavy guns mounted on them. They were the most visible symbol of power for the competing clans.

chance. According to the humanitarian perspective, the Marines were moving at a glacial pace. According to the military perspective, however, the Marines were "smokin'." For a landing force to be that far inland within six days, under uncertain threat conditions, was a considerable feat.²⁷⁸ And thus the most fundamental question: how do you define military security in a humanitarian intervention?

Joelle Tanguy suggests the following frame of reference for the military and NGO.²⁷⁹ The military's security is about "protection by arms, a practical security which must be put into place." The NGO, on the other hand, defines its security "in terms of the larger context: what is the situation developing around us and what is driving the relationships around us?" In this sense, security emerges from an acute situational awareness and the legitimacy that results from acting in a humanitarian manner in accordance with the overall situation.

The significance of these divergent points of view can be seen in the eventual withdrawal of MSF. By May of 1993, everything that MSF did was contingent upon the military. The physical threat was so bad that they consistently needed military protection, even with basic training programs for Somalis. Protection was driven by military logistics and logistics were decided by operations. In short, MSF was completely

²⁷⁸ Biser, 22 August 1995.

²⁷⁹ Tanguy, 6 September 1995.

associated with, and dependent upon, the military. For a group that originally viewed attending the HOC/CMOC meetings as a compromise to their independence, this position was unacceptable. MSF/France pulled out of Somalia in May of 1993.

This overall NGO conceptual approach to security suggests that the military needs to understand just how divergent the security definition can be and how important it is to create a dialogue with the NGOs from the very beginning to eliminate false expectations and, hopefully, create common understandings. Similarly, however, the NGOs must understand the vulnerability of a force not yet built-up. Jim Kunder, director of OFDA at the time and a former Marine himself, suggests that while the psychological impact of overwhelming force is obviously at its zenith during the first hours, days, and weeks, it is also the time at which a military force is at its most vulnerable. Thus while there is great opportunity for decisive action -- political, humanitarian, or military -- it is also a time of weakness because there may not yet be sufficient security for the armed forces. Consequently, there must be a certain amount of caution.²⁸⁰

For example, if a platoon had been parachuted into Baidoa and, for whatever reason, they had been wiped out, then what? How do you immediately redress the military and political implications of such a turn

²⁸⁰ Kunder, 7 August 1995.

of events? Or, what if a few well-placed snipers had kept the landing process at bay for a few hours/days? Simply, the military must have sufficient security to protect itself. It is these concerns that will always be in the forefront of every commander's mind.

Craig Anderson of World Concern sums up this seeming dichotomy of perceptions: the military "established themselves in military format; but, they couldn't have done it any way else." Yet, the NGOs still felt that "they [the military] took their understanding of security and applied their own solution . . . there was no brainstorming about 'what kind of security.'"²⁸¹ It would seem that to answer the most difficult question of all during a humanitarian intervention -- how do you define security in a way that enables the humanitarian effort but also protects the force? -- begins with this mutual brainstorming. It would further seem that such a dialogue must begin prior to the intervention itself.

M. DISARMAMENT

No one issue exemplifies this different perception of security more than the policy/non-policy of disarmament. Above all else, this problem was a political issue, something which the NGOs occasionally lost sight of when they blamed the military itself for inaction. Disarmament was NOT a part of the U.S. mandate. Viewed as related to nation-building,

²⁸¹ Anderson, 25 July 1995.

there was soon a public dispute between the Secretary-General and the President. Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for disarmament while President Bush declared that disarmament was not implicit within the Security Council resolution to use "all available means" to create a secure environment. Eventually, even the policy-makers in Washington could not avoid the reality that there had to be some sort of disarmament.

While all agreed and welcomed the attempt, the dreaded "D" word was soon much more than a thorn in the side of NGO/military relations. This "constant, festering, unending sore of the weapons business"²⁸² manifested itself most voraciously in identifying those who needed to be disarmed, particularly those Somali guards hired by the NGOs. As Colonel Gregson states, "who is the bad guy when everyone has guns?"²⁸³

Prior to the intervention, the NGOs had hired Somali guards from local warlords in order to get their relief shipments through (not to mention a measure of personal security). Pure and simple, everywhere was "Indian country." The problem, however, was that these same "guards" were sometimes using extortion to get their job if not moonlighting as bandits at night. As Carl Harris recalls of World Concern's guards, "they were pretty basic, crude thugs . . . it was nuts to fire them with their weapons [i.e. they would be used against World

²⁸² MacPherson, 9 September 1995.

²⁸³ Interview with Colonel Wallace Gregson, The Pentagon, 2 August 1995. Gregson was the UNITAF assistant J-3.

Concern], and we needed them."²⁸⁴ Besides, even with the guards' nebulous background, were the NGOs "going to turn on those guards with whom they would have to live afterwards [after the military's departure]?"²⁸⁵

Even prior to the debate over the weapons of NGO guards, there was consternation regarding the general security issue. American forces focused on securing certain areas -- such as general NGO areas and food distribution sites. The military thought that the NGOs should consolidate to make their protection easier. Initially logical, this fire-base approach did not account for the military's eventual departure, presented a possibly bigger target, and stood to separate the NGOs from the very population they were seeking to serve (an imperative component of a successful helper/helped relationship).

The larger issue, however, was that no matter how the security situation was approached, there would be "more secure" areas and "less secure" areas by default (Mogadishu was too big and there were not enough troops) with a decided need for protection between these zones. Even if relations were 100% perfect between the military and the NGOs, the NGOs would need personal guards.

²⁸⁴ Harris, 24 August 1995.

²⁸⁵ Gregson, 2 August 1995.

Given the overall political backdrop and an inexplicably slow approach by UNITAF, the disarmament policy painfully evolved from January to May. The first attempt to identify the "good guys with guns," those Somalis working/driving for the NGOs, involved the issue of pink identification cards by the CMOC. These cards, without a photo-ID, were easily counterfeited.

The second attempt, in February, involved a blue photo-ID card. This policy allowed Marines and soldiers to confiscate any "visible" weapon. This concept soon became disputed as "visible" was not clearly explained and open to interpretation by the military personnel manning the checkpoints. For example, did "visible" mean from outside the vehicle or once one looked in the cab, seeing a weapon on a guard's lap? A third policy resulted in April whereby a weapons policy card, simple and with pictures, was used in conjunction with the blue photo-ID card. At this point, things were more clear, but UNITAF was on its way out.

Several factors added insult to injury. First, the NGOs and their guards were inevitably caught in the disarmament net. During one week in March, for instance, 84 weapons were seized of which 54 belonged to NGOs.²⁸⁶ This process soon turned the CMOC into the tragic-comedy of 'Guns "R" Us' as humanitarians left the meeting with AK-47s strapped over

²⁸⁶ Dworken, *Observations From Restore Hope*, p. 31.

their backs.²⁸⁷ At the same time, Marines on the streets of Mogadishu -- who had spent a hard day's work fulfilling their assigned mission, and protecting themselves, by disarming those whom they had been told to disarm -- saw the CMOC's return of the weapons as directly contrary to their efforts.

Furthermore, even with a clear policy for Mogadishu, the rules would change from HRS to HRS (Humanitarian Relief Sector) according to the security threat and the international force present. Thus what finally worked in Mogadishu might not have been applicable in Baidoa or Bardera. Finally, as Colonel Kennedy points out, the administrative support for an ID card system requiring thousands of cards -- so crucial to an effective, or at least consistent -- policy was supported by just two UNITAF clerks.

The inability to reach a successful resolution despite numerous efforts at the most senior levels and the generally compliant nature of the humanitarian organizations, leads to the conclusion that the sustained confrontation represented more than just a vigorous application of weapons policies but a fundamental antagonism towards humanitarian organizations from some elements of UNITAF.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ Moreover, it usually took three to four days for NGOs to get their guns back (with no bullets). In the meantime, the immediate dilemma of a NGO guard/expatriate, who had just had their weapon confiscated, was how to get back through "Indian country."

²⁸⁸ Kennedy paper, pp. 23-24.

As Ambassador Oakley later reflected about this process, "demobilization and disarmament were screwed up, no doubt about it."²⁸⁹

N. HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY?

Because there was no higher political resolve behind the intervention, no humanitarian strategy ever emerged. Certainly, strategies existed. Since the very beginning, AID/OFDA, in the form of Andrew Natsios, had a plan for Somalia that comprehensively addressed issues beyond immediate relief, such as livestock, agriculture, and monetization. This American plan, however, was not clearly understood or adopted by the Americans themselves. This is not to say that the plan was articulated poorly. Natsios, in fact, had been a broken record from the summer of 1992 through the intervention promulgating the need for a nuanced and comprehensive response.

Rather, it suggests that policy-makers thought that just getting food over to Somalia would take it off the 'skyline;' and that was good enough. Moreover, it suggests again that once the Department of Defense became a part of the planning, the humanitarian intent was given lip-service while the military concerns dominated. Thus, there was not too much of an appreciation for the actual situation and the crying need for a comprehensive, integrated, and synergistic approach. Although it was

²⁸⁹ Oakley, 9 August 1995.

obvious from the beginning that Somalia demanded much more than just a food solution, that is exactly what it got.

This misunderstanding of the nature of the problem was exacerbated early on by NGO and military alike at the operational level. Charles Petrie observes that relief agencies themselves did not appreciate the relief-to-development continuum as they "operated in Somalia as if there was no tomorrow."²⁹⁰ Likewise, the military, unfamiliar with humanitarian issues and forced to deal with political ones because they had been ignored at higher levels, contributed to "relief issues [becoming] operationally subordinate to diplomatic and military issues . . . military and diplomatic strategy in complex emergencies needs to follow, not direct or be separated from, relief strategies."²⁹¹

The American plan was not adopted by the international community either. Natsios admits that he made a mistake in not attempting to better sell the plan to the European Community.²⁹² Even had he done so, however, it still remained for the implementors themselves to 1) accept the broad guidance of such a strategy; and 2) to simultaneously mold an operational manifestation of it. Even if all the

²⁹⁰ Charles Petrie, "The Price Of Failure," unpublished paper, p. 9.

²⁹¹ Andrew Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1994, p. 133.

²⁹² The EC is important because, combined with America, they represent 90% of all donor funds in emergency responses. Thus, if the money behind an operation supports one plan, then hopefully it will be that plan that the various field agencies, which implement donor projects, follow. (Otherwise, they do not get the money). In this manner, through the power of the purse, it may be possible to permeate a response effort with one overall plan. Natsios, 23 August 1995.

donor countries were to agree, it still comes down to the expert in the field.

The other strategy that existed was the U.N.'s "100 day" plan for Somalia. This piece of paper received absolutely no legitimization from the international community. Charles Petrie states unequivocally that the plan was "written by a group of nice people with a do-good mentality" but was not hard-nosed enough about the reality of the Somali problems; as a result, the plan "didn't really address anything."²⁹³ With no international consensus, no accepted plan, no political resolve, a short-sighted NGO vision, and a sometimes contentious NGO relationship with those whose mission it was to provide security, an overarching humanitarian strategy never stood a chance.

Furthermore, no one who worked in the HOC recalled ever having the feeling of a uniting strategy. Not only was there no sense of what the humanitarian community wanted to generally accomplish in the first month(s), there was not even a general sense of cohesion or purpose. Kate Farnsworth states that it was "not very clear what we were supposed to be doing."²⁹⁴ Carl Harris "didn't sense anything was coordinated towards a long-term goal."²⁹⁵ Lauren Landis-Guzman recalls the

²⁹³ Telephone interview with Charles Petrie, 21 and 23 August 1995.

²⁹⁴ Farnsworth, 31 July 1995.

²⁹⁵ Harris, 24 August 1995.

HOC/CMOC atmosphere as "reactive."²⁹⁶ Kevin Kennedy states that there was "no strategy in the beginning [during UNITAF]."²⁹⁷ Jim Kunder states that there was "no sense on anyone's part that this was anything more than dumping food."²⁹⁸

Given this strategic vacuum, how does the military incorporate the humanitarian priority into their daily taskings, assuming they were receptive to begin with? The CMOC staff did keep estimates of what was done. For example, "on average, UNITAF conducted 70 escorts, used 700 vehicles, and moved 9,000 metric tons of supplies each month."²⁹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirtpatrick confirms that UNITAF was tracking this information as well.³⁰⁰

But *what* was done is no indicator of *where* each action leads. While the military needs to keep track of this information, that is not their primary job nor should they be the only one doing it. Moreover, these numbers, in and of themselves, mean nothing, if the goal is to understand whether the original intent is being accomplished.

Two conclusions follow. First, even the best humanitarians are less effective without a comprehensive plan that has no political resolve

²⁹⁶ Telephone interview with Lauren Landis-Guzman, 23 August 1995.

²⁹⁷ Telephone interview with Kevin Kennedy, 17 October 1995.

²⁹⁸ Kunder, 7 August 1995.

²⁹⁹ *Observations From Restore Hope*, p. 21.

³⁰⁰ Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirtpatrick, USMC, 1 September 1995. Kirtpatrick worked in the G-3.

behind it. This lack of political resolve strongly indicates that the humanitarian/NGO community and the military have a common enemy: an inattentive and basically ill-informed civilian leadership, irrespective of country, and, as a result, a wishy-washy public mandate. Andrew Natsios was the Special Coordinator for the President of the United States of America, and he could not get his plan through.

If there is a common enemy, then there is also a need for all implementors to seek one another out. Bill Berquist suggests that the NGOs must have the opportunity for serious input prior to an intervention. "We didn't know what to expect . . . it would have been great to bring the [NGO] leaders out and sit down with [General] Johnson and spend some time strategizing."³⁰¹ (These words are akin to Craig Anderson's suggestion that there needed to be "security brainstorming" between the NGOs and the military).

This idea bears some consideration, particularly in light of the political context in which these events occur. In order for both sides to know "what to expect," there should be a meeting prior to intervention, if possible, between the commanding general and the NGO leaders (along with the DART). Even if to mutually recognize that they are speaking different languages, such a meeting represents a significant start. It also needs to be an on-going process.

³⁰¹ Berquist, 21 August 1995. Given just how quickly the Somalia response unfolded, this logic cannot be applied realistically in retrospect. The logic is more than applicable to future contingencies.

Moreover, extending this logic, there needs to be a humanitarian presence with the commanding general (this idea finds fruition in Rwanda when a DART member serves as the JTF commander's advisor). It is only through concerted and situation-appropriate efforts like these that the military and the NGOs have a chance at understanding each other.

O. CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS

This chapter has focused on the Mogadishu CMOC because that is where there was the most consternation between NGOs and the military. It should not be forgotten, however, that a significant humanitarian difference was made -- the food did get through -- and that there was much mutual respect between the NGO community and the military. This respect was particularly true among the regional HOC/CMOCs, where coordinators lived and worked together, and during the implementation process itself.

It should further be remembered that "there was such a big learning curve . . . at the time, nobody knew how to do any of this stuff."³⁰² Mark Biser states, "they [the military] didn't have any idea of what to do and they [the NGOs] didn't know what to ask them to do."³⁰³

³⁰² Lukasavich, 1 August 1995.

³⁰³ Biser, 22 August 1995.

While there are some obvious parallels with Bangladesh and northern Iraq, the size and complexity of the Somalia intervention remains unequaled. Given this enormous novelty and the extent to which success was achieved, it is fair to conclude that NGO/military relations were "good enough."³⁰⁴

Having said that, this conclusion does not accept "good enough" for the next time. Consequently, let us consider the following areas: 1) briefly, the issue of created expectations and the political will to address them; 2) the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of analysis; and 3) as with the other chapters, the boiled down NGO/military principles of coordination for this particular case.

P. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT

There has never been a greater need to interweave the expectations created by a foreign presence and the need for a continuum of effort.³⁰⁵ Because the U.S. military mission was somewhat nebulous -- the ironic result of an attempt to narrowly define the military's role in support of a seemingly simple humanitarian mandate -- there were many and different expectations among the participants, particularly the

³⁰⁴ Dworken, *Observations From Restore Hope*, p. 5.

³⁰⁵ The Rwandan intervention is not considered because, rightly or wrongly, the U.S.'s clear intention to be nothing more than a very short-term logistician was extremely clear to one-and-all.

Somalis. Dr. Ken Menkhaus writes that "evidence suggests that in the first phase of the intervention there was widespread popular Somali support for, and the expectation of, a move to marginalize the militias, provided it was done even-handedly so as not to expose one clan to attack by another."³⁰⁶ On December 9, 1992, Dr. Said Samatar stated that "there seems to be high expectations among the people that with the coming of the Americans, good days are here again. I fear that if the economic situation does not improve, there might be a feeling of letdown."³⁰⁷

Like it or not, the arrival of the world's mightiest army was going to create economic and political expectations. To think that it was possible to isolate the humanitarian effort from these concerns was a mistake, especially in a failed state like Somalia, where everything was political. Every Somali and their every expectation was a separate political entity because they had no means by which to voice their concerns. As a result, the political significance of an organized action takes on greater meaning because it is the only thing that works.

Thus, there must be a plan; a continuum of effort that accounts for these expectations.

³⁰⁶ Ken Menkhaus, "The Reconciliation Process in Somalia: A Requiem," PRELIMINARY DRAFT, unpublished paper, p. 23. [Hereafter cited as Menkhaus Paper].

³⁰⁷ NIGHTLINE, "Nightline in Somalia, Day Two." Also see Wescott Report, p. 33.

. . . everyone, both inside and out of the U.S. government, understood that military protection of humanitarian relief supplies to famine zones represented little more than a temporary palliative. All were aware that a long-term solution to the Somali crisis would entail a commitment to fostering national reconciliation and supporting the resuscitation of the collapsed Somali state. These tasks, though later derided by critics as "nation-building," were essential if the anarchy and armed banditry which triggered the famine were to be eliminated.³⁰⁸

Jeffrey Clark presented the answer in 1993: "What is required is a phased and linked national process that addresses humanitarian, military, political, and economic components, and that has the support of an international coalition of donors prepared to facilitate reconstruction programs."³⁰⁹ (Of course, such an endeavor would seek the full participation and eventual leadership of the Somalis themselves).

What Clark recognized, Lieutenant Colonel Tom O'Leary, the commander of the first Marine Battalion to land in Somalia, knew back in December of 1992. The intervention represented an "immediate change for their lives; they will have the highest expectations; if they are not met, the relationship [between helper and helped] will become disenchanted and then it will go sour . . . you can provide security and food, but how long will they be satisfied?"³¹⁰ It is with these words that

³⁰⁸ Menkhaus Paper, p. 1.

³⁰⁹ Jeffrey Clark, "Debate in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in *Enforcing Restraint*, p. 232.

³¹⁰ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O'Leary, USMC, Quantico, Virginia, 3 August 1995.

we discuss the strategic NGO/military lessons learned from this case study.

Q. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Humanitarian intervention is a political process. This process shapes every dimension of the effort, to include the NGO/military relationship. Despite a mandate not to be political, the military, and the NGOs, were very much political in their actions, albeit in an ad hoc manner. A permeating plan was needed and that plan should have been of U.N. origin with international donor support. The HOC should have been recognized by the international donor community and participants on the ground as the U.N. sanctioned center of humanitarian activity. Recognized as such, the humanitarian imperative remains primary as all other tasks -- political and military -- are developed in support of the HOC. Moreover, the HOC should have been the focus of the overall U.S. effort. By extension, the CMOC should have been the focus of UNITAF.

The HOC, however, was not capable of supporting such a U.S. focus because it did not have a plan that was realistic or supported by the international community. Yet to blame the U.N. is, to some extent, to blame ourselves. There is considerable merit to the argument that the U.S. was the U.N. throughout the entire Somalia intervention, particularly

during UNITAF. Indeed, as Liz Lukasavich described the HOC, "the only thing U.N. about it was that we called it U.N."³¹¹

This perspective reveals the underlying tension arising from the fact that the U.S. will almost never allow its military personnel to work directly for the U.N. Yet, the aegis of U.N. legitimacy was imperative to the whole operation. Hence, U.S. action required a U.N. cloak (thus the UNITAF concept). But when things go wrong, no matter who is to blame, politics dictate that the U.S. blame the U.N. This relationship must be better understood and we must "quit using the U.N. as a whipping boy."³¹² Only if this relationship is appreciated and worked at by both communities can the HOC, or its conceptual equivalent, be supported as the true center of a humanitarian intervention. If understood as such, there will be no misunderstanding as to roles and relationships between the NGO community and the military. On the other hand, if there is no acknowledged center of effort, then all of the other relationships will be confused.

In the absence of higher political resolve, the military and NGO communities must understand and accept the need for such an operational center. The first step to creating this center, however, is not a wire-diagram but the mutual understanding that there must be a unity

³¹¹ Lukasavich, 1 August 1995.

³¹² Farnsworth, 31 July 95.

of effort. The mechanism for realizing this unity of effort must be the HOC. If together they can create a central role for the HOC, or its conceptual equivalent, then perhaps they will have a greater chance of success.

The second strategic implication recognizes that, in such crises, the implementor will engage in nation-building activities in order to properly address the humanitarian need. Better understood as the enabling of "marginal self-sufficiency" by the military and moving from relief to rehabilitation and restoration by the NGOs, these political-socio-economic-civic dimensions will take place. They are the ingredients of problem-solving in a extremely complex humanitarian emergency like Somalia. The suggestion that Somalia did not have such "broader objectives" and thus did not "require an assessment of progress in the areas of politics, economics, health, agriculture, and welfare"³¹³ is dead wrong. "Did we get into nation-building? Absolutely."³¹⁴ The Marines were involved in everything from Councils of Elders to engineer support

³¹³ Center for Naval Analyses report: *Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report*, p. 31.

³¹⁴ Gregson, 2 August 1995. For an outstanding overview of just what kinds of activities the Marines were involved in, see Lieutenant Colonel John M. Taylor's article, "Somalia: More Than Meets the Eye," in the November, 1993, issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*.

to food distribution.³¹⁵ The problem, or the "big mistake," was that "nation-building was never acknowledged."³¹⁶

While politics dictate that nation-building will never be directly acknowledged, the nature of humanitarian intervention demands a clear humanitarian intent. It is very clear that the Somalia mission statement delivered to the U.S. military men and women in the field left things ambiguous and created differences of opinion as to how to relate to the NGOs. The mission statement must remain broad, allowing for operational latitude and guidance, while leaving no doubt as to what the humanitarian purpose is that it serves.

Finally, even if there had been a crystal-clear mission statement that allowed for a total understanding between the two communities based on the HOC and its humanitarian intent as the center of the effort, one has to wonder about the effect of UNITAF's implicit mission: few casualties. Again, this does not imply that the Marines acted in an overly-cautious manner; their aggressive patrolling and community interaction stand out. But, it is relatively safe to infer that this method was OK as long as there were no casualties. As the Somalis increasingly tested the

³¹⁵ One debate not addressed in this chapter is the issue of how much humanitarian effort should the military be involved in. While humanitarian purists recoil at the thought of such endeavors, there is a place for the military taking humanitarian action, particularly in the earliest stages of an intervention. Such action is ultimately of a tactical military nature because it gives potential belligerents a reason NOT to shoot at U.S. personnel. Of perhaps greater importance, it also gives the American armed service member a chance to participate and interact with the values which he/she joined to defend.

³¹⁶ Berquist, 21 August 1995.

Americans, however, there was the general understanding that the Americans were reluctant to use force. A fine line to draw, the point remains that casualties were a high-degree concern of the stateside decision-makers.

A common retort suggests that it is public opinion that drives the no-casualties concern. That notion is too simple. The no-casualties agenda results from the American public inability to tie casualties to any larger goal. There is no goal because the mission has not been politically articulated by the White House, and a self-fulfilling prophecy is the result: we cannot have casualties because the public will not stand for it; and they will not stand for it because we will not articulate our objective except in purely humanitarian terms. Implicit herein is the reminder that the military is an instrument of policy, an extension of politics by other means. If it has no political purpose, how can it function properly? Sending troops as a humanitarian curative -- doing something -- will never work. There must be a political purpose for the troops, the NGOs with whom they will work, and the public.

This [absence of a political understanding] sums up the complete ambiguity of this type of operation: action for action's sake . . . designed to soothe public opinion by 'doing something.' But the decision to move into the humanitarian field is the result of a cruel lack of a political perspective. Protecting humanitarian aid-workers becomes an aim in itself, replacing the age-old need for soldiers to have a political purpose when going to war. This new paradox of protection can be summed up as follows: humanitarian aid

permits intervention by armed forces yet gives them no precise political program.³¹⁷

The consequences of this disconnect between political purpose and a soldier's use are enormous. First, a cautious mind-set is potential and dangerous result from a setting where casualties are not allowed. This mindset could figuratively and literally bleed over into a real warfighting scenario. Moreover, a policy nominally in protection of the volunteer soldier actually endangers him. Any potential belligerent recognizes that the U.S. is leery of casualties, which in turn makes the soldier or Marine a high-value target. Because his death can change the course of a government, his humanitarian purpose is dwarfed by the perceived political ramifications of his death.

Ironically, it would seem, a political purpose from the international community and the governments of those sending troops allows the NGO and the military to assume their traditional garb: purely humanitarian and purely a tool of a higher policy. Without that resolve, they are as political as anyone else, with as great a chance of dying as someone in the warring factions.

³¹⁷ *Life, Death, and Aid: The Medecins Sans Frontieres Report on World Crisis Intervention*, p. 119.

R. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The most important operational conclusion is that the NGO/military dialogue must begin as soon as possible, ideally stateside. It should be actively and aggressively sought by both communities. This process is imperative for three reasons. First, if the emergency situation is to stabilize, there must be some sort of coordination. Second, such a dialogue ensures that the humanitarian intent remains primary. If by hearing the other community's interpretation of the humanitarian intent is the only accomplishment, it is a significant one. Third, a candid and continuous dialogue keeps the military and NGO united against a common enemy: the absence of political resolve. While one can inform higher headquarters and hope that senior policy-makers truly understand a phenomenon that has recently come to the forefront of foreign policy, the implementors will certainly drive, if not create, the eventual policy of the international community. As Ambassador Oakley has stated, "Somalia equaled ad hoc."³¹⁸ If so, then the operators must be in unison. They know the turf better than anyone and they must be in accord if they are to achieve any degree of success.

Such a dialogue demands one further operational conclusion. In a humanitarian intervention, the CMOC must become the focus of main effort from the very beginning for the military. Whether it becomes the

³¹⁸ Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University, 19 January 1995.

conceptual equivalent of the HOC or is a subordinate component of the HOC itself, *the CMOC represents the military's only institutional chance for accurate feedback on whether or not the humanitarian intent is being met.*

The CMOC must therefore be elevated in status and legitimacy within the military culture. The very best people must be assigned to it and it must be fully empowered by the JTF commander. To think of the CMOC as another place for "pogues" and non-warfighters is a fundamental mistake. If for no other reason than self-interest, the CMOC must become the priority because it represents -- through close coordination with the NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community -- the military's best chance to design and control its own exit strategy.

S. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The direct result of a need for a continuing and mutually reinforcing dialogue is the greatest lesson learned of all: the HOC and the military operations center must be *co-accessible*. This phrase is defined as "within secure walking distance of the other." Some have suggested that the two be collocated. While this possibility satisfies the operational need, it does not satisfy basic living and security requirements. The military needs a secure space where it can talk and analyze as the military force that it is. Very few need access to this space. Additionally, there is the obvious need to create the most secure

area possible. Thus, the military operations center will always be "in the wire."

The HOC/CMOC must be completely accessible to anyone willing to participate. It must also be frequented daily by the military leaders, particularly from operations. While it will be situation and terrain-dependent, the HOC/CMOC should be made secure by whatever means are appropriate. This recommendation does not suggest sandbagging, bunkers, or armed guards. Rather, in whatever surreptitious and subdued manner is available -- from a second, exterior "wire" to hidden snipers or a rapid reaction unit of some sort -- the HOC must be secure enough to allow for the unimpeded and ready access of both NGOs and military to meet there, or for NGO/humanitarian leaders to go over to the military operations center.

Additionally, co-accessability demands that the NGOs develop accepted mechanisms by which they speak with a collective voice. They cannot expect to send eighty people to a military staff meeting. The NGO Consortium, for example, can only become effective if one or two people can speak for it in an emergency. These mechanisms must be understood by the military prior to an intervention. Against their most cherished values of organizational autonomy, it is a change that NGOs must endure, at least during crises of this magnitude.

Finally, there remains the question of the HOC structure itself. A military perspective would suggest that coordination and unity of effort

are inherently impossible. With a Director responsible to the U.N., and two Deputy Directors responsible to OFDA and UNITAF each, it is a system built for inefficiency, if not failure. However, like the American government, it is the best system possible. These various players within the HOC impose a system of checks and balances to the humanitarian process. While it may not always be the most efficient structure, everyone is at the same table and truth is generally the result. That is as good as it gets.

T. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES

1. A liaison/collaboration must be established as soon as possible, preferably before the intervention itself. Such a process is continuing and dynamic as it reflects the changing nature of the emergency problem.
2. This liaison/collaboration process should be attended by the most senior leaders from both communities. Not only does better communication result, but the humanitarian element of the mission is elevated to a higher status by the joint task force commander's presence. This elevation is imperative, not only for the sake of the humanitarian community, but for the JTF commander's subordinate commands as well. His presence indicates what is important and what he expects from his junior leaders and men and women.
3. The military needs to incorporate Civil Affairs personnel into its planning process from the very beginning. Civil Affairs personnel are responsible for the military's doctrinal interface with civilian agencies.
4. NGOs have to establish their own form of doctrinal interface. They must be able to speak with some sort of corporate voice. If they cannot, they will not only exacerbate the situation, they will be left behind by those who can coordinate.

5. The HOC/CMOC must be co-accessible with the military's command element (or vice-versa depending upon the situation). The mandate must be continually re-visited by humanitarian (to include NGO) and military leaders alike.
6. The CMOC must be elevated within military culture. Not a "leader of men" environment, the CMOC, in a humanitarian emergency, will be the focus of main effort. The entire force must know the importance of the CMOC -- if only for the reason that it represents the ticket home -- and support its efforts anyway it can.
7. The CMOC Director must have unlimited access to the JTF commander. The Director represents the JTF commander's official military feedback on whether or not the humanitarian mandate is being met.
8. The military's mission must be explicit. Clarity, however, does not mean defining a mission so narrowly that its components are reduced to simple "go/no go" criteria (e.g. seize airfield). There must be an overarching and simple humanitarian intent that provides guidance as to what goal the military mission is working in support of. This humanitarian goal, if kept paramount, will provide the implicit and specific military tasks at hand.
9. If there is no political resolve from the leading country, in this case, the United States, and there is no humanitarian strategy universally supported by the international donor community, the military and NGOs must seek each other out for they have been reduced to trying locally. Left as such, they are the only ones who stand any chance of making the overall effort work. If there is enmity between them, then their potential contribution is significantly reduced.

V. OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE

A. INTRODUCTION

On July 4, 1994, Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, fell to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). With the sudden fall of the northwestern town of Ruhengeri on July 13th, thousands of Hutus thought themselves trapped. Hutus, fearful of a genocide equal to or worse than the one-half million deaths that they had recently visited upon the Tutsis, began to flee.³¹⁹ Their only means of survival was to flee west to Zaire or to the French safe-zone in the south-western part of Rwanda or to Burundi itself. Thus began the single-largest exodus in modern history.

Most fled toward Goma, Zaire, along the northwestern border of Rwanda. "It's a river of people bleeding out of Rwanda!" stated Panos Moumtzis, spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.^{320*} Kate Crawford, there with the DART, called it a "human tidal wave" that was "unprecedented in the history of refugee relief."³²¹ By nightfall of the 15th, just forty-eight hours after the exodus had begun,

³¹⁹ This flight was actually quite systematic and organized. Wanting to maintain as much power as possible while simultaneously delegitimizing the RPF, the former Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda manipulated, and continues to, the fear of a reciprocal genocide as a means to ensuring a sustained refugee presence just outside the Rwandan borders.

³²⁰ As quoted in *Time Magazine*. Transmitted: 94-07-22 13:32:56 EDT.

* Note: All *Time Magazine* articles taken from the America OnLine directory. Accordingly, footnotes will reflect the date and time that *Time* transmitted the article onto the Internet.

³²¹ Telephone interview with Kate Crawford, 17 March 1995.

the refugee camps in Goma numbered nearly a million people. Statistically staggering to imagine, somewhere between 15,000 and 30,000 Hutus had crossed the border per hour into Zaire. In Burundi, to the south, the refugee population had increased from 83,000 to 200,000 in the same amount of time. In the southwest, 6000 people an hour had crossed into the French safe-zone on July 14th.³²²

The worst situation was in Goma, Zaire. With a non-existent relief infrastructure and a volcanic soil, Goma was ready to explode. "It is impossible to find enough camps for one million people," Moumtzis said at the time, and "the land is volcanic; we can't drill for water. What are we going to do about latrines? It is an absolute nightmare. I don't know how we are going to deal with it."³²³ With so many refugees and a shortage of water, it was only a matter of time before cholera broke out. By July 17th, it was estimated that one refugee was dying per minute due to cholera, dehydration, and exposure.³²⁴ Clean water was needed fast.

By July 24th, American military personnel had been deployed to Goma, Zaire, Kigali, Rwanda, and Entebbe, Uganda, setting up the necessary infrastructure to complement and support the humanitarian response community. By the end of July, a CMOC had been established

³²² OFDA "Rwanda Chronology," working draft, pp. 9-10. [Hereafter cited as Rwanda Chronology].

³²³ Raymond Bonner, "30 Trampled to Death as More Rwandans Flee Rebels' Advance," Special to *The Dallas Morning News*, 18 July 1994, p. A1.

³²⁴ "Rwanda Chronology," p. 11.

in Goma and Entebbe. By the end of the first week in August, a CMOC had been established in Kigali. Working hand-in-hand with OFDA, UNHCR, DHA, and the NGOs already present, the American military helped to create an atmosphere of collaboration and coordination as the major problems of the humanitarian emergency were quickly addressed.

Given its limited mandate, the American military did a splendid job. It maintained a small "footprint," was subdued in achieving its goals, did everything possible to support UN leadership and credibility, and was "out" in sixty days. The JTF recognized that it was not in charge and that it was there to support according to its comparative advantage of logistics and infrastructure.

Indeed, the NGO/military relationship is officially a non-story. Because the U.N. was in charge, with the American military as just another supporting element, NGOs had to go through the U.N. infrastructure in order to obtain American logistical support. The U.N. prioritized the needs, utilizing the military's logistics through a single point-of-contact: the CMOC. There was no official interface between NGOs and the American military.

In purely operational terms, the cooperation and coordination among the various participants will stand out for a long time to come. And that collaboration will be the focus of this chapter. Yet, while the immediate humanitarian abrasion of refugees had to be treated, no small

task in itself, the much deeper political gash of genocide would remain unattended. The wrong solution, albeit almost perfect, had been applied.

It is this consciously ignored backdrop that shapes the context of the U.S. response and, consequently, the military's relationship with the NGOs. Given Rwanda's strategic insignificance and haunted by the lingering doubts of Somalia, the rationale behind U.S. policy and actions was to get out as quickly as possible, with no casualties. There would be no more Somalias. Accordingly, the U.S. did what it took -- to include submitting itself to the U.N. -- to achieve this overriding interest. To have recognized the situation for what it was would have raised complex political issues with which no one wanted to be bothered.

The U.S. government was not alone in its hidebound approach. The NGO community, with the preemptive and notable exception of Doctors Without Borders, thought that their humanitarian actions could occur without political effect.³²⁵ What resulted was not just the end of the refugee crisis, but the sustainment and de facto legitimizing of those who had committed genocide, the former government of Rwanda (to include their army and their militia, the *Interahamwe*, "united attackers").

No other event so embodies the moral quandary of intervention and the fading distinction between humanitarian and political. Rwanda was a political problem *par excellence*. But we, the West, treated it as a

³²⁵ Doctors Without Borders, for the first time in its history, actually called for military intervention during the massacre of the Tutsis by the Hutus.

humanitarian one. In the end, there is every reason to believe that this particular treatment of symptoms and not causes will bring us all back.

B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Rwanda and its cousin Burundi to the south share a history of enflamed ethnic conflict. In this region, the Tutsi minority has traditionally subjugated the Hutu majority. This ethnic division was reinforced by the German and Belgian colonial influences. With Rwandan independence from Belgian rule in 1962, the Hutus officially threw off the Tutsi yoke, killing thousands of Tutsis and sending thousands more into Zaire and Uganda.³²⁶ In 1973, the Tutsi-dominated Burundi army killed thousands of Burundi Hutus which instigated the further killing of Rwandan Tutsis by the Rwandan Hutus. In 1993, a Tutsi-dominated army coup in Burundi, set off more killings of Burundi Hutus by Burundi Tutsis. This sustained ethnic hatred set the stage for the Rwandan genocide in April of 1994.

On April 6th, a plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda (a moderate Hutu) and President Ntaryamira of neighboring Burundi (a moderate Hutu) was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport. While no one has ever been implicated, the results of this dual assassination are more than clear. Almost as if on signal, the killing of the Tutsis within

³²⁶ Many of the Tutsis in the Rwandan Patriotic Front were the offspring of the Ugandan exodus.

Rwanda began -- to include moderate Hutu political leaders. *Radio des Mille Collines* (Radio of 1,000 hills, originally operated out of Des Mille Hotel) was soon announcing "The grave is still only half full, who will help us to fill it?"³²⁷ Monique Mujawamariya, a Rwandan human rights activist who escaped, reported the following.

In my neighborhood there were six militiamen who in three hours killed 200 people. They had automatic weapons, they had a map, and they knew exactly where they were going. They had total impunity. They were paid, and they would get bonuses for the scope of the massacre.³²⁸

There is no doubt that the killing of the Tutsis was premeditated and systematic.³²⁹ Genocide had been committed.

As multiple reports indicate, this crime was known at the time, particularly in America. Upon returning from the region, Representative Tony Hall (Ohio-D) wrote an open letter to Ambassador Madeline Albright on June 9th, which combined realpolitik and idealism. "The fundamental concern must be to take swift action before other members of the global community begin to duplicate acts of Genocide . . . It is

³²⁷ Robert M. Press, "Surviving Tutsis Tell the Story of Massacres by Hutu Militias," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 1994, p. 9.

³²⁸ As quoted in *The Washington Post*, "So That the World Does Not Forget Rwanda," 24 April 1994, p. C7.

³²⁹ See also: 1) June 28, 1994 report by the UN's Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights; 2) Human Rights Watch report, May, 1994; 3) African Rights report, May, 1994.

imperative for the United Nations to strengthen itself by holding its member states accountable."³³⁰

But the knowledge of the event was ignored. To begin with, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not take any action. Generally speaking, a Cold War collection of dictators, acting against their own citizens under the guise of sovereignty, the OAU is used to looking away in the name of stability.³³¹ "When they look at a Rwanda, it makes them all nervous. Because it's either happening or could happen to them."³³² The OAU was not going to take any action -- it was not in their heritage or their interest.

That left the West, whose reaction was naturally shaped by its collective strategic indifference to central Africa. Yet, genocide is still genocide. Moreover, human rights in Africa had been recently rewoven into the fabric of American diplomacy. In an address before the 23rd African-American Institute Conference in Reston, Virginia, Secretary of State Warren Christopher laid out the parameters of America's policy toward the African continent:

The Clinton Administration will make Africa a high priority
and give it the attention it deserves . . . And we will help

³³⁰ According to the December 9, 1948, Convention on Genocide, contracting parties must prevent and punish genocide. Virtually the entire world has signed the document.

³³¹ Idi Amin, for example, was made president of the OAU despite his well-known crimes.

³³² Robert B. Oakley, as quoted by Bill Keller in "Blind Eye; Africa Allows Its Tragedies to Take Their Own Course," *The New York Times*, 7 August 1995.

Africa build *its* capacity for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution so that the people of that continent can live free of the terror of war. At the heart of our new relationship will be an enduring commitment to democracy and human rights . . . I want to make clear that the United States will take human rights into account as we determine how to allocate our scarce resources for foreign assistance.³³³

Despite this policy, there would be no action, in part because the Department of Defense saw another Somalia in Rwanda. Concerned with casualties and open-ended entanglements, there was no seeming rationale for U.S. military involvement. Though it was a political situation from the beginning, there was no political will to address the essence of the problem.

C. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION

With a full-fledged cholera/dysentery epidemic -- one person dying a minute -- the world mobilized according to a situation with which it was more comfortable. As one observer noted:

The miraculous and unheralded arrival of dysentery gave the world a born-again virgin purity. Genocide took a back seat to a humanitarian disaster. The drama of the rescue could now begin, and the curtain of good intentions allowed to fall on the mass graves. The moral and political question mark created by the world's passive acquiescence to the

³³³ Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "The United States and Africa: A New Relationship," in *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 21.

annihilation of the Tutsis was erased by the monumental logistical problems of dealing with the epidemic.³³⁴

On July 22nd, President Clinton called the situation the "world's worst humanitarian crisis in a generation . . . From the beginning of this tragedy, the United States has been in the forefront of the international community's response."³³⁵ Defined as such, the American response was a matter of addressing immediate humanitarian needs.

While there were significant refugee populations almost everywhere, the focus of the international media, and the U.S. response, would be Goma, where almost one million refugees were spread throughout three major camps. If the epidemic were to last, hundreds of thousands could easily die. While enormous, this situation was now a matter of organization. With DHA designated as the lead agency in Rwanda and UNHCR designated as the lead agency in Goma, Tanzania, and Entebbe, the infrastructure was soon in place to handle the situation.

D. COMMON UNDERSTANDING

The common understanding of the humanitarian problem was apparent. The first priority was clean water and then it was a matter of organizing the camps and establishing distribution systems for food stuffs

³³⁴ Rony Brauman, "Genocide in Rwanda: We Can't Say We Didn't Know," in *Populations in Danger, 1995, A Medecins Sans Frontieres Report*, p. 89.

³³⁵ As quoted by Kathy Lewis in "U.S. to Increase Relief to Refugees; President Orders Round-The-Clock Airlift Operation," *The Dallas Morning News*, 23 July 1994, p. 1A.

and other necessities. Although unprecedented in its size, a refugee problem is something with which the humanitarian community is quite familiar. Moreover, given the right tools, stopping cholera is somewhat academic. With a clear humanitarian mandate, this common understanding almost automatically equated to a permeating common sense in the field. The introduction of U.S. logistical support expedited a process that would have happened anyway. The stabilization of the emergency took place by mid-August.

Before focusing entirely on the humanitarian solution, however, it should be noted that there was a wide-spread feeling from the beginning that feeding the leaders of genocide, their army, and their militia, would have unpleasant consequences. Alain Destexhe, Secretary-General of Doctors Without Borders, wrote a letter to *The Economist*, published in the last week of July. He warned that just as the Khmer refugee camps on the Thai border had kept alive the Khmer Rouge, so would Rwandan refugee camps keep the former Hutu government alive. Using the same logic as Congressman Hall's June 9th letter to Ambassador Albright, Destexhe predicted that if the perpetrators were not punished, this fact would be "borne in mind by other potential tyrants."³³⁶

Of much greater stature, at least in America, was Ambassador Robert Oakley's prescient article in *The Washington Post* on July 27,

³³⁶ Alain Destexhe, letter to the Editor, *The Economist*, July 23rd-29th 1994, p. 8.

1994. Oakley warned from the beginning that this emergency needed a multi-faceted response. First and foremost, Oakley emphasized that the solution would be protracted and political. At the politically strategic level, the OAU had to become the primary player in solving the problem (in conjunction with the UN and NGOs). Tactically,

the OAU and regional African governments must accept the responsibility for dealing with the numerous armed and ruthless Hutus from the former regime who have moved to Zaire. In the short term they must be prevented from terrorizing the refugees and disrupting relief and return activities. In the longer term they must be prevented from organizing to return and seize power by force. Also the threat they pose to international civilian and military humanitarian workers cannot be ignored. Nor can the possibility of casualties. If casualties among humanitarian workers should occur, the American people need to recognize that the cause is worth the price. But to minimize the threat, an early start must be made on disarmament.³³⁷

What had been warned about is now true.³³⁸ What was prescribed was never attempted because the situation had been categorized as a humanitarian one. Reflecting on his article, Oakley notes that it was "not too terribly prescient -- just common sense at the time."³³⁹ Indeed, he

³³⁷ Robert B. Oakley, "A Slow Response in Rwanda," *The Washington Post*, 27 July 1994, p. A27.

³³⁸ Oakley's words manifested themselves as early as late October. From October 20th to November 17th, Jeff Drumtra of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) visited the refugee camps.

"In addition to physical intimidation, the regime [of the former Rwandan government] conducts "psychological warfare" in the refugee camps with an effective, systematic misinformation and propaganda campaign that exaggerates the dangers facing Hutus inside Rwanda, accentuates ethnic hatred, and has convinced many refugees that the **war must continue.**"

Jeff Drumtra, "Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi," p. 15.

³³⁹Telephone interview, 13 March 1995.

later emphasized that "everyone knew [about the political impact of feeding the perpetrators] from the beginning."³⁴⁰

It was against this backdrop that U.S. forces deployed to Uganda, Zaire, and Rwanda at the end of July. They would have only one concern -- the humanitarian need.

E. THE MISSION

On July 22nd, White House and Pentagon officials defined the military's mission according to the following tasks:

- Provide air traffic and communications control for the necessary airfields.
- Provide military security at the airfields.
- Provide surveillance aircraft to track refugees.
- Deploy loading/unloading equipment.
- Establish purified water system.³⁴¹

Despite these specifics, there was a primary humanitarian intent. Designated JTF "Support Hope" by European Command, Support Hope's mission was "to provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations in theater to alleviate the immediate suffering of Rwandan refugees (summarized verbally by

³⁴⁰ Telephone interview, 19 March 1995.

³⁴¹ *The Dallas Morning News*, p. A1.

USCINCEUR [the commander-in-chief of Europeand Command] as "stop the dying").³⁴²

This mission statement left no doubt as to what humanitarian end-state the military should work towards. The mission statement was further enhanced, however, by the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder. Schroeder took the somewhat unusual and additional step of examining every single speech and statement by senior policy-makers on *Operation Support Hope*. From these, he developed an intent of facilitating, not doing. This approach would keep the mission sharply defined, allow other participants to find their comparative niche, and prevent dependency upon U.S. resources. Importantly, such an intent was only possible because the political dimension was completely ignored by the NCA.

F. THE RESPONSE STRUCTURE

The international community was already reacting to the crisis. With a nominal airhead in Entebbe and a presence in Kigali and Goma, the U.N. had determined the lead agencies which would head the responses. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs was designated as the lead agency in Rwanda itself. UNHCR was designated the lead in Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. There would be some problems with this

³⁴² Operation Support Hope, After Action Review, p. 10. [Hereafter cited as OSH/AAR].

set-up as HCR-Zaire and HCR-Uganda were not in the habit of talking to each other directly; instead choosing to go upstairs to their international headquarters in Geneva. Although these types of problems caused consternation with the U.S. effort, the U.N. infrastructure was sufficient to deal with the crisis at hand. Indeed, the U.N. effort, in general, was commendable.

G. THE U.S. INTERFACE

With the U.N. already in place and long-time NGOs continuing their work there, the U.S., according to its mission and its desire to have a very subdued role, was just one among many participants. Whereas in the previous case studies, the U.S. had a central, if not leading, role to play, the U.S. would not be involved in any direct humanitarian action or decision-making. At every turn, it was facilitation and support. Crucial to the success of this type of mission was the person chosen to be responsible for civil-military operations.

In 1993, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan had established the Peace-Keeping Institute (PKI) in recognition that peacekeeping and its related endeavors would be a significant part of the future. Chosen to become the first Director was Colonel Karl Farris, an Army armor officer who had recently returned from working in Cambodia with the U.N. With a year under his belt working within the discipline and among the other players in the humanitarian community (to include

OFDA and several NGOs), Farris was a natural person to head the civil-military operations in Rwanda.

On July 23rd, General Sullivan gave Farris a Saturday morning call and told him to get in touch with the NGOs: what was the situation over there and what were their needs? Farris soon called Lauren Landis-Guzman (formerly of the Somalia DART and now working with Interaction) and Joelle Tanguy (formerly of MSF/France in Somalia and now the Executive Director of MSF/USA). Although Farris left for Europe the next day, both women got back to him in time and provided the appropriate information.³⁴³ For the first time, if ever so briefly, the military had sought out NGO expertise stateside before deploying. By July 28th, Farris was in Entebbe. His plan called for a CMOC in Entebbe, Goma, and Kigali.

H. CMOC ENTEBBE

Entebbe had been chosen by the JTF commander in full recognition that such a site was a stop-gap until Kigali International Airport opened up. (Although military planes could, and did, land there, commercial planes did not because the airport was not certified for safety, driving insurance rates sky-high). In the meantime, Entebbe would serve as the airhead through which supplies to both Rwanda and

³⁴³ Interview with Colonel Karl Farris, 4 August 1995, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Zaire moved. The JTF headquarters were located on the fourth floor of the Entebbe airport terminal.

The CMOC in Entebbe was stood up on July 28th and was initially under the direction of Farris and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Quentin Schillare, USA. When Farris went to Kigali to stand-up the Kigali CMOC in early August, Colonel Steven Riley, USA, took over as Director of the CMOC (Schillare continued as the Deputy Director).

The CMOC was collocated with the JTF headquarters at the Entebbe Airport air terminal. Located on the fourth floor of the terminal as well, the CMOC was directly across from the J-3 shop (operations). While there would still be some slight conceptual problems between the J-3 and the CMOC, this set-up would prove ideal. The goal of the CMOC was to be in the wholesale business of expediting transport to the retailer, the NGO, who dealt directly with the customer, the refugee. The best manner in which to accomplish this task was to "create an atmosphere to support, not to lead."³⁴⁴

Although successful in this goal, both Schillare and Riley were a bit ambivalent about their non-traditional assignment. Riley, a logistician, had never heard of a CMOC -- "I couldn't spell it"³⁴⁵ -- and Schillare, an armor officer, greeted the news as though he had just "tested positive for

³⁴⁴ Telephone interview with Colonel Steven Riley, 23 February 1995.

³⁴⁵ Telephone interview with Colonel Steven Riley, 5 September 1995.

HIV."³⁴⁶ Yet, both quickly grasped the central role of the CMOC and found themselves working directly with UNHCR and the varied and transient NGOs who were on their way to and from Rwanda and Zaire.

The CMOC met every morning at 0800 on the fourth floor. Schillare or Riley initially ran the meetings as UNHCR did not have the office space or furniture to conduct meetings. (Later, after HCR took an office space on the first floor of the terminal, the meetings were held there). Again, in a familiar format, specific coordination events for that day and the next forty-eight hours were analyzed as a common sense and prioritization emerged from the discussion. Essentially, the humanitarian needs of Goma drove the process. If there were any disputes, Eva Demant, the senior UNHCR representative would have the final say.

The representatives at the meeting would vary, especially among the NGOs. NGOs showed up according to the need to move their "stuff" or themselves into or out-of theater. Hence, the NGOs were not so much a permanent, same person representative as they were a permanent, collective presence. Given their transient nature and the fact that Entebbe was a stop-gap measure waiting on Kigali International, there was no real need for NGOs to even attend the CMOC meetings.

The information they had, however, either about shipments coming in or about events/needs as they left Rwanda, was very important to the

³⁴⁶ Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Quentin Schillare, 29 August 1995.

CMOC and its ability to monitor the entire situation. Per the principle of altruistic self-interest, the CMOC came up with two "hooks," or valuable goods, to exchange for the NGO information. Because commercial air was not flying into an uninsured Kigali airport, military air was the fastest theater entrance (the other possibility was a long truck drive). This asset was self-evident and the CMOC developed a process by which the NGO presented a flying "chit" to the Combined Logistics Cell (to be discussed shortly) and were accommodated accordingly.

The second "hook" was as novel as it was brilliant. The CMOC posted a bulletin board outside their office on which NGO personnel could tack their business cards. NGOs would want to find out who else was "in town." One look at the board, a discussion with CMOC operators, and an NGO worker, in search of expertise and/or assessments, could track a trusted colleague to within a day or two. In the meantime, once at the CMOC, the NGO representative would be asked the pertinent questions of the day.

Although not dealing with the same NGOs on a daily basis, this was the most official direct contact the military would experience with the NGO community. This NGO interface proved successful for five main reasons.

First, Riley and Schillare clearly understood, according to Schroeder's intent, that their job was to facilitate and support.

Next, along with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Lindsey, USA, Schillare had developed the idea of the Combined Logistics Center (CLC). The CLC acted as the mechanism by which the CMOC coordination process was enacted. With Lindsey and two U.N. workers from Croatia, the CLC did the actual tarmac movement of relief supplies and implemented all of the coordination decisions agreed upon at the CMOC meeting.³⁴⁷ For instance, once a flying "chit" was approved at the CMOC meeting, the NGO person would take the "chit" to the CLC where it was recorded and prioritized according to the CMOC's intent. The CLC, as the first stage of implementing CMOC coordination, was an instrumental tool for making things happen.

The CLC also represented the first step taken by the CMOC in an effort to transition to the U.N. Developed in conjunction with U.N. workers, the CLC was the first mechanism of coordination to be fully assumed by the U.N., as Lieutenant Colonel Lindsey eased himself out of the picture. Moreover, the CMOC itself, while it physically remained on the fourth floor, its coordination meetings were soon transferred to the U.N.'s office space on the first floor. This transition not only meant less of a walk, it also symbolized that the U.N. was taking control of the effort.

³⁴⁷ For example, all the relief supplies brought in by commercial air had to be re-palletized to military pallets in order to load them.

The CMOC's constant awareness and encouragement of the necessity for U.N. control was critical in establishing U.N. leadership, and thus responsibility, for the overall logistics effort out of Entebbe. With the U.N. as the primary player, the U.S. could begin to assume a less-pronounced role while simultaneously creating an environment in which NGO personnel were more comfortable: the U.N. facilitating the entire response. Also, the sooner the U.N. was in charge, the faster the Americans went home.

Fourth, the NGO interface was a success because of the attention given to the CMOC by General Schroeder. Not only did the CMOC Director or Deputy-Director attend the JTF staff meetings but Schroeder also took the time to go and spend time in the CMOC itself. Schroeder went so far as to use a secondary entrance to the air terminal that had him pass first through the CMOC before entering the rest of his staff's office space. As a result, Riley and Schillare had unlimited access to the JTF commander. Both Riley and Schillare confirm that Schroeder was very concerned with the CMOC and its impact on civilian relations.³⁴⁸

Finally, Tom Frye of the DART had been seconded to General Schroeder as a humanitarian advisor. Frye traveled everywhere with the General and provided "humanitarian" input for all the decisions made by Schroeder. Thus, not only was the CMOC collocated with the JTF (it was

³⁴⁸ Riley, 5 September 1995; Schillare, 29 August 1995.

really an extension of it), when the JTF commander was away, he always had humanitarian expertise on-call. (An important point as Kigali and Goma had different humanitarian needs. Moreover, Frye could tap into the DART presence in both towns).

While all worked out very well, there were some initial problems that are worth noting. When Dr. Brent Burkholder of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) flew to Rwanda on July 24th, he waited in Entebbe for three days. Granted, the military was just setting up and figuring themselves out, but it was apparent that the military's first concern was providing for itself.³⁴⁹ This perception was probably not due to any malicious intent, but rather a manifestation of a traditional military mindset (something evidenced by Riley and Schillare's initial reaction to being assigned to the CMOC).

Schillare reflects, however, that "his biggest frustration in Entebbe" was a mindset more concerned with a wire-diagram schematic and its infrastructure than the humanitarian purpose it was facilitating.³⁵⁰ For example, such a mindset created a backlog of humanitarian supplies in Entebbe during the first few days.³⁵¹ The root cause of such problems, though, was the following question: on which mechanism should the JTF

³⁴⁹ Telephone interview with Dr. Brent Burkholder, 6 September 1995.

³⁵⁰ Schillare, 29 August 1995.

³⁵¹ This problem was, in part, solved by Tom Frye who pointed out to Riley that there were too many idle military planes on the tarmac. Riley and the CMOC accepted this observation and "turned it up a bit." (Riley, 5 September 1995).

staff focus to accomplish its mission? It soon became a matter of convincing the J-3 and the rest of the joint staff that "in a humanitarian JTF, the CMOC is the focus." Schillare went to great lengths to make this point. At the staff meetings, he would bring over a big can of maize or a box of high-energy biscuits and state: "this is why we're here." As Colonel Riley points out, "who are you there to support: yourself, or the humanitarian effort?"³⁵²

This insight is noteworthy because it suggests that even with a clearly humanitarian intent, a supportive JTF commander, and the collocation of the CMOC and the J-3, a traditional mindset will present itself. Not because it is malicious or purposeful, but because it is human nature to fall back into something known and comfortable -- i.e., the way one is trained -- when confronted with the unknown.

With the influx of trucks with a forty metric-ton payload (compared to a C-130 thirteen metric-ton payload) and, later, the opening of Kigali airport in mid-September, the Entebbe airhead died a natural death and CMOC Entebbe became secondary in importance to the CMOC in Kigali. Before considering this effort, however, it is necessary to examine the nature of CMOC Goma and its importance during the first weeks of August.

³⁵² Schillare, 29 August 1995; Riley, 5 September 1995.

I. CMOC GOMA

Goma, Zaire, was the focus of the crisis. At the end of July there were over 800,000 refugees in three camps and they were dying at a rate of 6500 a day. The area was blanketed from above by the haze of thousands of fires and from below by human feces. It was absolutely unprecedented.

UNHCR was reeling. Philippe O'Grendi of UNHCR had to find a way to address the myriad of problems. Among the most pressing needs were the distribution and storage of clean water and the burial of the dead. Other concerns included the rapid influx of NGOs with varying degrees of skills and previous experience, the utter chaos of the situation, and the potential for violence.

The organization of a response to such an overwhelming problem necessitated a central location in which all agencies could meet. O'Grendi established his coordination center (there was no real title) at a bank in downtown Goma. Accordingly, O'Grendi would have large NGO meetings once or twice a week (where over 100 would participate). The real money-maker, however, were the sectoral meetings which addressed specific areas (i.e. sanitation, water, seeds and tools, etc.) and how to best coordinate the available assets. This central yet diffused effort, based on consensus-building, proved very effective.

By July 30th, CMOC Goma had been established at the airfield on the northern edge of town. (The U.S. focused its support efforts on water purification, delivery, and storage as well as some basic engineering help). The term "CMOC" is actually a misnomer. It was more like a MOC, a military operations center that facilitated U.N. requests *vis-à-vis* its liaison with O'Grendi's coordination center at the bank. The "CMOC" had no interface with NGOs, or any other civilian agencies. The actual military headquarters - enclaved for security reasons out at the airfield - served to facilitate U.N. requests and take care of its own infrastructure. There was no civil dimension to it as an operations center. One DART member described it as a "separate support activity."³⁵³ This assessment is a fair one as the "CMOC" at the eye of the hurricane ironically had no coordination contact with the NGOs (although there was obviously contact at the point of implementation between troops and NGOs).

The liaison was primarily one person: Major Richard D. Hooker, Jr., USA. Hooker's job was to liaison in support of UNHCR in accordance with his commander's intent (facilitate, don't do). It was a relatively simple process. Hooker would attend the general and sectoral meetings, which were conducted in French and English, as one more player within the humanitarian response. He would collect and track requests that had been validated by UNHCR only. (Sometimes these requests would be left

³⁵³ Interview with Greg Garbinsky, Washington D.C., 31 July 1995. Garbinsky was a member of the DART in Goma.

in a drop-box in the basement of the bank where the DART was collocated). Once done, and working in conjunction with OFDA's expertise, Hooker would report back to Brigadier General Nix, USA, the "CMOC" commander for final approval. By all accounts, this methodology worked reasonably well.

Crucial to this success was the NGOs' understanding of the American military's role and Hooker himself. It was self-evident that the Americans were not there to implement, coordinate, or otherwise take charge. One-and-all recognized that the U.S. force would abide by Philippe O'Grendi and UNHCR's decisions on prioritization. Hooker was essentially understood as a messenger. Given the context of the U.S. mission and the role of Hooker, there would be no attempt at an end-run by the NGOs to speak directly with the Americans. Besides, there was just too much to do.

This common understanding of the U.S. purpose and role forced the NGOs, *vis-à-vis* UNHCR, to use the military for exactly what it said it would do. Also, it forced the UNHCR and the NGOs to come up with alternative methods and means of their own to solve situations that the U.S. could conceivably address, but would not.

The issue of transition was the only noteworthy problem of this nominal interaction. According to Greg Garbinsky, the American force had promised to leave certain gear and equipment behind and then vacillated. While the DART could have pushed harder for a transition

plan, it was probably anticipating more than the four-day notice the American forces had provided. Also, the gear issue was important because its absence/presence determined just how self-sufficient the UNHCR effort would become. Both issues were resolved as the gear and equipment stayed and the departure was postponed for a week.

By mid-August, the death rate was down to "just" 500 a day as the situation began to resemble something with which UNHCR and the rest of the humanitarian community could again cope. On August 28th, "CMOC" Goma shut down.

J. CMOC KIGALI

CMOC Kigali was formed on August 5th by Karl Farris as a sub-component of UNREO (U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office). Farris directed the CMOC and reported to General Schroeder in Entebbe. During the third week in August, Farris and his Deputy Director, Lieutenant Colonel John Crary, USA, returned home. They were replaced by Colonel Paul Monacelli, USAR, and Colonel Fred Jones, USAR, both Civil Affairs officers. CMOC Kigali shut down on September 28th.

In order to coordinate the relief efforts in Rwanda, the U.N. had established DHA as the lead agency. DHA, according to its coordination mandate, set up the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in the UNDP building (U.N. Developmental Program) in downtown Kigali. The OSOCC was run by the U.N.'s Humanitarian Coordinator, Arturo

Hein. In reality, however, it was run by his Deputy, Charles Petrie (the same official who had worked in the Somalia HOC). The OSOCC had three objectives:

1. To provide a framework for the coordination of operational activities undertaken by humanitarian organizations responding to the Rwanda emergency;
2. to act as a focal point for the collection analysis and dissemination of information relating to developments in the emergency and the international relief activities; and
3. to facilitate the access to and sharing of resources for the timely and efficient delivery of humanitarian relief.³⁵⁴

The four essential components of this operation were represented within the OSOCC. There was UNREO (U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office) itself which handled the actual coordination; UNAMIR (U.N. Assistance Mission In Rwanda) the peacekeeping mission; ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Organizations) which funded a tent outside of the UNDP building to work in concert with UNREO, handling NGO liaison; and the CMOC, which handled airlift and relief support.³⁵⁵

Not unlike UNHCR's coordination center in Goma, the OSOCC had large weekly meetings (as many as 100 people) every Tuesday and Friday night in which everyone had the opportunity to speak. Petrie, speaking

³⁵⁴ Internal UNREO Paper titled, "Operational Coordination of Humanitarian Relief," pages unnumbered.

³⁵⁵ This organization was known as "UNREO" or the OSOCC. Importantly, elements within the OSOCC, to include the CMOC, were not commonly thought of as independent entities. If you needed something, you went to UNREO, not, for example, to the U.S. Army's CMOC.

from a table at the front, would open the meeting up with words of praise for various organizations and then ask for a general concurrence to that meeting's agenda. Then, according to emergency priority, sector, or region, the relevant representatives would speak their piece as a picture emerged from the different reports. Later sector-specific meetings would discuss the details of their responsibilities (i.e., sanitation). This consensus-building and diffused approach won high-marks from all involved.

It is extremely important to note the role of Petrie. While Petrie obviously was an outstanding leader in this potentially leaderless environment, it is more important to reflect on what the following comments indicate: that the U.N., like in Goma, can be very capable. Karl Farris remarked that Petrie was "the right person to pull a loose community together."³⁵⁶ Quentin Schillare from the CMOC in Entebbe noted that "Petrie is one of the heroes . . . if they didn't have him there, the plan [the military's] would have fallen apart."³⁵⁷ Paul Monacelli states that Petrie "was the key to success . . . he had the ability through his personality to get people to work together . . . If there had been no Charles Petrie, we may have had to have played a more active role."³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Farris, 4 August 1995.

³⁵⁷ Schillare, 29 August 1995.

³⁵⁸ Telephone interview with Colonel Paul Monacelli, USAR, 1 September, 1995.

These comments, all from military officers with over twenty years experience, reveal the true scope of an operation well-done. For the first time in our study, the U.N. had been up to the task and had managed to satisfy its hardest customer, the American military.

Thus, it was with a very comfortable subordinancy that the CMOC operated in Kigali. Some might rush to point out that the wire-diagram called for Farris/Monacelli to report to the JTF in Entebbe. Of course, this point is true. Yet, let there be no doubt, "we were working in support of the U.N. effort."³⁵⁹ As uncomfortable as that may seem to some, it is also the reason for the operation's success. Not only did this attitude make for more cohesive coordination, it also allowed the U.S. to write its own exit strategy.

Like Goma, the official coordination between NGOs and American military is a non-story. With DHA having the last word on prioritization, the CMOC was removed from that decision-making process and its inherent responsibilities. Unlike Goma, however, and because the CMOC was collocated with the OSOCC, there were unique opportunities to encourage the coordination process and thus accelerate the exit strategy.

Truly regarded as just another component of the overall effort, the CMOC's position was first strengthened by its widely-acknowledged mandate -- to facilitate, not do. As in Goma, this position prevented an

³⁵⁹ Farris, 4 August 1995.

end-run by NGOs to take the path of least resistance; *i.e.*, to use the military simply because it was there. Consequently, the NGOs respected the OSOCC structure and operated according to its parameters: submitting requests and awaiting adjudication and assignment by DHA. In this sense, the CMOC remained distinctly in the background.

In accordance with the military's mandate, this type of presence was more than appropriate. Yet, upon further inspection, it was nominally negative to the overall purpose. Accepted as part of the OSOCC structure and as not responsible for how resources were allocated, the CMOC inherently risked the chance of becoming a passive player, with absolutely no control over events. It could easily have assumed the mantle of somebody else's tool.

This potential was not realized for four main reasons. First, as discussed briefly, the CMOC accepted and encouraged its subordination to UNREO. Colonel Farris recognized from the beginning that "it's OK not to be in charge . . . it's best that you not be in charge."³⁶⁰ Out of sync with traditional military training -- "when in charge, take charge" -- this awareness indicates the open-mindedness with which one must approach these situations. Farris further notes that there can be no "presumed formula based on a warfighting [doctrinal] mindset." This unencumbered

³⁶⁰ Farris, 4 August 1995.

and atypical military intent permeated the entire CMOC Kigali effort as the humanitarians were more receptive to the CMOC staff.

Second, there was an aggressive liaison effort. Farris was constantly out and about the city and countryside. As he checked on the implementation of coordinated efforts, Farris did not hesitate to let NGOs know of the CMOC's capabilities. It was through unofficial contact like this that NGOs became aware of the CMOC and what it could do for them. This theme was continued by Monacelli. Adding to the "C" themes of Collaboration, Consensus, and Coordination, Monacelli stressed that there must be a "Courting" process as well. This unofficial contact was essential in a wire-diagram that did not reflect such interaction. Monacelli suggests that "the more structured you become, the less effective you are in coordinating with the humanitarian community."³⁶¹ Thus, the informal, yet aggressive, courting process becomes the primary conduit of mission accomplishment.

Next, the CMOC did not become a passive instrument of the U.N. infrastructure because they were able to demonstrate their value-added nature. According to the principle of altruistic self-interest, the sooner the NGOs and the humanitarian community accessed the military's logistics, the sooner stabilization would result, the sooner the military could return home. The obvious "hook" was the logistic capability. For

³⁶¹ Monacelli, 1 September 1995.

example, the CMOC brought down a Movement/Control team down from European Command to coordinate the burgeoning fleet of U.N. trucks in Rwanda (eventually over 400 trucks).

But there were also more subtle enticements that made the NGOs want to check in with the CMOC when they stopped by UNREO. For instance, the new government of Rwanda had posted a map of known land-mines in the Kigali area. Fred Jones managed to get a copy of it, posting it outside the CMOC office. Initially ignored, it received a great deal of attention when a mine was set off just a few days later. Another examples involves the use of the military's aerial photography. At one point, the rumor-mill had produced a near catastrophe of almost 100,000 refugees congregating near one particular bridge. The military was able to produce some photo-imagery that suggested that the actual numbers were significantly less. It was these types of innovative approaches that made NGOs seek out CMOC personnel when they stopped by UNREO.

Finally, it was the manner in which military interaction was presented that made the official and unofficial interface with NGOs "user-friendly." Monacelli points out that they "made a conscious decision not to sit at the front table; we instead sat in the first row of chairs." In this manner, a proper example of "coordination and facilitation with no unrealistic expectations" was set.³⁶² As the emergency stabilized, and

³⁶² Monacelli, 1 September 1995.

with obvious symbolism, the CMOC officers slowly moved towards the back of the room. By the time the CMOC shut down at the end of September, the CMOC was represented by an Air Force Second Lieutenant intelligence officer who stood in the back.

Thus, it was always very clear that the military would transition out sooner, rather than later. While they were there, however, it was also clearly understood that they would do everything within their mandate to facilitate the humanitarian effort. It was this well-balanced approach, coupled with the inter-personal skills of the CMOC officers, that made the CMOC most effective.

These four points were only possible because the CMOC was collocated with the OSOCC. Importantly, these points, due to the manner in which they were implemented, did not encourage the CMOC to be viewed as a passive appendage of the U.N. infrastructure. Moreover, they also directly contributed to an information sharing atmosphere that was so important to Petrie's leadership style. If sharing was the accepted name of the game, the above elements to the CMOC strategy eventually contributed to the snowball of cohesion that Petrie was pushing downhill.

K. THE NGOS AND THE NGO LIAISON

This atmosphere of information sharing was reinforced by one final intriguing element of the OSOCC, located in a tent outside the UNDP building: The NGO Liaison Unit (NLU). Just as the CMOC did not

officially interface with NGOs, the NGO Liaison did not coordinate the NGO effort. Yet, Anita Menghetti, the NGO Liaison, had very good relations with all the CMOC officers and was equally appreciated by them. This only official NGO relationship of the CMOC made for smoother coordination and cohesion within UNREO. Her contribution to the NGOs -- "to be nothing to everybody and everything to everybody"³⁶³ - - reflects just how far the NGOs have come in acknowledging the need for integration; while also demonstrating just how very far they have to go.

Anita Menghetti's employment process, in and of itself, reveals the complex nature of the NGOs and their cherished tradition of organizational autonomy. Menghetti had been working for ICVA in Geneva. ICVA, like Interaction in the United States, is an umbrella NGO for over a 100 European and American NGOs. Also like Interaction, the NGO membership uses ICVA for very general purposes that serves everyone's interest. ICVA, too, serves no coordination or operational role in emergencies.

Thus, the NGO community in the greater Rwandan area did not ask for a NGO Liaison Unit. But Rudy von Bernuth, the Vice President of ICVA's Executive Committee (and also Vice President of Save the Children/U.S.) thought that they should have one anyway. Consequently,

³⁶³ Menghetti, 7 August 1995.

he had Save the Children fund ICVA's position and placed it under UNREO. Menghetti was thus seconded to the U.N. by Save to work in the ICVA funded unit. NGO liaison, let alone coordination, does not come easy.

In so many words, Menghetti was the "welcome-wagon" in Kigali to all the arriving NGOs. She registered NGOs (eventually building a computer database of who was doing what, where); she gave them all the necessary information (cost of renting, maps, how much to pay interpreters, drivers, etc.); and she served as a reference point for any NGO which had questions regarding UNREO. (She even developed a library, by sector, for the NGOs). All of this was done single-handedly until November, when two interns arrived to help her out.

Although the NLU was an absolutely invaluable service, the NGO community did not want to: 1) take it over; 2) expand it into a working group that could express its collective voice at the UNREO meetings. As Rudy Von Bernuth relates, the NGOs "accepted it [the NLU], but didn't invest in it."³⁶⁴

And why invest in it? The NGOs had an accomplished fellow NGO of whom they could ask questions when they wanted. Importantly, they did not have to listen to anything she said. In the meantime, they could

³⁶⁴ Interview with Rudy von Bernuth, Save the Children, Westport, Connecticut, 7 August 1995.

attend UNREO meetings, contribute as they saw fit, and continue on with their humanitarian charter.

In many ways, at least initially, the Rwandan emergency was like a long-lost friend to the NGO community. The military was kept in its place, was accessible as needed *vis-à-vis* the U.N., and, in the meantime, they were able to act as they wanted, as they have always done. They were free to go about being purely humanitarian.

L. THE OTHER MILITARY

In many ways, the Rwandan intervention was also greeted as a long-lost friend by the rest of the American forces deployed to the region. While the CMOCs displayed a nuanced understanding of the situation, the rest of the American contingent behaved according to its cherished charter. With the CMOC handling the humanitarian coordination, the much valued and coveted single point-of-contact had reasserted itself. The enclaved deployment of military personnel ensured that the interaction between American forces and NGOs, let alone the refugees themselves, would be very limited.³⁶⁵ A dynamic, multi-dimensional chessboard had been reduced to a two-dimensional wire-diagram, something with which the military was infinitely more comfortable.

³⁶⁵ Even Richard Hooker had to get special permission to stay out past 1800. American personnel attending specific NGO water/sanitation liaison meetings had to leave before it got dark out. (Interview with Dr. Les Roberts of the Center for Disease Control, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 September 1995).

Worrisome, however, is the overriding imperative of the deployment: no casualties. Indeed, Dr. Burkholder distinctly remembers being in the Goma "CMOC" and seeing the Army's posted number one goal: no casualties.³⁶⁶ With Somalia as a cognitive map, this feeling saturated the forces and was evident in everything they did. For example, the Americans built up the airstrips in Goma and Kigali into veritable fire-bases. When they moved, they had HUMVEE's with mounted .50 caliber machine-guns at the front and rear of the convoy. No matter the context, they always wore their flak jacket and helmet.

A first response might be, "well, that's what militaries do; besides, you can't argue with results (no casualties)." This point is well-taken. There is a very strong argument that such a presentation of no-nonsense and overwhelming force set the proper tone for the deployment and, as a result, there were no problems.³⁶⁷ Such an employment, if necessary, further makes for an easier transition to a real warfighting scenario. These points are very true and seemingly persuasive.

But when women were driving throughout the countryside, alone, as were the rest of the NGO personnel, one begins to wonder whether or not this particular application of "security" is appropriate. Many recall the curious juxtaposition between unarmed NGOs going anywhere they

³⁶⁶ Burkholder, 6 September 1995.

³⁶⁷ Warfighting skills, it should be noted, were not attrited as they were actually employed in such activities as establishing bunkers and providing security for convoys.

wanted and the armed-to-the-teeth military having to be in before dark while not being allowed in the refugee camps at all. Greg Garbinsky notes that once the Americans left, convoys around Goma increased by one or two runs a day because there was no security to slow it down.³⁶⁸

M. ARTIFICIAL SEPARATIONS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT

In both communities, then, the Rwandan intervention was almost welcomed home like a long-lost brother. The NGOs, eventually over a hundred in the region, were able to access military support while simultaneously keeping it at arm's length. The military was able to do something humanitarian, in a military manner, while keeping the humanitarians at arm's length.

This acceptance of traditional roles was possible for one reason: the political reality was ignored. Fortunately for the military, this ignorance was part of their mandate. The ghost of Somalia dictated no casualties, a small footprint, a short duration, and an overwhelming conventional power. From the beginning, as political instruments, they were intentionally isolated from the political situation by the senior policy-makers. There would be no political impact from their presence and no expectations created because it was understood from the

³⁶⁸ Garbinsky, 31 July 1995.

beginning what the military's role would be. Which, a clear military role, is the way it should be.

In this sense, lessons had been learned from past humanitarian interventions. There was no way the military means would be confused with the humanitarian end. As a result, the military was much more effective. That the political situation was ignored, that "we had postponed death in that part of the world until another bloodbath" and that "we really didn't solve a problem"³⁶⁹ was beside the point. In fact, the case can be made that Rwanda was the ultimate continuum of effort: the military knew and kept its place, according to its mandate, as it enabled the humanitarian effort.

The NGOs, on the other hand, used their own charters to isolate themselves from the political reality. Despite having a significant and immediate humanitarian impact, very few NGOs were willing to acknowledge, let alone consider, the long-term ramifications of their actions. That, in fact, they were feeding the perpetrators of genocide and specifically enabling the former Rwandan government, whose sole intent was to begin the war again (something the U.S. government was obviously party to with its financial support of the NGOs). As Rudy Von Bernuth states so clearly, "we'd better 'fess up to the fact that we can't do

³⁶⁹ Riley, 5 September 1995.

anything that's apolitical."³⁷⁰ Anita Menghetti takes it one step further:
"There never was such a thing as an apolitical NGO."³⁷¹

What was nominally the purest of humanitarian missions, and was conducted as such by the NGOs and the military, ultimately was operating in the purest of political environments.

N. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Above all else, this "emergency" was rooted in genocide. No matter how one presents the case, this one irrefutable fact glares through the humanitarian mist. The entire world had stood by and watched.

Only when the "humanitarian" label had been attached did the world take action. This last slap-in-the-face to the one-half million dead will forever remain one of the most tragic ironies of our lifetime. And thus the international community of nations must ask itself: what is the purpose of armies and what is the purpose of humanitarian organizations if not to prevent this great evil? Ultimately, this question may be the only one worth asking. For now, however, it is important to examine some other philosophical ramifications of this ignored political reality.

Rwanda, as an extension of the Somalia experience, raises some very fundamental questions: about national interest and the use of force

³⁷⁰ von Bernuth, 7 August 1995.

³⁷¹ Menghetti, 7 August 1995.

in a humanitarian intervention and its eventual effect on the CMOC. The singlemost manifestation of these concerns is the enclave deployment of U.S. personnel. Irrespective of force protection, mission statement, and the end-result, the following observations, at the least, have to be considered before the next such intervention.

"Many attempts to have NGOs and the military become more familiar with each other have been made in the U.S., but those meetings and exercises mainly involve the higher level managers of NGOs and the upper ranks of the military. The real familiarization has to be made among field people. Since Somalia and the loss of U.S. lives there, the understandable emphasis on security has distanced U.S. military personnel even more from their NGO counterparts. This was obvious in Goma, Zaire, where there was almost no social mixing of the two groups. Without the personal relationships, such as were possible in northern Iraq, the organizational relationships will never work. *In a field of human endeavor so stressful and emotional, the personal linkages are even more important.* [emphasis added] In Goma, while sometimes sitting in the back of a pickup truck on the way to the camps, we would pass a military convoy escorting several U.S. military water technicians: as I said, an understandable concern for the well being of soldiers, but not available to civilians who were taking far more risks. This situation

sends very mixed messages to NGOs and makes it difficult for them to identify with the mission of the military."³⁷²

This statement by a world-respected doctor who has served extensively in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda is disconcerting. Anita Menghetti synthesizes these ideas about the military's separation from the relief effort more directly: "duty only goes so far . . . you have to see the effect of what you're doing."³⁷³ And Dr. Les Roberts suggests that like Mao's guerrillas, all helpers must swim in the sea of the helped.³⁷⁴ The above thoughts have three potential consequences.

Essentially, the paramount question that begs asking is: does such a deployment separate the American soldier from the very values that he espouses and joined to defend? What are the ramifications (psychological or otherwise) upon an American force that, regardless of its mandate, ignores the reality around it?³⁷⁵

Second, as the Bangladesh and northern Iraq case studies indicate (and to some extent Somalia), success comes from the power of an intangible cohesion that results from the mixing between the

³⁷² Dr. Michael Toole, fax to author, 8 June 1995.

³⁷³ Menghetti, 7 August 1995.

³⁷⁴ Roberts, 19 September 1995.

³⁷⁵ American forces, for example, did not take part in the burial of the refugee dead, ostensibly to protect them from the trauma of such an event.

humanitarian community and the military, and then, more importantly, between the helpers and the helped. That type of cohesion was an impossibility from the beginning in Rwanda. Granted, the CMOC worked extremely well. But there was nothing like the cohesion witnessed in northern Iraq and Bangladesh where everyone was intermingled in a common, uniting effort. If the political aspects had been acknowledged in Rwanda, the CMOC effort would have failed. As a liaison within such a politically-charged environment, the necessary cohesion between the two communities would never have resulted. The Mogadishu CMOC, despite the best efforts of those involved, would have been replicated.

Third, as discussed in the Somalia chapter, does such a cautious and enclaved deployment -- primarily focused on no casualties -- not eventually effect the mindset of the warfighter? If, at every level, the troop commander's basic worry is no casualties, is not risk-taking and boldness ineluctably eroded? Will this cautious mindset not figuratively and literally bleed over into a warfighting scenario? As Dick Vennigone of World Vision observed about Rwanda: "How can you be a world leader and expect to use your military power without anybody getting hurt?"³⁷⁶

These questions are left at the rhetorical level. Humanitarian operations must be conducted as military operations pursuant to a

³⁷⁶ Vennigone, 12 September 1995

political purpose. Only then will military personnel be unfettered to act, *and interact*, as the situation demands.

O. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The first concern, based on the above philosophical implications, is that the CMOC, as a liaison between the communities, is an unwitting ~~abettor~~ to the problem. Granted, the CMOC in this case did everything unofficially possible to interact with the NGOs and understand the larger issues. But as an institutional interface, it remained a liaison tool. Both communities -- because of their desire to ignore, or have ignored for them, the political context -- did not mind this artificial separation. As a result, the CMOC as a liaison worked relatively well. If the political context had been remotely addressed by either community, the CMOCs would have failed. Such an environment demands that decisions be made at the same table in conjunction with the other political and military concerns. Therefore, we must be careful to suggest that the interface of the two communities has been finally figured out. It worked for one, and only one, reason: it was a humanitarian effort that did not seek to address the larger political issues.

P. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (PURELY HUMANITARIAN)

Once this last notion is accepted, it is possible to focus on the positive coordination lessons learned. First and foremost, although it was

just another player, the U.S. obviously could have taken on a larger role, even after it deployed. By defining its mission and assiduously pursuing and maintaining it, the American force made very clear what it would do to its fullest extent, and what it would not even consider. In so doing, the other parties were able to more easily define their own role within the continuum of effort.

Such a clearly defined mission also prevents other parties from accessing the military for resources simply because it is the path of least resistance. Fully aware of what they would not get from the military, even though the military could theoretically provide it, the NGOs were forced to come up with their own alternatives. This avoidance of military dependence ultimately rested on the accepted role of the U.N. as lead agency. All parties recognized that the U.N. would have the final word on prioritization. There must be a center of effort. The U.N. proved capable.

This logic additionally implies that *vis-à-vis* the U.N., the comparative advantage of both communities were successfully employed. While there was not an extensive intermingling, so as to provide further cohesion to the overall effort, there is no doubt that both communities did extremely well within their respective sectors. Moreover, the military was willing to accept its subordinate role. Colonel Farris' words come back to mind: "it's OK not to be in charge." Clearly reminiscent of the Bangladesh and northern Iraq coordination processes, this atypical

military mindset is a critical element upon which the military/NGO relationship must be founded.

There is also the operational issue of transition, best illustrated in the Goma example. Without a clear idea of what the military was going to do, the humanitarian community could not project what resources were needed and when. Not a significant event in light of the overall impact, this glitch does point to an idea that will make the next humanitarian intervention better: "joint" assessment/transition teams.

To a large degree, the arrival of the military imposes a false time line on the continuum of a humanitarian emergency. The NGOs and those being helped have been there long before and will remain long after an American intervention. In this sense, the highly sought after end-state of the military is a false ending. In order to be sensitive to this fact and its operational implications, the CMOC must "plug into" or have as its own, an element fully dedicated to assessment/transition.³⁷⁷

Hopefully, such an element could tap into a parent element within the conceptual HOC/OSOCC. If not, the continuum nature of a complex emergency demands that the military think about its short-term actions, to include withdrawal, and their long-term implications. Thus, this element of at least the CMOC, should include people with operational

³⁷⁷ The warfighting analogy would be the elevation of the S-3 Alpha (the assistant operations officer in a Marine Combat Operations Center) whose job it is to think about the battle three to four days away while tying it into the reality of the present battle.

experience who can also conceptually relate to the humanitarian response. It will be their only job to work jointly with the humanitarian experts as they simultaneously assess the immediate situation while relating it to the mandate's end-state. The CMOC Director, and the JTF commander, should use them as an impartial reality check on the effect of the overall military effort. If done properly, in conjunction with the humanitarians, there will be no surprises, such as the Goma withdrawal, as everyone stays attuned to each other. Ultimately, such a process enhances the possibility that the military's artificial end-state will encourage the overall continuum of effort.

Finally, there is the role of Army Civil Affairs. Although there should be further discussion as to when and how to bring the Reserves into the emergency situation, it goes without saying that they are critical to a successful effort. In this particular case, the effort worked perfectly as the Civil Affairs officers maintained and increased the excellent momentum that the regular officers had created. The question remains, however, what if the conventional folks applied had not been Farris, Riley, Schillare, or Crary? (Which is to say, what if General Sullivan himself had not taken a direct interest in the matter?) What if those responsible for the sandbagging of the airports had been instead given the mission of working with the NGOs? The forces chosen, to include their specialties and their individual personalities, are absolutely critical to the success of a mission.

Q. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

There are two noteworthy tactical implications. First, in this case, collocation worked. Importantly, it worked because the OSOCC was recognized by the U.S. military and the NGOs as the center of the entire effort. Once collocated, the CMOC came to be truly viewed as the support mechanism that it was. This perception was largely due to an energetic and aggressive CMOC staff that not only clearly defined its mandate, but pursued it with the same vigor.

It was also due to the unifying lesson of all the case-studies: the principle of altruistic self-interest. On the military's side, it recognized that it had to "court" and provide the "hook" to engender NGO participation and the exchange of information. The exchange of services was again mutually beneficial.

R. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES

This chapter concludes with some basic principles of NGO/military coordination from this particular study.

1. For the best type of cohesion to develop among the response participants, there must be an intermingling between military and humanitarians, and between the entire international response and those being helped. This cohesion, rightly or wrongly, did not develop in Rwanda due to the enclaved deployment of American forces.

2. Once isolated from the political dimension of the emergency, both the military and the NGO perform admirably according to their traditional mandates and comparative advantages.
3. Once the U.N. is isolated from the complex political issues of an emergency, it works relatively well. If isolated -- kept to traditional refugee or Chapter Six scenarios -- the U.N. can prioritize needs and effectively employ the comparative advantages of the military and the NGOs.
4. It is OK for the military not to be in charge.
5. A broad humanitarian mandate allows for the military to stick to its comparative advantage in support of the humanitarian goal. Once defined, other components, particularly the NGOs, can define their own effort and not seek out the military as the path of least resistance to solve problems outside of the military's mandate.
6. The CMOC must be the focus of effort in a humanitarian intervention. Any other military focus runs the risk of the military means becoming confused with the humanitarian end.
7. The CMOC Director must have direct and unlimited access to the JTF commander.
8. A predetermined joint assessment/transition team whose sole job is to relate the immediate situation to the mandate while working in conjunction with the humanitarians, would do much to smooth the eventual military withdrawal.
9. Collocation works when there is a recognized center of effort.
10. The principle of altruistic self-interest remains self-evident.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Locusts have no king, yet they advance together in ranks . . .

Proverbs 30:27

A. INTRODUCTION

As we have seen, there are many dimensions to the relationship between the NGO community and the American military during times of humanitarian intervention. Given the unfolding nature of this relationship, tidy conclusions are out of the question. If there was to be one lesson from these experiences, however, it would be that there are no comprehensive models. None of these cases will ever be repeated; none should be cast in bronze nor held up as holy writ. There remains, however, some conceptual linkages among these studies, as well as some known facts and indicators, that can be drawn out. Similar to the chapter conclusions, the conclusion examines the NGO/military relationship and the effectiveness of the CMOC from the strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives. Moreover, it presents other conceptual lessons learned about the relationship at each respective level.

B. STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS

The most important implication of this study is the importance of recognizing that humanitarian operations are implicitly political.

Specifically, it is the handling of the political dimension by the highest levels, to include the President, that determines the NGO/military relationship. Other strategic lessons involve the national security implications for a successful NGO/military relationship; the role of the U.N.; and the importance of initiating the NGO/military relationship as soon as possible.

1. The Political

The effectiveness of the CMOC and its incumbent NGO/military relationship was determined by how the political dimension of the intervention was handled. In northern Iraq, the political problem of 400,000 refugees from an ethnic group without a state was addressed as an extension of the Gulf War. There was a residual responsibility and resolve to see the matter through. There were also in-theater forces with which to do it. Although articulated as "purely humanitarian," the United Nations turned the traditional notion of sovereignty on its head as it eventually occupied the northern section of Iraq. Without Resolution 688 of the Security Council, the situation could not have been addressed.

Moreover, a rapidly unfolding situation in the field prevented higher echelons of government from getting involved, let alone identifying a policy. As Major General James Jones notes, the only reason *Operation Provide Comfort* worked so well was because it was "all done without a piece of paper being signed; the situation grew up so quickly that it

outstripped the governments' ability to be bureaucratic."³⁷⁸ Consequently, the policy-makers had to rely on those in the field. Fortunately, the political situation, as a means of enabling the humanitarian intent, was consistently and correctly assessed by Fred Cuny and OFDA (among others). From convincing the Kurds to come out of the mountains, to the camp site selection, to the identification of the Iraqi police in Zakho, to the inclusion of Dohuk, the political dimension could not be ignored. Once committed, Washington eventually served the purpose of rubber-stamping the necessary and correct political decisions -- based on a humanitarian intent -- of the operators in the field. As a result, however, the right course of action was pursued and supported by Washington.

With a primary humanitarian intent that provided de facto political guidance for higher echelons trying to keep up with the situation, and a secure zone in which to operate, the NGO/military relationship was truly isolated to just traditional humanitarian concerns. Because the military understood the overall humanitarian intent, it consciously worked to support and enable the NGOs. Indeed, because the military was there first, with no prior NGO presence, it was very clear that the NGOs and the U.N. had to take over the effort. In this sense, the Zakho CMOC's one mission was to support and facilitate that transition (something

³⁷⁸ Jones, 2 August 1995.

accomplished in the form of Michael Hess, who took the CMOC to the NGOs).

In Bangladesh, a more traditional humanitarian intervention took place whereby one state aided another. Yet there were political complexities to this situation as well. There was a thirty-nine day old democracy still trying to figure out how its institutions related to one another. There were tensions between the Bangladeshi government and its army. There were tensions between the government and the NGOs. There were the claims of the Bangladeshi political left that the Americans were there to establish a permanent base. Not acknowledged by Washington, these political realities were addressed at the operational level by the JTF commander.

With the creation of a split command, the Dhaka command element worked directly with the government about all issues related to the relief effort. Additionally, the strong but subordinate role played by the JTF commander in relation to his Ambassador and the Prime Minister had an undeniable calming effect on the underlying tensions. These two factors kept the politics in the capital.

Because of these factors, the JTF forward command element in Chittagong, the center of the disaster area, was allowed to focus on the coordination and implementation of the relief effort. Although not called a CMOC, the NGO coordination function performed by the Military

Coordination Center at Chittagong airport -- where NGOs worked hand-in-hand with the military -- was essentially the same as in northern Iraq.

In Somalia, the political dimension was never acknowledged by Washington D.C. (In fact, it was only the recommendation of General Powell that allowed for there to be a political overseer at the operational level). Consequently, the military's mission, although seemingly clear and limited, became confused. Without addressing the multiple and overlapping problems that were present in Somalia, such as disarmament, the military stood no chance of creating a secure zone. Yes, the food got through and the immediate starvation was averted; but what next? Stabilization meant political expectations among the humanitarian community and the afflicted population -- and those expectations could not be met by the local force without a higher political resolve. There was none.

As a result, the CMOC became many things to many people, resulting in problems of separation and communication (among other reasons, these problems resulted from the CMOC operating as a liaison, instead of an operations, center). And there were problems within the military as to exactly what their mission was in relation to the NGOs. In the end, the CMOC was not only attempting coordination in a very confused environment, it was also addressing policy concerns such as disarmament and weapons retrieval. Comparatively, the strategic ignorance of the political dimension had the biggest impact on the

Mogadishu CMOC, as it ultimately had to address both relief and specific political problems.

In Rwanda, we see the return of a "traditional" solution, like a long-lost friend, because the political dimension is ignored at every level. This traditional solution focused on the unprecedented humanitarian scope of the refugee crisis, while ignoring the genocide that preceded it. Thus, despite an official American policy of human rights and the unquestioned veracity of the genocide reports at the time, the United States and the world did nothing. For the American government in particular, which only saw a repetition of Somalia, there was no desire to think about the political complexities of a central African country with no strategic value.

The ignoring of the genocide allowed the humanitarian dimension to be isolated. Consequently, the relief effort worked quite well. The CMOCs established in Entebbe, Goma, and Kigali were able to liaison directly with the U.N. agency responsible for overall coordination (the liaison did not officially take place with the NGOs). With a clear mandate and another agency in charge, the military's relationship to the humanitarian effort, to include the transition, went relatively smoothly.

What are the lessons? "Anybody who tells you that politics has nothing to do with humanitarian aid is way off the wall."³⁷⁹ Humanitarian intervention is a political process. Even if the political dimension is

³⁷⁹ A "senior Western relief official," in *Newsweek*, "Diaster Fatigue," p. 38, 13 May 1991.

addressed at the highest levels, the actual relief effort must still be aware of the local political impact of its decisions and the strategic accumulation of its actions. If these impacts are not consciously addressed, then those actions will contribute, perhaps inadvertently, to the formation of a *de facto* policy. Moreover, it would seem that even with an awareness of the political impact of their decisions and actions, the attempt must be made to operationally isolate those involved in coordinating the NGO/military relationship from the specific political issues of the moment. This was in fact the case in Bangladesh and northern Iraq, benignly, and in Rwanda, malignantly. If the NGO/military relationship is not isolated from specific political issues -- like the disarmament policy in Somalia -- then the chance for confusion is markedly greater.

2. Presidential Leadership

Ultimately, the political discussion points to the need for Presidential leadership. Congressman McHugh's words after his return from the Kurd refugee camps ring loud: "We think this requires strong political leadership . . . the President should consider the possibility of appointing a high level official within his administration to facilitate the movement of these requests and help the interagency processes move rapidly." By law, this person exists: he or she is the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. Irrespective of legal

appointments, however, it is only a sustained presidential gaze that will provide political resolve, dissipating interagency differences.

Moreover, it is only the President that can *continually* articulate the link between the humanitarian need and the deployment of military forces. Only he can explain what political purpose the military forces serve. Only he can tell the American public that the humanitarian goal is in the national interest and that casualties may result. If he does not, then military means and humanitarian ends stand a much greater chance for being confused as the possibility of failure increases exponentially.

Obviously, given the other domestic and international issues of the day, the President cannot always focus on a particular humanitarian intervention. He needs a ready pool of advisors who understand the multifarious dimensions of humanitarian intervention. In short, the long-standing call of Andrew Natsios for a permanent humanitarian emergency sub-committee to the National Security Council should be implemented. Such a committee would be solely responsible for tracking these events and planning contingencies. Importantly, it would ensure that the humanitarian intent was kept primary at the highest level. The head of this sub-committee, during times of crisis, would have direct access to the President.

3. The National Interest and Happenstance

A third strategic observation is that from realpolitik to diplomatic windows of opportunity to goodwill, the consequences of successful humanitarian intervention make a considerable and compelling case for the national interest. But, one has to ask, would the two most successful interventions have taken place if the American forces had not already been in the area? If the "Proven Force" infrastructure had not already been in Turkey and the Civil Affairs personnel had not been in theater; or, if the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade had not been already en route returning from the Persian Gulf, would the interventions have taken place? That the results of these two successful interventions are in the interest of the nation is beyond doubt. (Whether they would have happened if there had not been a war is an important question).

For example, in northern Iraq, a potentially explosive regional issue that has been a matter of great significance to Turkey, our NATO ally, was settled within a matter of months. In Bangladesh, a country which provided troops to Desert Storm, the U.S. proved itself a reliable ally while simultaneously setting an example of democracy during the implementation process.

Moreover, humanitarian interventions provide the opportunity to interact with other nations in a unique way that would not otherwise take place. In northern Iraq, French NGOs and the French military worked hand-in-hand with their U.S. counterparts. In Bangladesh, there were

Japanese, Pakistani, and Chinese helicopter contingents. All of these interactions, no matter how small, are conducive to building good relations with other states. All represent social/economic/diplomatic windows of opportunity.

Finally, these endeavors, because of their purpose, created tremendous goodwill. The area around Zakho is still remembered as "happy valley." The Kurdish deaf sign for President George Bush is the cross. In Bangladesh, people still speak highly of the American military and the manner in which it handled itself. This kind of goodwill is the kind that endures.

It should further be noted that this goodwill is not the monopoly of those helped. Time and again, the press reports on these interventions reflect American servicemen and women truly thankful for the opportunity to help and to give. Given their primary mission -- to be prepared to kill and die for the national interest -- these experiences unmistakably remind them of the values they joined to defend.

4. The Role of the United Nations

The U.N. is capable of handling the role of helping refugees or classic peacekeeping. Although late in northern Iraq, the U.N. eventually took over the effort and still runs it today. In Rwanda, the U.N. did a very good job in coordinating the various "subordinate" agencies, to include NGOs and the American military. Once it is involved in

military/political affairs that entail a significant security threat (*i.e.*, a Chapter Seven case), however, the U.N. structure simply does not work, significantly affecting all of the relationships under its mandate. In the most ambiguous of humanitarian interventions, a secure environment must be created by a great-power lead coalition under the general aegis of the U.N. Only after real stability has been achieved should the U.N. take over.

5. Stateside NGO/Military Coordination

This coordination, or at least collaboration, should take place prior to the intervention. If not, it should take place during the intervention. The NGOs need to develop a stateside mechanism through which they "plug into" the interagency planning process. Against their nature, this change must be endured in the name of a comprehensive response. Such a process allows for a continuing dialogue. The existence of the dialogue is ultimately more important than what is actually said. While true coordination of effort cannot always be the expected result, the expression of how each community understands the others expectations and needs is imperative. Also, how each community interprets the term "security" is of paramount importance. An agreed on dialogue -- perhaps sponsored by a humanitarian sub-committee of the NSC -- would significantly reduce misunderstanding and duplication of effort.

C. OPERATIONAL OBSERVATIONS

The operational observations are, perhaps, the most important. Given the general lack of political resolve, those at the operator level must be aware of what their aggregate actions encompass and determine. More often than not, the actions of the operators create or significantly influence a policy. As one senior military official said "those guys were creating policy down there." (The official then retracted that statement and said that "they were creating the relationship to achieve broader policy goals.")³⁸⁰

Moreover, it is in the best interest of the operators -- the military because it seeks a quick exit, and the NGOs because they seek the primacy of the humanitarian need -- to work together against a common enemy: a potentially inattentive stateside political apparatus. Pursuant to this common need is to correctly understand that there is a continuum of effort in which all parties have a proper role to play.

1. The Continuum

As Colonel Gary Anderson noted about the NGO/military relationship in Bangladesh, there must be a "synergistic relationship." The essence of realizing this synergy is the strategic acknowledgment that the humanitarian intent is primary. Once recognized, the NGO and

³⁸⁰ This official preferred non-attribution.

the military work, according to their comparative advantage, to support the intent as they complement the other. Importantly, how "success" is defined must always reside with the NGO, and other humanitarian and indigenous authorities, who are there for the long haul. The military must recognize that its success results from placing itself properly within the overall continuum of effort. Its end-state is an artificial one whose sole purpose must be to effectively transition the overall effort to the next phase of recovery. The military's mission is to enable marginal self-sufficiency.

Three basic precepts follow. First, the military cannot be in charge. If it is in charge, there is the strong potential for it to provide its own solutions with its own means. Colonel Steve Riley's admonition must be the basic question of every military activity: "who are you there to support, yourself or the humanitarian effort?"

If the answer is yourself, two problems result. First, the "structure to support the structure" becomes more important.³⁸¹ How much to how many for how long will dominate the discussion as the military worries more about proving mission accomplishment -- via briefing exercises to senior Pentagon officials -- rather than considering the affect of its efforts according to the original humanitarian intent. The second consequence is the implicit encouragement of mission creep. Cultural and

³⁸¹ Hess, 5 June 1995.

technological concerns aside, the provision of military solutions inevitably creates a dependency upon the military infrastructure. If that particular stage of the effort is dependent upon the military, no matter the political pressure to withdraw, the political fallout from leaving the situation will be much worse. At all costs, the military must not provide solutions that inherently rely on military hardware and infrastructure.

The second precept is to help the helper, specifically the NGOs. They are usually culturally aware and sensitive to the situational needs of that particular emergency. This awareness generally provides the right information to the military and prevents military infrastructure-based solutions. In the end, it is their war to win or lose. The military can only help with one of the more severe battles of the humanitarian continuum.³⁸²

The third precept is that the CMOC must be the military's operational focus of effort within a humanitarian intervention. It must maintain its title as an operations center. Humanitarian intervention is about joint civil-military efforts. If it becomes a liaison center, then it becomes divorced from reality. Military operators must be empowered to solve coordination problems at the same table, person to person, with

³⁸² This discussion is not inconsistent with the imperative of cohesion between military and humanitarian and helper and helped. There will be times, particularly during implementation, that the military will be involved directly with the afflicted population. There will also be times when, according to tactical (security) necessity, the military will engage directly in humanitarian efforts (i.e., doing something humanitarian to show the various belligerents the purpose for which they are there). The general point being, however, that the military's role will usually be to support the humanitarians.

the NGOs and other humanitarian personnel. It is absolutely critical that this process take place. If it does not, then different solutions and plans will arise from the inevitably competing centers of operations to whom the liaisons report.

The military's Tactical/Combat Operations Center should work in support of the CMOC. (The TOC/COC would be concerned only with coordination internal to the military). This proposed relationship further implies that the military headquarters be co-accessible to the center of the humanitarian effort. The overwhelming and compelling need for them to be thinking alike demands that they be mutually accessible (defined as within secure walking distance of the other).

Finally, the CMOC must be elevated within the military culture. Once recognized as the operational center of effort, the military should work to support it just as they would support the operations center of any regular military operation. Moreover, it should be duly established that service in a CMOC during a humanitarian intervention is noteworthy.³⁸³ By virtue of its humanitarian feedback function, the CMOC is the first indicator of changing phases within the continuum of effort. Working hand-in-hand with the NGOs and the other humanitarian professionals, CMOC personnel must trace and plan the transition process to complete military withdrawal. The transition process should be planned for from

³⁸³ Additionally, the military as an institution must incorporate and encourage such specialties as those involved in a humanitarian intervention/peacekeeping/nation-assistance scenario.

the day the CMOC is established. As Colonel Paul Monacelli states about the Rwandan effort, "whenever we set up something, we knew when it was coming down."³⁸⁴ It is with this prudent mindset that the humanitarian intent must be pursued.

2. Continuum Roles

Within the military, the role of the Civil Affairs community takes on an increased importance. The Civil Affairs contingent has two tracks to pursue in support of the JTF commander. The first track is the traditional function of liaison with established authorities within the host nation/region, if there are any. The second, non-traditional, track is to coordinate with all international organizations and, particularly, with non-governmental organizations. These tracks are their institutional responsibility. In an age where humanitarian/peacekeeping type operations are rising in importance, everyone seems to be redefining themselves according to these two buzz words. The Civil Affairs community, to include the Marine Corps', needs to claim its institutional mantle better. If it does not, it may find itself unneeded.

The role of the NGO community is of paramount importance. They must participate, they must advise, and they must do it in a manner conducive to a comprehensive effort. The best NGO example of collective connectivity remains the NGO Coordination Committee of

³⁸⁴ Monacelli, 1 September 1995.

Northern Iraq whereby the NGOs had a coordinated voice (which also, incidentally, was listened to by the military). Unfortunately, given the independent nature of NGOs, this role has been hard to codify. Against their most cherished and liberating traditions, the NGO community must find a way to endure and succeed in the coordination of their advice and efforts in complex humanitarian emergencies.

On September 17-18, 1995, Interaction sponsored a "in-house" discussion for American NGOs to begin addressing this need for common mechanisms within the community to properly "plug into" the overall humanitarian response. While the jury is still out on just how receptive the various NGOs were to such possibilities, the new era's verdict is in: coordinate or be left behind. In an age of declining foreign aid and increasing complex humanitarian emergencies, those NGOs that can coordinate appropriately with the U.S. government will not only receive the most money, they will also receive the logistical support so critical to rapid response and credibility. The NGOs must reconcile their traditional identity with these incorrigible facts of a new era. It has been a slow process.

The other important role to be played out within the continuum is that of OFDA. Far and away the consistent shining star of these emergencies, it has been their responsibility to be the floating glue of these ad hoc responses. They have performed admirably. The most conversant in the various organizational cultures present during a

humanitarian intervention, OFDA personnel are essential to ensuring smooth coordination. They must continue to be institutionally supported in their "glue" role. No matter the official mission of OFDA, all parties will look to them for leadership and liaison; particularly in a transitory age whereby most parties are still unfamiliar with the other actors. OFDA must exert its leadership, not just in the specifics of humanitarian response, but also in the political leadership of the operation itself. Despite fiscal constraints, OFDA has sought to develop this very role. Beginning with assigning Tom Frye to General Schroeder in Rwanda and continuing with the current assignment of Tom Dolan to the J-3 at Pacific Command in Hawaii, OFDA remains the most visionary of the parties discussed. They must be encouraged and supported in these endeavors.

The last operational point returns to the obvious: institutions do not play roles, people do. We can promulgate all the information and education in the world, but the face-to-face coordination of two to eighty people is irreducible. This NGO/military relationship is about people. The ones controlling the operation in theater are the most important linchpins in the entire endeavor. Good people matter -- they must be selected carefully.

D. TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS

These observations, meant for those at the proverbial table itself, derive directly from operational or strategic points. A common enemy

exists for both the military and the NGOs: the humanitarian task at hand. One needs the other to accomplish that endeavor. Nevertheless, just because both are there in the name of humanitarianism does not mean that they will see eye-to-eye. The principle of altruistic self-interest governs the relationship. In short, there must be a mutually beneficial exchange of goods for the relationship to succeed.

The relationship is also about personalities that are not necessarily concerned about ego or credit. They must be willing to accept the invisible nature of their contributions. They must additionally recognize the need for transparency. Only with an integrity based on no secrets can the trust and cohesion grow that is fundamental to a successful effort.

Finally, two military points. The CMOC Director must have unlimited access to the JTF commander. Second, there will be times when the military has to demonstrate a humanitarian intent: not for humanitarianism's sake, but out of tactical necessity. In northern Iraq, the Marines immediately began to build a camp to demonstrate to the Iraqis in the surrounding hills that their intent was peaceful. In Bangladesh, the Marines did not carry weapons. In Somalia, the Marines were involved in food distribution. Although generally not a good idea for the military to be involved in the specific humanitarian tasks of the mission, sometimes it will be necessary. The NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community must understand this necessity.

E. MAKING IT BETTER

What, in brief, should be done to make the NGO/military relationship better? The first step is to assume a worst-case scenario, such as Somalia. The problem in Somalia was that the humanitarian intent became separated from the military means. In order to prevent such an event while effectively addressing the inevitable complex political issues, a civil-military network must be established.³⁸⁵

A network, by definition, exists at several levels. While there is one point responsible for the entire net, that same point is not responsible for every single piece of coordination and implementation. This burden is shared by the entire network. At the top of the civil-military network is the Executive Steering Group (ESG). The ESG is the senior policy group within the intervention. Sitting on it, at the least, are the Presidential envoy/political overseer (if there is one), the JTF commander, an OFDA representative, and the NGO selected representative. Such a Group keeps the political, military, and humanitarian facets of the intervention strategy integrated.

This Group's existence does not suggest that it becomes the primary organ of the response or that it supersedes a U.N. HOC/OSOCC. It simply indicates that the Americans realize the need to speak with one

³⁸⁵ This discussion based on the I MEF example. Telephone interview with Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC, 5 October 1995.

voice. The ESG would complement any existing infrastructure. Of even greater importance, however, the ESG would keep the politics isolated from the CMOC. Hopefully backed by a strategic political resolve, the ESG would center policy questions on itself as the CMOC was left to worry about humanitarian coordination and implementation.

The CMOC, in conjunction with a HOC/OSOCC if there is one, would be responsible for the entire relief effort. The CMOC would be supported by regional Civil-Military Operations Teams (CMOTS). The CMOTs, assigned to area/sector commanders would be responsible for running the local CMOC, if necessary, while advising the military commander. With an ESG, CMOC, and various CMOTs, a civil-military network would be established to address the complicated issues of a complex humanitarian emergency.³⁸⁶ Such a network would thus spread the weight of the operation and allow for unity of effort.

F. WHERE TO?

The U.S. military/NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of our present and the era into which we are entering. Its proclamation is twofold: 1) interagency/multinational coordination will only increase; and 2) the role of civilians in military operations, no matter how pure the "battlefield," will also only increase. These traits are not just about

³⁸⁶ The role played by SF, CA, and OFDA in Operation Provide Comfort remain the best working example of such a network.

humanitarian intervention. Witness Haiti continuing and Bosnia looming. Whether it is humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, or nation-assistance, the NGO and the military will interact. It is our -- both communities -- responsibility to understand this relationship prior to its implementation in the field. Like the locusts without a king, we must advance together, or not at all.

LIST OF REFERENCES

BOOKS

Abed, F. H., Dodge, Cole P., and Hossain, Hameeda, editors, *From Crisis To Development: Coping With Disasters in Bangladesh*, Dhaka, University Press Limited, 1992.

Damrosch, Lori Fisler, ed., *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

Hirsch, John L, and Oakley, Robert B., *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, Washington D.C., U.S. Institute for Peace.

Johnson, Philip, *Somalia Diary*, Atlanta, Longstreet Press, 1994.

Medicins Sans Frontieres, Francois Jean, ed., *Life, Death and Aid*, London, Routledge, 1993.

Medicins Sans Frontieres, Francois Jean, ed., *Populations in Danger: 1995*, London, La Decouverte, 1995.

ARTICLES AND REPORTS

Abizaid, John P., "Lessons for Peacekeepers," *Military Review*, March 1993.

Anderson, Gary, "Operation Sea Angel: A Retrospective on the 1991 Humanitarian Relief Operation in Bangladesh," Strategy and Campaign Department Report 1-92, Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 15 January 1992, Unpublished.

Anderson, Mary, "International Assistance and Conflict: An Explanation of Negative Impacts," Unpublished paper.

Bartholet, Jeffrey; Moreau, Ron; Post, Tom, and Whitmore, Hame, "Disaster Fatigue," *Newsweek*, 13 May 1991, p. 38.

Beamish, Rita, "White House Says Northern Iraq is Safe Haven for Kurds," *Associated Press*, AM Cycle, 11 April 1991.

Binder, David, "First U.S. Troops Arrive in Bangladesh to Begin Large-Scale Relief Effort," *The New York Times*, 13 May 1991, p. 3.

Bolger, Daniel P., "The Ghosts of Omdurman," *Parameters*, Vol. xxi, no. 3, Autumn 1991.

Bonner, Raymond, The New York Times News Service, "30 Trampled to Death as More Rwandans Flee Rebel Advance; Zaire Border Town Swamped," *The Dallas Morning News*, 18 July 1994, p. 1A.

Brown, Ronald J., and Smith, Richard, "Angels From the Sea: The Humanitarian Relief Effort in Bangladesh, 1991," The United States Marine Corps Historical Center, DRAFT.

Brown, Ronald J., "The 5th MEB During Operation Sea Angel: An Occasional Paper," Unpublished.

Brown, Ronald J., "With Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: U.S. Marine Security and Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991," Unpublished.

Burkle, Frederick M., "Liaison in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," Unpublished paper, November 1993.

Campbell, Kurt M. and Weiss, Thomas G., "Military Humanitarianism," *Survival*, Vol. xxxiii, no. 5, September/October 1991.

Caplan, Tony, "U.S. Presses U.N. Condemnation, Urges Relief," *United Press International*, BC Cycle, International Section, 4 April 1991.

CARE, "Anatomy of CARE's Response to the Iraq/Turkey 1991 Emergency," Prepared by Murray Hysen, Inc., October 1991, Unpublished.

CARE-International, "Emergency Commodity Management Project, Northern Iraq: Final Report," July 30, 1991, Unpublished.

CARE-International, "North Iraq Food Management Operation, Strategy Paper," June 1, 1991, Unpublished.

CARE-Turkey, "CARE's Response to the Kurdish Refugee Situation in Turkey: Final Report," June 17, 1991, Unpublished.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter No. 92-6, "Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian Assistance," CALL, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, December 1992.

Chase, Eric L., and Stackpole, Henry C. III, "Humanitarian Intervention and Disaster Relief: Projecting Military Strength Abroad to Save Lives," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1993.

Christopher, Warren, "The United States and Africa: A New Relationship," *Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 21.

432nd Civil Affairs Company, "CJTF Provide Comfort After Action Report," Green Bay, 7 June 1991.

Clarke, Jeffrey, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," In *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort Brief, prepared for General Colin L. Powell, 30 May 1991, Incirlik AFB, Turkey.

Crossette, Barbara, "Relief Officials Say Bad Planning Proves Calamitous in Bangladesh," *The New York Times*, 5 May 1991, p. 1.

Dallaire, R.A., and Poulin, B., "UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1995.

Destexhe, Alain, Letter to the Editor, *The Economist*, July 23rd-29th 1994, p. 8.

Drumtra, Jeff, "Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi: October 20 to November 17, 1994," Washington D.C., U.S. Committee for Refugees.

Dworken, Jonathan T., "Improving Marine Coordination with Relief Organizations in Humanitarian Operations," Alexandria, Center for Naval Analyses, Interim Report, April 1995.

Dworken, Jonathan T., "Military Relations With Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope," Alexandria, Center for Naval Analyses, October 1993.

Dworken, Jonathan T., "Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1995.

Dworken, Jonathan T., "What's So Special About Humanitarian Operations?" *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 13.

Elmo, David S., "Food Distribution for Operation Provide Comfort," *Military Review*, September 1993.

Facts on File, "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up as Refugee Crisis Escalates; U.S., Allies to Build Camps in Iraqi Territory; Conditions Worsen in Makeshift Camps," International Affairs Section, 18 April 1991, p. 269, A1.

Haberman, Clyde, "U.S. Presses Military Relief Effort; Hungary Kurds Await Rescue From Mud and Cold," Special to *The New York Times*, 14 April 1991, p. A10.

Harden, Blaine, "Turkey to Move Iraqi Refugees; Effort Would Ease Harsh Living Conditions," *The Washington Post*, 16 April 1991, p. A1.

Harden, Blaine, "U.S. Troops Order Iraqi Police Away; Marines Step Up Work on Tent Camps; Kurds Remain Wary," *The Washington Post*, 23 April 1991, p. A1.

Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 23 April 1991, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service.

Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Situation in Somalia, 17 December 1992, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service.

"Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies," London, African Rights, November 1994.

Brigadier General Ibrahim, and Colonel Moazzem, "Disaster Preparedness in Bangladesh and the Role of Bangladesh Army in Disaster Management," Paper presented at USCINCPAC Conference, 16-19 September 1991, Unpublished.

Jones, James L., "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: Humanitarian and Security Assistance in Northern Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1991.

Keller, Bill, "Blind Eye; Africa Allows Its Tragedies to Take Their Own Course," *The New York Times*, 7 August 1994, p. 1.

Kennedy, Kevin, "The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore Hope," Unpublished paper, April 1995.

Klubes, David R., "Bangladesh Relief Effort," *Navy Medicine*, July-August 1991.

Lewis, Kathy, "U.S. to Increase Relief to Refugees; President Orders Round-The-Clock Airlift Operation," *The Dallas Morning News*, 23 July 94, p. 1A.

Lorenz, F.M., "Weapons Confiscation Policy During Operation Restore Hope," Unpublished paper.

Lyons, Terrence, and Menkhaus, Ken, "What Are the Lessons To Be Learned From Somalia?" *CSIS Africa Notes*, Number 144, January 1993.

Malone, John D., Sharp, Trueman W., and Yip, Ray, "US Military Forces and Emergency International Humanitarian Assistance," *JAMA*, Vol. 272, No. 5, August 3, 1994.

McCarthy, Paul A., "Operation Sea Angel: A Case Study," RAND/Arroyo Center, MR-374-A, 1994.

McGrady, Katherine A.W., and Zvijac, David J., "Operation Restore Hope: Summary Report," Alexandria, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1994.

McHugh, Lois, "International Disaster Assistance: Cost to the United States of Six Recent Crises," Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, July 1995.

Menkhaus, Ken, "The Reconciliation Process in Somalia: A Requiem," Preliminary Draft, Unpublished paper, April 1995.

Metz, Steven, "Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda," U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, September 9, 1994.

Miller, Carol A., "Recent Military Operations Other Than War: Army Civil Affairs Contributions," U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Project, May 1995, Unpublished.

Minear, Larry, "New and Old Humanitarians," *The Providence Journal*, 26 June 1995, p. B4.

Muir, Jim, "Kurds Assess Why Revolt Against Saddam Failed," Special to *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 May 1991, p. 1.

Natsios, Andrew S., "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and US Policy," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter 1994.

Natsios, Andrew S., "Humanitarian Relief Interventions in Somalia: the Economics of Chaos," Unpublished paper, April 1995.

Natsios, Andrew S., "The International Humanitarian Response System," *Parameters*, vol. XXV, no. I, Spring 1995.

Nickerson, Colin, "Aid Slow to Reach Cyclone Victims; Red Tape, Chaos in Bangladesh," *The Boston Globe*, 8 May 1991, p. 1.

Nickerson, Colin, "Misery Outstrips Relief in Bangladesh," *The Boston Globe*, 6 May 1991, p. 1.

NIGHTLINE, "Nightline in Somalia, Day Two," American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 8 December 1992.

NBC's Meet The Press, The Reuters Transcript Report, December 6, 1992, BC Cycle.

Oakley, Robert B., "A Slow Response on Rwanda," *The Washington Post*, 27 July 1994, p. A27.

Petrie, Charles, "The Price of Failure," Unpublished paper, April 1995.

Press, Robert M., "Surviving Tutsis Tell the Story of Massacres by Hutu Militias," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 1994, p. 9.

Refugee Policy Group, "Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 1990-1994," Washington D.C., November 1994.

Refugee Policy Group, "Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency," Washington D.C., November 1994.

Refugee Policy Group, "The Somalia Saga: A Personal Account 1990-1993," Washington D.C., November 1994.

The Reuters Transcript Report, "President Bush Address To Troops at the Airport in Baidoa, Somalia," 1 January 1993, BC Cycle.

Richburg, Keith B., "Relations With the Warlords and Disarmament," Unpublished paper, April 1995.

Richburg, Keith B., "Somali Memory Lingers as GIs Head for Rwanda," *The Washington Post*, 31 July 1994, p. 1A.

Richburg, Keith B., "U.S. Begins Airlift For Starving Somalis; Negotiations With Kenya Clear Way for Aid," *The Washington Post*, 22 August 1992, p. A18.

Ross, Robin, "Some Early Lessons from Operation Haven," *RUSI Journal*, Winter 1991.

"Rwanda: Who is Killing; Who is Dying; What is to be Done," London: African Rights, May 1994.

Rudd, Gordon W., "Operation Provide Comfort," PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1994.

Rudd, Gordon W., "Operation Provide Comfort: One More Tile on the Mosaic," For The U.S. Army Center of Military History, unpublished.

Schroeder, Daniel, "Lessons of Rwanda," *Armed Forces Journal*, International, December 1994.

Selvage, Ronald R., "Operation Sea Angel: Bangladesh Disaster Relief," *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1991.

Captain Shafiq-ur-Rahman, "Disaster in Bangladesh: A Multinational Relief Effort," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1993.

Shalikashvili, John M., "Opening Statement before The Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee," U.S. House of Representatives, 31 March 1992.

Siegal, Adam B., "A Chronology of U.S. Marine Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations," Alexandria, Center for Naval Analyses, September 1994.

Siegal, Adam B., "Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights From Seven Case Studies," Alexandria, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1995.

Slim, Hugo, "The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Practitioner: Some New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon," *Disasters*, Volume 19, Number 2, June 1995.

Spiro, Peter J., "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decisionmaking Institutions," *Parameters*, vol. XXV, no. I, Spring 1995.

"Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment," London, African Rights, May 1993.

Stackpole, Henry C. III, "Angels From the Sea," *USNI Proceedings*, May 1992.

State Department Briefing, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, 18 August 1992.

St. Louis Dispatch, "Relief For Bangladesh Hampered; Lack of Coordination, Disease are Concerns," 5 May 1991, p. 1A.

St. Louis Dispatch, "U.S. Speeds Relief to Bangladesh; Supplies Finally Reaching Remote Areas; Some Efforts Draw Criticism," 19 May 1991, p. 6A.

St. Petersburg Times, "In Iran, Politics Thwarts Efforts to Help Refugees," 9 May 1991, p. 3A.

Taylor, John M., "Somalia: More Than Meets the Eye," *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1993.

United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office, "Operational Coordination of Humanitarian Relief," Unpublished, pages unnumbered.

U.S. Agency for International Development/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, "Kurdish Relief and Repatriation: DOD-AID/OFDA Partnership," Washington D.C., December 1991.

USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, "Chronology of U.S. Government Assistance to Rwanda (since April 6, 1994)," DRAFT.

USAID/BHR/OFDA, "Situation Report No. 25 (Final)," Northern Iraq, July 17, 1991.

USAID/BHR/OFDA, "Situation Report # 5," Rwanda, August 18, 1994.

U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, "Support Hope After Action Review," October, 1994.

United States European Command, "After Action Review, Operation Support Hope, 1994."

Van Biema, David, "Exodus From Rwanda," *Time Magazine*, Transmitted to America OnLine Directory, 94-07-22 13:32:56 EDT.

The Washington Post, "So That the World Does Not Forget Rwanda," 24 April 1994, p. C7.

Weck, Jon, Personal notebook, pages unnumbered.

Whitaker, Raymond, "Disease Follows in Wake of Bangladesh Disaster," *The Independent*, 3 May 1991, p. 13.

Yang, John E., and Devroy, Anne, "U.S. Seeks to Protect Kurd Refugee Areas; Iraq Warned Against Air Operations in North," *The Washington Post*, 11 April 1991, p. A1.

INTERVIEWS (ALL DATES 1995)

Personal

Richard Vennigone, World Vision International. 28 October 1994, Los Angeles.

Lauren Landis-Guzman, Interaction. 13 January; 1 August.

Gene Dewey, Congressional Hunger Center. 13 January.

Andrew Natsios, World Vision Relief and Development. 16 January, Washington D.C.

Fiona Terry, Mediciens Sans Frontieres. 17 January, Washington D.C.

Colonel Dennis C. Barlow, USA, 18 January, The Pentagon.

James Q. Roberts, OSD SO/LIC. 18 January, The Pentagon.

Colonel J.S. Anderson, USMC, OSD SO/LIC. 18 January, The Pentagon.

David Mitchell, OSD SO/LIC. 18 January, The Pentagon.

Elizabeth Lukasavich, OFDA. 19 January; 1 August, Washington D.C.

Dr. Philip Johnson, CARE. 19 January, Washington D.C.

Ambassador William Ferrin, National Defense University. 19 January, Washington D.C.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University. 19 January; 20 January; 10 August, Washington D.C.

Lieutenant Colonel George A. Biszak, USMC. 15 March, Twentynine Palms, CA.

Ken Casey, World Vision, U.S. 16 March, Monrovia, CA.

Brian Sellers-Peterson, World Vision, U.S. 16 March, Monrovia, CA.

Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC. 14 April, Camp Pendleton, CA.

Colonel Joseph Stager, USAR. 27 April, Fort Bragg, NC.

Colonel Robert Schoenhaus, USAR. 27 April, Fort Bragg, NC.

Captain Askold Kobasa, USA. 31 May, Monterey, CA.

Colonel Jon Weck, USAR. 3 June, Mountain View, CA.

Colonel Roger Blythe, USAR. 4 June, Mountain View, CA.
 Fred Gregory, World Concern. 19 June, Seattle, WA.
 Kate Farnsworth, OFDA. 31 July, Washington D.C.
 Tom Dolan, OFDA. 31 July, Washington D.C.
 Greg Garbinski, OFDA. 31 July, Washington D.C.
 Julia Taft, Interaction. 31 July, Washington D.C.
 Dayton Maxwell, Department of State. 1 August, Washington D.C.
 Colonel Wallace Gregson, USMC. 2 August, The Pentagon.
 Major General James L. Jones, USMC. 2 August, The Pentagon.
 Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Folkerts, USAF, 2 August, The Pentagon.
 Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirtpatrick, USMC. 3 August, Quantico, VA.
 Major David Castellvi, USMC. 3 August, Quantico, VA.
 Major John Monihan, USMC. 3 August, Quantico, VA.
 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas O'Leary, USMC. 3 August, Quantico, VA.
 Colonel Karl Farris, USA. 4 August, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
 Dr. Steven Metz, U.S. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, PA.
 Rudy von Bernuth, Save the Children. 7 August, Westport, CN.
 Jim Kunder, Save the Children. 7 August, Westport, CN.
 Anita Menghetti, Department of Peace Keeping Operations, U.N. 7 August, New York.
 Lance Clark, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, U.N. 7 August, New York.
 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hess, USAR. 7 August, New York.
 Dr. Les Roberts, Center for Disease Control. 18 September, Honolulu.

Telephone

Colonel Steven Riley, USA. 23 February; 27 February; 5 September.
 Peter Smith, OFDA. 23 February.
 Regina Tuly, OFDA. 3 March.
 Josiah Rosenblatt, Department of State. 6 March.
 Michael Mahdesian, Department of State. 7 March.
 Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret), National Defense University. 13 March; 19 March.
 Kate Crawford, OFDA. 17 March.
 Gene Dewey, Congressional Hunger Center. 21 March.
 Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR. 4 April.
 Richard Smith, United States Marine Corps Historical Center. 4 April.
 Lieutenant Colonel James Powers, USA. 8 May.
 Joel Charney, Oxfam, US. 9 May.
 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hess, USAR. 9 May; 11 May ; 5 June.
 Roy Williams, International Relief Committee. 9 May.
 Mark Thompson, Oxfam, UK. 10 May.
 David Jones, International Alert, UK. 10 May.
 Captain Larry Naab, USAR. 12 May; 25 May.

Lieutenant Colonel John Petrella, USAR. 12 May.
 Major David Elmo, USAR. 14 May.
 Colonel Jon Weck, USAR. 15 May; 18 May.
 Colonel Roger Blythe, USAR. 16 May.
 Dr. Mary Kilgour, U.S. Agency for International Development. 16 May; 12 June.
 Major General Donald Campbell, USAR. 16 May.
 Mark Gorman, 9 May; 16 May.
 Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Murphy, USAR. 16 May.
 Kevin Henry, CARE. 17 May.
 Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC. 19 May.
 Ronald Libby, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. 19 May.
 Colonel Donald Gressley, USMC (ret). 23 May.
 General Robert Beahm, USAR. 24 May.
 Colonel John O. Easton, USMCR (ret). 25 May.
 Major General William N. Farmen, USA. 25 May.
 Dayton Maxwell, Department of State. 26 May.
 Lieutenant Colonel William Norton, USMC. 28 May; 12 June.
 Brigadier General Peter Rowe, USMC (ret). 29 May.
 William Garvelink, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. 30 May.
 Henryka Manes, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. 30 May; 2 June.
 Gerald Whitehouse, Adventists Development Relief Agency. 30 May.
 Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Moore, USA. 31 May.
 Colonel Jean Ronsick, USAF. 2 June.
 Lieutenant Colonel John Frasier, USMC (ret). 3 June.
 Rear Admiral Steven Clarey, USN (ret). 5 June.
 Bill Coops, Northwest Medical Teams. 5 June; 6 June.
 Shawn Messick, Armenian Relief Society. 6 June; 8 June; 21 August; 25 August.
 Dague Clark, Save the Children. 6 June.
 Ambassador William Milam, Department of State. 7 June.
 Kirk Deardon, Save the Children. 7 June.
 Major Steven Yoshimura, USA. 8 June.
 Robin Needham, CARE. 8 June.
 Colonel Stanley Florer, USA. 8 June; 9 June.
 Brigadier General Randi West, USMC. 9 June.
 Sandi Tully, CARE. 12 June.
 Joe Mengore, Northwest Medical Teams, 6 July.
 Cathy Ellis, Northwest Medical Teams, 6 July.
 Julia Taft, Interaction. 11 July.
 Captain Edward Anglim, USN. 13 July.
 Dr. Bradley Sack, Johns Hopkins Hygiene School. 13 July.
 Lieutenant General Jay Garner, USA. 19 July.
 Dr. Lisa Prusak. 25 July.

Andrew Natsios, World Vision Relief & Development. 25 July; 23 August.
Craig Anderson. 25 July.
William Berquist. 21 August.
Charles Petrie, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, UN. 21 August; 23 August.
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Biser, USMC (ret). 22 August.
Lieutenant Colonel Crary, USA. 22 August.
Lauren Landis-Guzman, Save the Children. 23 August.
Colonel Fred Jones, USAR. 23 August.
Carl Harris. 24 August; 31 August.
Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Davidson College. 24 August.
Lieutenant Colonel David Currid, USA. 25 August.
Lieutenant Colonel Quentin Schillare, USA. 29 August.
Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirtpatrick, USMC. 1 September.
Colonel Paul Monacelli, USAR. 1 September.
Joelle Tanguy, Medecins Sans Frontieres. 6 September.
Dr. Brent Burkeholder, Center for Disease Control. 6 September.
Colonel Robert MacPherson, USMC. 9 September.
Mark Walsh, U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute. 12 September.
Richard Vennigone, World Vision International. 12 September.
Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC. 5 October.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| 1. | Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John K. Kingman Road, Suite 6944
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218 | 2 |
| 2. | Library, Code 13
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002 | 2 |
| 3. | African Rights
11 Marshalsea Road
London, England
SE1 1EP | 1 |
| 4. | The Honorable Madeleine Albright
United States Ambassador to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017 | 1 |
| 5. | Mr. Paul T. Anthony
George Washington University
922 24th Street, NW #10
Washington D.C. 20037 | 1 |
| 6. | Mr. Dave Anderson
Northwest Medical Teams
P.O. Box 10
Portland, Oregon 97207 | 1 |
| 7. | Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC
Director, Experimental Unit
MCCDC, South Street
Quantico, Virginia 22134 | 1 |
| 8. | Colonel J.S. Anderson, USMC
Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Attn: Policy Planning
Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
Washington D.C. 20301-2500 | 1 |

9. Mr. Brian Atwood 1
Agency for International Development
Washington D.C. 20523
10. Mr. Salim Bana 1
Orange Plastics, Inc.
1860 Acacia Avenue
Compton, California 90220
11. Mr. Mark Biser 1
4610 Daniels Street
Vancouver, Washington 98663
12. Brigadier General Geol Blanchette 1
Commander, USACPOC
Building D-2507
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307
13. Dr. James Blandon 1
Code NS/BI
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
14. Frederick M. Burkle, M.D. 1
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance
MCPA-DM PACIFIC HSSA
1 Jarrett White Road
Tripler AMC, Hawaii 96859-5000
15. Dr. Claude Buss 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Bu
Monterey, California 93943
16. Dr. Paul Bell 1
U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID-San Jose
APO AA 34020
17. Major General Donald Campbell, USAR 1
Commander, USACPOC
Building D-2507
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 18. | Dr. Fred Casmir
Pepperdine University
Communications Division
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, California 90263 | 1 |
| 19. | Captain James Krajicek, USMC
3rd Civil Affairs Group
Marine Reserve Force, USMC
P.O. Box S55124
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5124 | 1 |
| 20. | Major James Jeffries, USMCR
4th Civil Affairs Group
Marine Reserve Force
Armed Forces Reserve Center, Bldg. 351 (STOP 21-D)
2701 South Capitol Street
Anacostia Naval Station
Washington, D.C. 20374-3511 | 1 |
| 21. | 351st Civil Affairs Command
ATTN: Colonels Roger Blythe and Jon Weck
1776 Old Middlefield Way
Mountain View, California 94043-1809 | 2 |
| 22. | Rear Admiral Stephen Clarey, USN (ret)
322 B Street
Coronado, California 92118 | 1 |
| 23. | Commander in Chief
US Special Operations Command
ATTN: Mr. Anthony Normand
MacDill AFB, Florida 33608 | 1 |
| 24. | Mr. Tom Constantine
Defense Intelligence Agency
Office of Trans-National Issues
PGT
Washington D.C. 20340 | 1 |
| 25. | LCDR Ernest G. Cunningham
1971 Detroit Avenue
Burlison, Tennessee 38015 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 26. | Department of Military Strategy
National War College (NWMS)
Fort Leslie J. McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319-6111 | 1 |
| 27. | Mr. George Devendorf
Interaction
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 801
Washington D.C. 20036 | 1 |
| 28. | Mr. Gene Dewey
Congressional Hunger Center
525 A Street, NE, Suite 308
Washington D.C. 20002 | 1 |
| 29. | Mr. Thomas Dolan
323G Kaelepulu Drive
Kailua, Hawaii 96859 | 1 |
| 30. | Dr. William Douglas
American Institute for Free Labor Development
1925 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington D.C. 20006 | 1 |
| 31. | GEN Wayne A. Downing, USA
Commander in Chief
US Special Operations Command
MacDill AFB, Florida 33608-6001 | 1 |
| 32. | Ms. Jennifer Duncan
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/JD
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943 | 10 |
| 33. | Mr. Jonathan Dworken
Center for Naval Analyses
III Marine Expeditionary Force
Unit 35601, Okinawa, Japan
FPO AP 96606-5601 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 34. | Dr. Dana Eyre
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Ey
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943 | 1 |
| 35. | Major General William N. Farmen, USA
500 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310 | |
| 36. | Dr. Joseph Fischer
HQ USASOC
History and Archives (AOHS)
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5200 | 1 |
| 37. | Colonel Hayward S. Florer, USA
Directorate of Training and Doctrine
JFK SpecWarCenter & School AOJF-DT
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307 | 1 |
| 38. | Lieutenant Colonel Dennis B. Fowler, USAF
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Office of the Foreign Policy Advisor
HQ USCINCPAC/FPA Box 64028
Camp Smith, Hawaii 96861-4028 | 1 |
| 39. | Major Robin Friedman
HQ Corps G5
219 Tacoma Avenue N, #402
Tacoma, WA 98403 | 1 |
| 40. | Lieutenant General Jay Garner, USA
U.S. Space and Strategic Defense Command
P.O. Box 15280
Arlington, Virginia 22215-0280 | 1 |
| 41. | William Garvelink
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
320 21st Street, NW, Room 1262A
Washington D.C. 20523 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 42. | <p>Toby Gati
 Assistant Secretary of State Intelligence and Research,
 State Department
 2201 C Street, NW, Room 6531
 Washington D.C. 20520</p> | 1 |
| 43. | <p>Mr. Thomas Gettman
 World Vision Relief and Development
 220 I Street NE, Suite 270
 Washington D.C. 20002</p> | 1 |
| 44. | <p>Dr. Anthony W. Gray, Jr.
 National Defense University
 Industrial College of the Armed Forces
 Ft. Lesley J. McNair
 Washington D.C. 20319</p> | 1 |
| 45. | <p>Mr. Mark Gorman
 137 Riggs Drive
 Sitka, Alaska 99835</p> | 1 |
| 46. | <p>Colonel John E. Greenwood, USMC (ret)
 Marine Corps Gazette
 PO Box 1775
 Quantico, Virginia 22134</p> | 1 |
| 47. | <p>Colonel Wallace Gregson, USMC
 Expeditionary Warfare Division
 Room 4A 720
 2000 Navy Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20350</p> | 1 |
| 48. | <p>Colonel D.A. Gressley, USMC
 1840 Goldenrod Lane
 Vista, California 92083</p> | 1 |
| 49. | <p>Dr. Robert Gurevich
 Center for PVO/University Collaboration in Development
 Bird Building
 Western Carolina University
 Cullowhee, North Carolina 28723</p> | 1 |

50. Mr. Steven Hansch 1
Refugee Policy Group
1424 16th Street NW, Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20036
51. Harvard University 1
JFK School of Government
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
52. The Honorable Tony Hall 1
1432 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-3503
53. Mr. Kevin Henry 1
CARE, USA
151 Ellis Street NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-2439
54. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hess, USAR 1
Citicorp Securities, Inc.
399 Park Avenue
12th Floor, Zone 7
New York, New York 10043
55. Mr. Rick Hill 1
Intertech Relief and Reconstruction Corporation
3511 North Hall Street, Suite 302
Dallas, Texas 75219
56. The Honorable H. Allen Holmes 1
Assistant Secretary of Defense SO/LIC
The Pentagon RM 2E258
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500
57. Major General Marvin T. Hopgood, USMC 1
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001
58. Hurlburt Base Library 1
16SCS/SVRL
ATTN: Susan Whitson
410 Cody Avenue
Hurlburt FLD, Florida 32544-5417

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 59. | Ms. Patricia Irvin
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs
The Pentagon, Room 2D540
Washington D.C. 20301-1000 | 1 |
| 60. | Captain Gregory Janson, USMC
The Basic School
Quantico, Virginia 22134 | 1 |
| 61. | Dr. Ravi I. Jayakaran
World Vision of India
Flat No. 4, Second Floor
31, Gurunanak Nagar, Pune 411 042 India | 1 |
| 62. | The JCS Staff
J-3 Special Operations Branch
Washington, D.C. 20318-3000 | 1 |
| 63. | Major General James Jones, USMC
Expeditionary Warfare Division
Room 4A 720
2000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20350 | 1 |
| 64. | Mr. Mark R. Janz
World Vision International
121 East Huntington Dr.
Monrovia, California 91016-3400 | 1 |
| 65. | Mr. Kevin Kennedy
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations
Room S-2920B
New York, New York 10017 | 1 |
| 66. | Sunda Khin
Refugees International
21 Dupont Circle, NW
Washington D.C. 20036 | 1 |
| 67. | Dr. Mary C. Kilgour
6734 Melrose Dr.
McLean, Virginia 22101 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 68. | General Charles Krulak, USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
2 Navy Annex
Washington D.C. 20380-1775 | 1 |
| 69. | Mr. James Kunder
Save the Children
54 Wilton Road
P.O. Box 950
Westport, Connecticut 06881 | 1 |
| 70. | Dr. Roman Laba
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/La
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943 | 1 |
| 71. | Dr. Christopher Lamb
OASD (SO/LIC)
The Pentagon, Room 2B525
Washington D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 72. | Ms. Lauren Landis-Guzman
Save the Children
1200 G Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington D.C. 20005 | 1 |
| 73. | Dr. Sandra Laumark
CARE
151 Ellis Street, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-2439 | 1 |
| 74. | Dr. Cynthia Levy
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Le
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943 | 1 |
| 75. | Library
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6428 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 76. | Library
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840 | 1 |
| 77. | Mr. Bill Lind
Free Congress Foundation
717 2nd Street, NE
Washington D.C. 20002 | 1 |
| 78. | Ms. Elizabeth Lukasavich
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
2201 C Street, NW
Washington D.C. 20520 | 5 |
| 79. | Colonel Robert I. MacPherson, USMC (ret)
242 Aikahi Loop
Kailua, Hawaii 96734 | 1 |
| 80. | Ambassador Edward Marks
2737 Devonshire Place NW #103
Washington D.C. 20008 | 1 |
| 81. | Mr. Dayton Maxwell
World Vision Relief and Development
220 I Street NE, Suite 270
Washington D.C. 20002 | 1 |
| 82. | Mr. Timothy M. McCully
American Red Cross, National Headquarters
2025 E SF, NW
Washington D.C. 20006 | 1 |
| 83. | Mr. Peter McDermott
UNICEF
UNICEF House, 3 UN Plaza
New York, New York 10017 | 1 |
| 84. | Marquat Memorial Library
US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School
RM C287, Bldg. D3915
ATTN: Mr. Fred Fuller
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 85. | Dr. Ken Menkhaus
Department of Political Science
Davidson College
Davidson, North Carolina 28036 | 1 |
| 86. | Shawn Messick
Armenian Relief Society
100 Shumate Lane
Fredricksburg, Virginia 22406 | 1 |
| 87. | Colonel Douglas Meyer, USAR
USAJFKSWCS
AOJK-AR
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000 | 1 |
| 88. | Ambassador William B. Milam
Special Negotiator
Bureau of Oceans, Environmental & Scientific Affairs
Department of State, Room 7831
Washington D.C. 20520 | 1 |
| 89. | Tess Miller, J.D.
4180 Sunridge Road
Pebble Beach, California 93953 | 1 |
| 90. | Dr. Larry Minear
Brown University
Watson Institute for International Relations
1424 16th Street, NW, Box 1970
Providence, Rhode Island 02821 | 1 |
| 91. | Ambassador Rodney Minott
Department of National Security Affairs
Code 56 NS/Mi
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943 | 1 |
| 92. | Mr. David C. Mitchell
Office, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict
Policy and Missions
Room 2B535, The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301-2500 | 1 |

93. Dr. Maria Moyano 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Mm
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943

94. Major General James Myatt 1
268 Bush Street #4108
San Francisco, California 94104

95. Naval Doctrine Command 1
ATTN: Vicki Shankland N331E
1540 Gilbert Street
Norfolk, Virginia 23511-2785

96. Dr. Norman Naimark 1
Stanford University History Department
Stanford, California 94305

97. Mr. Andrew Natsios 1
World Vision Relief and Development
220 I Street, NE, Suite 220
Washington D.C. 20002

98. Ms. Robin Needham 1
CARE, Ethiopia
151 Ellis Street NE
Atlanta, GA 30303-2439

99. Colonel Gregory Newbold, USMC 1
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
The Pentagon, Room 4E868
Washington D.C. 20350-1000

100. Lieutenant Colonel William Norton, USMC 1
1986 Vineyard Avenue
Vista, California 92083

101. Ms. Phyllis Oakley 1
Assistant Secretary of State, Population,
Migration and Refugee Affairs
2201 C Street, NW
Washington D.C. 20520

- | | | |
|------|--|---|
| 102. | Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (ret)
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Fort Leslie J. McNair
Washington D.C. 20319 | 1 |
| 103. | Mr. Bill O'Keefe
Catholic Relief Services
344 Rosebank Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland 21212 | 1 |
| 104. | Dr. Bert Patenaude
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Pa
Monterey, California 93943 | 1 |
| 105. | Peacekeeping Institute, Army War College
United States Army War College Box 57
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-5050 | 5 |
| 106. | Mr. Charles Petrie
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations
Room S-2920B
New York, New York 10017 | 1 |
| 107. | Mr. Richard F. Ragan
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs
The Pentagon, Room 4b, 868
Washington D.C. 20350 | 1 |
| 108. | Mr. Lewis Rasmussen
United States Institute of Peace
1550 M Street NW, Suite 700
Washington D.C. 20005-1708 | 5 |
| 96. | Ms. Anne Richards
United States Department of State
S/RPP Rm 7330
2201 C Street, NW
Washington D.C. 20520 | 1 |

109. Les Roberts, M.D. 1
Center for Disease Control
National Center for Environmental Health
4770 Buford Hwy. NE, MS: F46
Atlanta, Georgia 30341-3724
110. General Peter Rowe, USMC (ret) 1
15 White Sail Lane
Laguna Niguel, California 92677
111. Lieutenant Colonel Howard P. Schick, USMC 1
Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Division
Fenwick Road Building 96
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000
112. Captain Chris Seiple, USMC 5
Plans Division, PP&O Department
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
2 Navy Annex
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775
113. Robert Seiple 3
World Vision
34834 Weyerhaeuser Way
Federal Way, Washington 98001
114. Ms. Sarah Sewall 1
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Peace Keeping/Peace Enforcement Policy
The Pentagon, Room 1C661
Washington D.C. 20301-1000
115. Lieutenant Commander Trueman W. Sharp, USN 1
Code HS, 2 Navy Annex
Washington D.C. 20380-1775
116. Mr. Paul Shultz 1
Office of International Security and Peace Keeping Operations,
State Department
2201 C Street, NW
Washington D.C. 20520

117. Judge Abraham D. Sofaer 1
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
118. Ambassador Richard F. Staar 1
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, California 94305-6010
119. Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole III, USMC, (ret) 1
W1101
Ark Towers 3-40
Rotpongi, Chome
Menato-Ku, Tokyo, Japan 106
120. Dr. Paul Stockton 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/St
Monterey, California 93943
121. Strategic Studies Group (SSG) 1
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
122. Ms. Julia Taft 5
Interaction
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 801
Washington D.C. 20036
123. Ms. Joelle Tanguy 1
Medicins Sans Frontieres
11 East 26th Street
New York, New York 10010
124. James W. Terbush, M.D. 1
Regional Medical Officer
Amembassy FPO/AP 96534-0001
125. Dr. Frank Teti 1
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Te
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943

- | | | |
|------|--|---|
| 126. | Michael J. Toole, M.D.
Macfarlane Burnet Centre for Medical Research
Yarra Bend Road
PO Box 254, Fairfield, Victoria
Australia 3078 | 1 |
| 127. | US Army Command & General Staff College
Concepts and Doctrine Directorate
ATTN: Mr. John B. Hunt
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5000 | 2 |
| 128. | U.S. Army Center for Military History
ATTN: Dr. David Hogan
1099 14th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20005-3402 | 1 |
| 129. | USASOC
Directorate of History and Museums
ATTN: AOHS - Dr. Stewart
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5200 | 2 |
| 130. | US Military Academy
ATTN: Department of Military History
West Point, New York 10996 | 1 |
| 131. | US Special Operations Command
Joint Special Operations Forces Institute
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000 | 1 |
| 132. | Lieutenant General P. K. VanRiper, USMC
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
3250 Catlin Avenue, Suite 203
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001 | 1 |
| 133. | Mr. Richard Vennigone
World Vision International
121 East Huntington Drive
Monrovia, California 91916-3400 | 1 |
| 134. | Mr. Rudy von Bernuth
54 Wilton Road
P.O. Box 950
Westport, Connecticut 06881 | 1 |

135. Mr. Gerald Whitehouse 1
Adventist Development and Relief Agency
12501 Old Columbia Pike
Silver Springs, Maryland 20904
136. Mr. Roy Williams 1
International Rescue Committee
122 East 42nd Street
New York, New York 10168-1289
137. Brigadier General Randall West 1
Legislative Assistant to the Commandant
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
2 Navy Annex
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775
138. World Concern 1
ATTN: Christy Gardner
19303 Fremont Avenue North
Seattle, Washington 98133
139. Dr. David Yost 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Code NS/Yo
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
140. Dr. I. William Zartman 1
Johns Hopkins University
The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
1740 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
141. Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni 1
Commanding General
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Box 555606
Camp Pendleton, California 92055